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A3,STRAC'l'
This thesis, assuming the existence of re5tru~·turing and re-
analysis processes in grammar, seeks to provide a precise and
minimally simple definition of such processes (chapter 2),
which successfully applies to restructuring and reanalysis
phenomena ooth neld to be su~h independently of this thesis
(causative constructions, chapter 4), and introduced as such
in this thesis (middle constructions, chapter 3).
Chapter 2 comprises the theoretical core of the thesis. Section
2.1 seeks to formalize the intuitive idea that restructuring
is defined by the presence of more than one structure for one
~ the same sentence in one and the same level of grammar.
Section 2.2 seeks to formalize the intuitive idea that reanalysis
is defined by the merger of the subcategorization properties of
an element with the subcategorization properties of another
element.
Chapters 3 and 4, on the other hand, comprise the core of the
thesis' empirical discussion. Chapter 3, in particular, uses
middle constructions, concretely Italian si constructions,
to illustrate the theory of restructuring arrIvad at in section
2.1; while chapter 4 uses causative constructions, concretely
in French, to illustrate the theory of reanalysis arrived at
in section 2.2.
Various theoretical and empirical issues essentially
independent of restructuring and reanalysis are taken up in the
course of the thesis as the oppo~t~nity presents itself. Perhaps
the most sizable example of this is to be found in chapter 3;
where, in taking into consideration Italian 6i for the purposes
of restructuring, we independently present what to our knowledge
is the first unified theory of its impersonal and r~flexive
constructions, as well as of its middle ones.
Theais Superv~sor: Noa~ Chomsky
Title: lnet.l tute Profecsor
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1. Introduction
The purpose of this introduction is twofold: first,
to actually introduce the discussion to follow; second, to
partially complement it, in particular with references to the
related literature.
The body oftlris thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 presents our theory of restructuring and reanalysis;
Chapter 3 and 4 illustrate our theory of restructuring
and reanalysis with middle constructions and causative con-
structions respectively.
Chapter 2 is articulated into two sections. First,
se~tion 2.1 presents our:theory of restructuring; there, as
we point out, our points of departure are Chomsky
(1981; 1982) and Zubizarreta (1982), specifically Chomsky's
(1981; 1982) ideas about phrase markers not representable
by a tree structure and ~ubizarreta's (1982) ideas about "paral-
lel" or "simultaneous" structures. Second, section 2.2
presents our theory of reanalysis; as we also point out, there
our point of departure is Rouveret and Vergnaud
(1980), specifically their 1c1EBs about "cosuperscripting"
between verbs.
Chapter 3, in turn, divides into three sections. Section
3.1 discusses different constructions of Italian
involving a lexical element a1: impersonal si
constructions, middle!! constructions, reflexive s1 construc-
tions , and middle-reflexive!! construcions; for each
-1-
construction section 3.1 derives the appropriate structure
and the corresponding properties of sl. If section 3.1 is
correct, middle and middle-reflexive 51 constructions instan-
tiate restructuring; independently of restructuring, on
the other hand, if section 3.1 is correct, the four different
types of si can be unified into one. Actually,
only three types of si are recognized
in the literature: impersonal, middle and reflexive!middle-
reflexive; the introduction of the middle-reflexive type
is another innovation of section 3.1. Section 3.2,then,
follows up on the discussion of a1 constructions in section
3.1; and adds a discussion of French se constructions and
Icelandic -at constructions. If section 3.2 is correct,
French se and Icelandic -at are very much the same element
as Italian sl; this in turn strongly suggests that the
characterization of Italian 8i and s1 constructions can
actually translate into a characterization of impersonal!
reflexive/middle elements and constructions universally. Finally,
section 3.3 goes back to one theoretical issue left open
from section 2.1, the PF and LF of restructuring constructions.
Again, the discussion in section 3.3 is anchored
to Italian 8i data, but the conclusions are taken to extend
not only to se data in French, etc •.• , but also to restruc-
turing data in general.
Finally, chapter 4 divides into two sections. Section
4.1 discusses causative constructions in Frenc~ ~ese 1n-
clude , on the one hand, causative constructions characte-
rized by standard word order and Case marking, similar in
all respects to English causative constructions,to which
they are compared; on the other hand, causative constructions
proper, characterized by idiosyncratic word order al.d Case
marking. As pointed out there, section 4.1 follows essentially
Rouveret and Vergnaud (1980) in assuming that causative
constructions proper instantiate reanalysis. Section 4.2
then follows up on section 4.1 by considering the absence
of causative constructions proper
in English, by comparing causative con-
structions proper in French to causative constructions proper
in Italian,and by discussing in the process the interaction
of causative constructions proper with a number of other con-
structions. If section 4.1 is correct, what holds of causative
constructions proper in French holds of causative construc-
tions proper in Italian, though with an added parameter; once
more, the strong suggestion is that the account of French
(and Italian) causative constructions proper can actually
translate into an account of causative constructions proper
universally.
In more detail, section 2.1, following closely as
noticed there Lasnik and Kupin (1977) ,starts by defining
a phrase marker as a colle±ion of monostrings; a normal
phrase marker is then defined as a tree structure, a
restructuring phrase marker as a phrase marker which is not
a tree structure. Crucially,a double condition on restruc-
turing phrase markers is imposed first, we require that
each restructuring phrase marker be equivalent under union
to a set of tree structures, what we call its normal form;
second, we require that each two trees in a normal form
be related either by movement or by deletion or else be
identical up at least 1 0 indexing. Not less crucially,
having defined a normal lexical item as an item which maps
to a normal phrase marker, and a restructuring lexical item
as an item which only maps to a restructuring phrase marker,
an attempt is ronde to prove that a restructuring phrase
marker must always contain at least one restructuring lexical
item. In the case it cannot l:c derived, h.o\tJeVer, this condi_tion
can. simply be stipulated as such in our grammar.
On the other hand, section 2.2 starts by subsuming
the relations Case assignment and cosuperscripting,
familiar from Chomsky (1981; 1982),
under a general relation Case; where Case assignment is
Case between a Case assigner and a nvrninal and cosuperscrip-
ting is Case between two nominals. The relation reanalysis
is then introduced, and subsumed again under the general
relation Cas~ as Case holding of a reanalyser and a Case
assigner or eventually another reanalyzer. Next, the condi-
tions on Case assignement also familiar from Chomsky (1981;
1982), the Case filter, the government condition, the
adjacency condition, are also reintroduced, with
one major addition: the government and adjacency conditions
now apply to reanalysis as well. Furthermore, in a move
also dictated by reanalysis, the adjacency condition is now
taken to be a condition on PF, as opposed to s-structure. Fi.nally,
a new condition is introduced, once again grouping together
Case assignment and reanalysis; according to it, a
Case up for assignment or for reanalysis must
be assigned and reanalyzed respectivelyw
Next, chapter 3 does not particularly need to be
introduced in any more detail than it already was. We want
to take the OPliurtuni ty to mention here, however, that 8i
constructions in Italian, !! constructions in French, -at
constructions in Icelandic, etc ... have given rise recently
to a number of different treatments. A detailed comparison
of those treatments with a first version of the theroy of
chapter 3 can be found in Manzini (1982a). We want to
mention here, however, that Burzio (1981) was our source for
much of the data, and not a few times for their interpretation,
including a number of impo~t~t generalizations,such as
that both impersonal and middle s1 always are associated with
nominative Case. Similarly, Belletti (1981) was the source
of crucial data and of iItp:Jrtant generalizations, such as that
not only impersonal but also middle a1 always is associated
with a theta-role; finally, Rizzi (1983) was the source
of our treatment of the impossibility for reflexive
si to refer back to a derived subject. Marantz (1981),
on the other hand, was our main inspiration in trying to
reduce the different types of ~i to one' only type.
Finally, chapter 4, much as chapter 3, does not
particularly need to be introduced in any more detail than
it already was. As we pointed out already, a large amount
of our debt in chapter 4 is to Rouveret and Vergnaud (1980);
we want to point out here, however, that, at least, we also
owe to Burzio (1981)the idea of causative verbs subcatego-
ri~ing for subjectless predicates. We leave it to the reader
to exercise himself in further comparisons.
In general, in writing this thesis we did not feel
we had to explain the notions we were introducing if they
were easily found in Chomsky (1981; 1382) or the references
cited there. Similarly, we did not reference the notions
we were introducing if they ~eeasily available, with the
related bibliography, in Chomsky (1981; 1982). We do want how-
ver to refer here ingeneral to the works cited in our ~ib­
liography for much general background to this thesis.
2. Restructuri.ng and Reanalysis
2.1
- ,.~ ..
Restructurina
e(
Our starting point in this section is the notion of
restructuring defined by the discussion of and ~renosition
stranding in Chomsky (1981), by Chomsky (1982), by Zubizarreta
(1982) and by the discussion there of Romance "restrllcturing"
and causatives Our
end will be defining our own notion of restructurino. In
particular we will introduc~ a notion of ohrase marker,
(1), and a new notion of restructurinq ohrase J!1a~':1:er, (3), as
opposed to a notion of normal phrase marker, (~); we will further
introd~ce a notion ofnorrnal form of a ?hrase marker, (4); and
we will finally introduce a notion of restructuring lexical
item, (17), as opposed to a notion of normal lexical item,(16).
In addition we will introduce conditions on the association of
phrase marker ~~~ normal forms, (5), and on normal forms them-
selves, (7). We will further indicate a number of theorems and
corollaries of the theory we oropose, re~arrlina in particular
the relation of normal phrase markers and normal forms, (6) and
(8) and (20), of restructuring ~hrase markers and normal forms,
(9) and (21), of normal forms and restructurin~ lexical item8,
(18), and of normal forms and normal lexical items, (19). In
the process, we will present examples of the objects we define,
of the effects on them of the conditions we propose and of the
consequences in general of our theory, in particular examples
of normal forms, of the effects of condition (7) on normal forms,
and of the relation of normal forms and restructurin~ and normal
lexical items, (10)-(15). Finally we will identify restructurinq
itself with any mapping within a normal form from a normal
-14-
phrase marker to another, (22). In concluding, we will leave
the relation of restructuring phrase markers to PF and LF to
be discussed in a later section II
~ begin with, we assume, taking Lasnik & Kupin
(1977) as our starting point,
marker is a set of monostrings, as in (1):
(1) J is a phrase marker iff
1 is a set of monostrinqs
We assume on the other hand
that a pllrase
=
that when a set of monostrinqs includes in
particular a one symbol nonterminal string, a terminal string,
and in general monostrings which are each in a orecede or
dominate relation with any other, in other words when a phrase
marker is representable as a tree structure, a normal ph~~~e
marker is defined, as in (2). We assume further that when a
phrase marker by the definition (1) is not a phrase marker by
the definition (2), in other words is not representable as a
tree structure, a restructuring phrase marker is defined, as
in (3);
.... 1";-
(2) 'J is a normal phraee marker iff
'] is a set of monostrings
if 111 t ~ ~ Jl ; i dominates 't' or
t dominFJtes f or
f precedes '1' or
t precedes
"'"'"'(3 ) J is a restructuring phrase marker iff
....,
is a phrase mark.erJ
') is not a normal phrase marker
In summary, a phrase marker is a set of rnonostrings,
including in particular a one symbol nonterminal string and a
terminal string, as in (1). A phrase marker in which either
a dominate or a precede relation holds between each two rnon~-
strings, i.e. a phrase marker representation on a tree s~ructure,
is a normal phrase marker, as in (2). A phrase marker which is
not a normal phrase marker, i.e. is not representable as a
tree structure is a restructuring phcase marker, as in (:).
Next, we define a normal form of a phrase marker to
be a set of (distinct) normal phrase markers, i.e. by the already
familiar definition of normal phrase marker phrase marker~
representable as tree structures, such that the union of the
normal phrase markers yields the phrase marker itself, as in
(4). We then assume the existence of a condition imposing
that a phrase marker have a normal form, i.e., by the definition
of normal form and of normal phrase marker, a set of tree
structure. such that the phrase marker can be obtained from the
union of these tree structures, as in (5):
(4) If 3 is a phrase marker
0'
j is a normal form of ~ iff
there are ~l' • · .,In such that
3' =-~?l' · 'Sn j
t:') t:\
.) l' · · .,:J n are l1.ormal phrase IT arkers
iff:9i'?j~~~; 1i F1j
(?lU · .. U~ n = 'S
..-;
(5) If J is a phrase marker there must be
a l' such that '3' is a normal form of ?
An obvious corollary of the definitions of normal
form and normal phrase marker is that given any normal 9hrase
marker, the set containing just the normal phrase marke~ itself
is a normal form of it, as in (6):
(6) If? is a normal phrase marker,
if ~I = ~ '3 J, 'J' is a normal form of "]
Thus any normal phrase marker has at least one normal form,
and condition (5) is always satisfied by normal phrase markers.
On the contrary, by the definitions of rebtructuring phrase
marker and normal form, a restructuring phrase marker can have
or not have a normal form; if it does not, condition (5)
obviously rules it out.
In summary, a phrase marker must have a normal form,
as in (5). Anormal form of a phrase marker is a set of distinct
normal phrase markers, i.e. tree structures, such that the union
of the normal phrase markers yields the phrase marker itself,
as in (4). In other words, a phrase marker must be equivalent
under the operation of union to a set of tree structures or
else i$ ruled out by the grammar; a set of tree structures
equivalent under union to a phrase marker is called a normal
form of the phrase marker. Trivially, a set consisting of
a normal phrase marker is a normal form of the nonnal phr~5e'marker
itself; hence a normal phrase marker always has at least one
normal form and automatically satisfies condition (5). A
restructuring phrase marker on the other hand can have or not
have a normal form, hence can satisfy or not satisfy condition
( 5) •
Next, we assume the existence of a condition i~posing
that in a normal form of a phrase marker each two normal phrase
markers be either derivable one from another or phrase-structure
identical, as in (7). We assume the obvious definition of
phrase-structure identity as identity up to phrase structure
rules;
assume the definition of derivation
move and delete mappings:
we obviously
as a sequence of
(7) f'? ..., \If J is a phrase marker, ~ a normal form
of '1 and ~~i,7'j i~ 3' , i.t must be the case
that there is a derivatior. from 7i to 1 j or
~ ,~ ? 0
from J j to J i or J i and l j are phrase structure
identioal
Obviously, a normal form consisting of just one
normal phrase marker always vacuously satisfies condition (7);
.. ,~-
on the other hand a normal torm consisting of more than one,
normal phrase marker can satisfy or not satisfy condition (7)
and if not is obviously ruled out~ It follows that any normal
phrase marker, having in any case a normal form consisting ;ust
of the normal phrase marker itself, as in (6), always has at
least one normal form which satisfies (7). On the contrary,
as a c0r01lary of the definition of normal form, of normal phrase
marker and of restructuring phrase marker,
it follows that a normal form containing only one normal
phrase marker always is the normal form of the phrase marker
itself, as in (8), and that on the contrary a normal form of
a restructuring phrase marker always contains more than one
normal phrase marker, as in (9):
(8 ) If 1 is a phrase marker, ,...,-~ a normal form of
and J' = !Sl~' :; is a normal phi"aSe marker and
'J -'")
=) 1
(9) If 3 is a restructuring phrase marker and
.., 'J • \ --:J f) ~
a normal form of .j , = 1.) l' · · · ',)n I'
Hence, a restructuring phrase marker, supposing it has a normal
form at all, can have a normal form which satisfies condition
(7) or not, since by (9) it has only normal forms consisting
of more than one normal phrase marker; in case it does not, it
is obviously ruled out.
In summary, in a normal form of a phrase marker, there
must be a derivation from one to another of each two normal
phrase markers or the two normal phrase markers must be phrase-
structure identical,as in (7). Paraphrasing, each two tree
structures in a normal form of a phrase marker must be obtainable
one from the other by movement or deletion or be identical
with respect to phrase structure. A consequence of the theory
is that a normal form including just one normal phrase marker
always vacuously satisfies condition (7); indeed normal phrase markers
always have e normal form consisting just of themselves, as in
(6), hence always have normal forms which satisfy (7). On the
other hand a normal form consisting of more than one normal
phrase marker can satisfy or not satisfy condition (7); indeed
restructuring phrase markers have, if any, normal forms consisting
of more than one normal phrase marker, as in (8)-(9), hence can
have or not have a normal form which satisfies (7).
In addition, phrase markers which satisfy condition
(5) and normal forms of phrase markers which satisfy condition (7)
must be well formed with respect to the other conditions of grarcmar:
conditions on movement and deletion, such as the
recoverability condition on deletion, etc.; conditions
on the mapping from the lexicon to s-structure, such as the
Proj ectior& Principle, ef:c.; and condi tion on a-a tructure,
such as the e-criterion, the Case filter,
the binding conditions, etc. In particular, in normal
forms satisfying (7) the uerivatiun from one normal phrase
marker to another must satisfy the condi tiona on movement and deletion,
furthermore, for each normal pllrase mark.er in a normal form
the derivation from O-structure must satisfy the conditions on
movement and deletion,
.. 1. 0.-
the mapping from the lexicon
must satisfy the Projection principle, and the
phrase marker itself m\lst satisfy the 8-critetoion, the
Case filter" etc. If these conditions are not sa~~sfied,
the normal forms are obviously ruled out. Phrase markers which
satisfy condition (5) in turn must have normal forms which
satisfy these same conditions; if not they are ultimately ruled,
out.
In summary, once condition (5) and condition (7) are
satisfied by a phrase mal:'ker and a normal form respectively,
the other conditions of gramnar must be satisfied by ..the derivation
from one to another normal phrase marker in a normal form, by
the derivation of each normal phrase marker from D-structures,
by the mapping of each normal phrase marker from the lexicon,
and by each normal phrase marker itself. In short, once the
new conditions (5) and (7) are satisfied, we are back to the
conditions of qrammar as usual.
Consider for example the pair of normal phra~e
markers of Latin in (10), where the normal phrase marker on the left
is a "configurational" phrase marker, and the nonnal phrase marker on the
riqht a "nonconfigurational" phrase marker; this pail" of normal phrase
markers is ill formed under condition (7):
I
L
s
/'0"
Marcus vp
,/''''Tulliam amat
loves
s
~/ '~
Marcus Tulliam amat
loves
In (lJ), the
normal phrase marker on the left and the normal pllrase marker
on the right can be described as related by the deletion of a
node VP; but the deletion of a node VP to the exc.L~tsion of the
material dominated by VP does not qualify as a deletion in the sense of
the theory of gram:nar; consequently the relation defined by the
deletion of the node VP does not qualify as a derivation.
Hence, since in (10) none of the two normal phrase markers
can be obtained from the other by deletion in the sense of
the theory of grammar, nor of course by movement, and in general
none of the two normal phrase markers can be derived from the
other, under (7) (10) is ill formed; and so
are all normal forms of the same description,
containing pairs of one "configurational" and one "non
configurational" normal phrase marker.
A~ another example, consider the pairs of normal
phrase markers in (11)-(12). In (11)-(12)
each normal phrase marker is perfectly well formed. But the
pairs of normal phrase markers are all ill formed under (7):
(11) ~J John /'-L loves Mary'
~
Russia is dangerous
,
J
_ ~ l ..
(12) a.' ./"-..
lRussia is dangerous
/~ (
America is dangerous J
(12) b. /~
~ John /""',
L loves Mary
/,
Mary / ""-
loves John
)
J
In (12b) the two normal phrase markers can be described as
related by the permutation of two constituents; in (12a) the
two normal phra~e markers can be described as related by the
substitution of c constituent, in (11) the two normal phrase
markers can be desoribed as totally unrelated. In all of (11)-
(12) neither one of the two normal phrase markers can be obtained
from the other by movement or deletion, i.e. neither one of
the two normal phrase Inarkers can be derived from the other.
Hence all of (11)-(12) are excluded by condition (7), and with
them, of course,
all normal ~orms containing pairs of normal phrase markers of
the same description.
On the other hand,
there actually are examples of pairs of normal pllrase
markers well formed under condition (7) as well as under the
other conditions of grammar.
To begin with, normal forms of the type, roughly, of
(1.3) falling under the general type of "restructuring" can
be argued to be wellformed in Italian:
(13 )
~,
(
- 1 '> -
c:
,• .J
/~
Mario VP
,/ ,.
vuole S
wants /'"
PRO· vr
."
../" "
s
/~~~
Mario VP
.//"'- "
vuole Vp
want!
manqic.:re 1e mele
to eat the
apple.$
mangiare Ie mele
to eat che apples
Obviously (13) satisfies condition (7); in (13) indeed the
normal phrase marker on the right can be derived from the
normal phrase marker on the left by deletion of the embedded
constituents PRO and INFL, the embedded
S being deleted as a consequence of the deletion of its head
INFL. Further in (13) the derivation by deletion from the normal
pl\r~.se marker on the left to the normal phrase marker on the right
satisfies the recoverability conditions on deletions; ~ndeed
the elements deleted
in the derivation, the PRO and the infinitival
INFL with its projection S,are not lexical. Finally, the two
normal phrase markers in (13) are themselves well formed, if
we assume both is a main verb subcategorizing for an object,
and in particular an object con trol sentenc'e ,I and optionally
an auxiliary verb IOOdifying another verb; if so, first, the ~ nonnal phrase markers
in (13) satisfy the Projection Principle on the mapping
from the lexicon to phrase markers, for, in (13) valera
subcategorizes for an object control sentence in the normal phrase
marker on the left and modif iea another verb in the normal r'll \~a ~ e;
inarker on tile right. All oth.sr conditions then are satisfied in
the obvious way. We can notice parenthetically what
happens if in (13) the infinitival control sentences in the
normal phrase marker on the left is substi tuted by a subjunctive sentence
with a pro subject. The resulting pair of normal phrase
markers again satisf ies condi tion (7); for, the nOI11\al phrase marker
on the right can be derived fran the nOI11\al phrase marker on the left
by deletion of the embedded pro and INFL with its projection
s. However, ill this case, the deletion under which (7) is
satisfied violates the recoverability condition on deletions
since at least the subjunctive INFL and possiblY the
1
pre in that it is Case marked, are lexical elements; hence the
normal form is ultimately excluded.
Next, normal forms of the type roughly of (14) are
also well formed in Italian, if our section 3.1 is correct:
(14 ) s~"(pro] VP I bambini i
1 · / -- . . the children
siJ+lava Jbambini
one washes the children
VP )
/~ ~
s.i+lavan.o t i j
wash (midd Ie)
(14) again satisfies condition (7); in (14) the normal phrase
marker on the right can again be derived flom the normal
phrase marker on the left, this time by movement
In addition the derivation in
(14) from one normal phrase marker to the other satisfies the
conditions on movement, whatever they are, as every sentence
internal movement does. Finally, the two normal phrase markers
in (14) are themselves well formed, if we assume, as in section
3.1, that Italian si, besides being a clitip, both has the naruna]
properties of being interpreted as a free variable ("one") and
of being bound to its subj ect, and optionally the morphology-like propel CI'
of 1Jeing a passivizer .. If so, first, the two normal phrase markers
in (14) satisfy the Projection Principle; indeed in the
normal phrase marker on the left si is bound to its subject
and is interpreted as a free variable and in ~~e normal phrase
marker on the right 51 is a Passivi2er eliminatinq an accusative case and a
- '. .
subject 8-role and therefore inducing NP-m:>vement. All other conditions are th~n
satisfied in the obvious way-
Finally, if our section 3.1 is correct, normal forms
of the type of (15) are well formed in Italian:
)
~
VP
./~
si+lavano t i
wash (mdddle-refl.
S
~"-::''''I:":~/' ..., ... ." .......,.
I bambini i
'the children'
(15) 5"
/' ~"~"
.....-
~ I bambini i VP
'J the children / '" .l sij+lavaMo pro)
themselves wash
(15) once more satisfies condition (7); indeed it is easy to
see that the two normal phrase markers are phrase structure
identical, their terminal elements being identical and their
nonterminal elements being identical in categorial content, thougt
jlfJt in indexing, etc. Suppose we assl.JI1E as before that 5i has both the
optional property of being a passivizer and the properties
of being bound to its subject and interpreted as a free variable;
bu,t we assume now, again as in section 3.1, that if
si is bound to its subject by cosubscripting it is interpreted
- 1..6 .-
as a bound variabl~ (a reflexive). If so, the two normal 9hrase
markers in (15) again
for,
satisfy the Projection Principle
in the normal ph~rase marker on the left si is bound to its
subject by cosubscripting and interpreted as a reflexive;
and in the normal phrase marker on the right 8i is a passivieer
eliminating an accusc\tive case and a subject theta-role. Again, all 0-
ther conditions are satisfied in the obvious way.
Are there examples of pairs of normal phrase markers
well formed under (7) but ill formed under the other con-
di tions of grammar'?
In answer to this question we notice first that the
three normal forms in (13), (14) and (15) have one thing in
common: a lexical item, valere in \13) and si in (14) and (15),
whose properties, optioIlal properties included, cannot be. mao9t=d to a nonnal
phrase marker but rather must be mapped ta a restructuring
phrase marker. Consider first valere. If
valera as a lexical property both SUbcategorizes for an object ~
is an'auxiliary to I another verb there is no normal phrase
marker such that the lexical properties of v~lere are mapped
to it; rather, the lexical properties of valere can only be
mapped, under the Projection Principle, to a restructurin~
phrase marker. indeed, there is no tree structure such
that both the syntactic frame S and the syntactic frame
VP can be simultaneously represented in it; rather, the two
subcategorization frames __ Sand VP can only be simultaneously
represented in a restructuring phrase marker. Similarly,
consider 8i. If
....--
si as a lexical property both
-L l ..
is a free variable bound to its subject and a passivizer
there is no normal phrase marker such tha t roth the naninal and
l:he. passivizer t;>roperties of si can be mapped to it; rather,the lexical
properties of !! can only be mapped to a restructuring phrase
marker. In other words, taking first the case in which si is
bound to its subject by cosuperscripting, there is no tree
structure
such that in it si can simultaneously be the free variable
subject of a sentence and a 9assivizer inducing movement
of the object of the sentence into the subject;
ind~ed there is no tree structure such that both si and a
moved object can be subjects. Similarly, taking the case in whictl
si is bound to its subject by cosubscripting. there is nc tree
structure
such that in it 81 can simultaneously be the reflexive
object of a sentence and a passivizer
inducing movement of the object into the subject; indeed
there can be no tree structure such tha t in it si is the obj ect.
and at the same tim; there is no object under movemen t • Ra ther ,
the nominal properties of !! and its passivizer properties
can only be simultaneously represented in a restructuring
phrase marker.
Imagine then normal forms exactly like (13)-(15)
except that valere in (13) is substituted by a verb, say valera',
with only one syntactic frame, either S or __ vpJ and ai
in (14)-(15) is substituted by an element, say !i', with either
the properties of a free variable bound to its subject, or the
properties of a passivizer but not both~
It ~_ easy to see that normal forms of the type
envisioned are well formed from the point of view of condition
(7) exactly as (13)-(15) are; and similarly from the point of
view of the condi tiona on nlovernent and deletions apply ing to
the derivation under which (7) is satisfied. It is equ~lly
easy to see, however, that a number of normal forms of the type
envisioned are excluded by the Projection Principle
on the mapping from the ll~::icon to phrase markers.
Consider, for instance, the case of the valere' analogue to
(13); if volere' has the syntactic frame S, the Projection
Principle is not satisfied at the normal phrase marker
in which volere' modifies another verb, if on the other hand
valere' has the syntactic frame VP, the Projection Principle
is not satisfied at the normal phrase marker in which
volere' subcategorizes for an object (control) sentence.
Similarly, it is easy to see that a numb~r of normal forms of
the type under consideration are excluded by conditions on
phrase markers such as the a-criterion, th~ Case filter,
etc. Consider, for instance, the case of the si'
analogue to (14); if 8i' simply is a passivizer, the idea is 'that
the normal phrase marker in which the object is not moved
into subject position the object itself does not receive
Case and the Case filter at least is violated, if sit is
simply a free variable bound to its subject by cosuperscrip-
ting, in the normal phrase marker in which the object is
moved intc., subject position, !.! cannot form a chain wi th its
s\.lbj eat i' ,"u the Case
filter and a-criterion
gets no a-role and Case, ·
... l.., _
are violated,since 5i
Finally, in the sit analogue of (15), if sit
simply is a passivi,zel, both normal phrase markers are
well formed, if in turn the empty category in both normal
phrase markflrs is taken to be a trace; complementaI'ily, if
si' simply is a reflexive bound to its sUbject by cosubscripting,
both normal phra~e markers are well formed, if in turn the
empty category in both normal phrase markers is taken to ba a
pro. But, if so, the two normal phrase markers turn out to
be identical against the definition of normal form itself.
We now can go back to the theory. To begin with,
we define a lexical item whose properties can map to a well
formed normal phrase marker a normal lexical item, as in (16) 1
and we define a lexical item which can only map to a well
formed restructuring phrase marker a restructuring lexical item,
as in (1 7) ;
(16) ~ is a normal lexical item iff
~ is a lexical item and there is Q ~
such that 7 is a well formed normal phrase
d 7marker an ~ maps to ~
(17) ~ is a restructuring lexical item iff
~
x is a lexical item, and if j is a well formed
.., ,....,
phrase markeL and ~ maps to~ , ~ is a
restruoturing phrase marker.
-"?c-
In what precedes, we have provided tentative proof
'that when normal lexical items are substituted for
the restructuring lexical items in (13)-(15)', the
result is either ill-formedness or the creation of one single
normal phrase marker in the place of two. Suppose our proof
ultimately extends from (13) to all normal forms with two
normal phrase markers derivable one from the other by deletion;
from (14) to all normal forms with two normal phrase markers
derivable one from the other by movement; and from (15) to
all normal forms containing two normal phrase markers
phrase-structure identical. If so, having exhausted all types
of admissible normal forms with more than one normal phrase
marker, we altogether have a proof that in our theory any
well formed normal form with more than one normal phrase marker
contains at least one restructuring lexical ite~, as in (18);
if not, (18) can simply be postulated as an independent o~incinlp:
and n > 1, there are/
~
must be ~i' 0/, !~ and 1" such that
Q( is a restructur ing
lexical item
Much more straightforwardly, of course, it follows from our
theory that a normal form with only one normal phrase marker
contains only normal lexical items, as in (19); by (8) indeed a tlorrr1al
form consisting of one normal phrase marker is the normal form of
~ normal phrase marke~ and by definition only
lexical items can map to a normal phrase marker:
normal
(19) If '], is a normal form and l' = i ~ .)
~
if ,301 ~ Co J and 01. is a lexical item
~ is a normal lexical item
Further consequences of our theory are that the
normal form of a normal phrase marker containing just the
normal phrase marker itself is its only normal form,
as in (20); and that a normal form containing more than one
normal phrase marker
phrase marker, as in (21):
is a normal form of a restructuring
(20) If ~ is a normal phrase marker and
1"')'~..\ is a normal form of :1
.~. 1'" 1 ., 0~ = L~ 1J and ~ 1 = j
( 21) ~ .~If j is a phrase marker, ~ ,
,.., ,. \,..,
form of ...), ~ = t:.) l' · ·
a normal
j?is a restructuring phrase marker
Indeed by (18) a rtonnal fo.t1ll containing IOOre than one normal phrase
marker must contain at least one restructuring lexical item.
but by definition only normal lexical items map to normal
phrase markers; hence normal phrase markers can only have
normal forms consisting of one normal phrase marker, themselves,
as in (20). On the contrary, since by (20) a normal phrase
marker can only have a normal form consisting of itself, a
normal form ccnsisting of more than one normal phrase marker
can only be a normal form of a restructur lng phrase rilarker, as in (21 \ ,
In summary, a normal lexical item is a lexical
item which can map to a normal phrase marker, as in (16); a
restructuring lexical item is a lexical item which must map
to a restructuring phrase marker, as in (17). A straight-
forward consequence of our theory is that normal forms
containing only one normal phrase marker contain only normal
lexical items, as in (19); another possible consequence
of our theory is that normal forms containing more than one
normal phrase marker must contain at least one restructuring
lexical item, as in (18). If so, further obvious consequences
of the theory are that the only normal form of a normal phrase
marker is the normal form consisting just of itself, as in
(20); and that conversely a normal form consisting of more
than one normal phrase marker can only be the normal form of
a restructuring phrase marker, as in (21).
What then is restructuring? Under
condition (7) two normal phrase markers in a normal form
must be derivable one from the other by movement or deletion,
But this only conCArns phrase structure configurati.ons.
What about the general mapping between the two? This mapping,
whatever its exact content, we ident~fy with restructuring,
as in (22); and in the obvious way,given any two normal phrase
markers in a normal form,we say that the one restructures to
the other:
(22) If S' is a normal form,
p is a restructuring mapping (restructuring)
iff
~ ,., .., l"" ~ fJif() i,Jj)= ~ , f(.)i) =~j
Let us now give a general summary_ To begin with,
we have introduced six kinds of objects: phrase markers, as
in (1), normal phrase markers, as in (2), restructuring phrase
markers, as in (3), normal forms of phrase markers, as in (4),
normal lexical it~ms, as in (16), and restructuring lexical
items, as in (17). Phrase markers, as in (1), are sets of
monostrings, normal phrase markers, as in (2), are phrase
markers representable as tree structures; restructuring phrase
markers, as in (3), are phrase markers not representable as
tree structures; normal forms, as in (4), are sets of normal
phrase markers/tree structures equivalent under union to a.
phrase marker; normal lexical items, as in (16), are lexical
items mapping to normal phrase markers/tree structures;
restructuring lexical items, as in (17), are lexical items
mapping to restructuring phrase markers. Furthermore, we
have introduced two new conditions: a condition, ~5), that
phrase markers have a normal form, and a condition, (7), that
each normal phrase marker in a normal form have a derivation
to another, or from another, or be phrase-structure identical
to another. Otherwise,
we have
assumed all of the other definitions and conditions of grammar
unchanged. We have then shown that various consequences follow
from our theory concerning the rel.ation of normal and restructuring
phrase markers and normal forms: a normal form with only one
normal phrase marker always is a normal form of a normal phrase
marker, (8); a normal phrase marker always has a normal form
consisting just of itself, (6), and only the normal form
consisting just of itself, (20) i a normal form with more than
one normal phrase marker always is a normal form of a
restructuring phrase marker, (9); and a restructuring phrase
marker has, if any, a normal form with more than one normal
phrase marker, (21). Similarly, we llave shown that various
cosequences follow from our theory concerning the relation of
normal and restructuring lexical items and normal forms: a
normal form wi th only Olle normal phrase marker contains only
normal lexical items, (19), and, most significantly, a normal
form with more than one normal phrase marker contains at least
one restructuring lexical item, (18). As for restructuring
itself, we have idantified it simply with the general mapping
from any normal phrase marker in a normal form to any other,
(22) •
In short, there are phrase markers representable
as tree structures -- normal phrase markers -- and phrase
markers not representable as tree structures -- restructuring
phrase markers; correspondingly,there are lexical items which
map to tree structures -- normal lexical items -- and lexical
items which map to non tree structures -- restructuring lexical
i teal'S. For any phrase marker, however, there mu at be --
condition (5) -- a set of tree structures, or normal phrase
markers, which are equivalent to it under union -- normal form;
and in any set of tree structures, or normal forms, the tree
structures must be such that each has a derivation to another
of from another or is phrase-structure identical to another
condition (7). There is a one-to-one correspondence between
normal phrase markers and normal forms containing one normal
phrase marker -- (6) and (8) -- and normal phrase markers do
not have any normal form with more than one normal phrase
marker -- (20). To normal forms with one normal phrase
marker ~orrespond restructuring phrase markers -- (8)
and I restructuring phrase markers correspond, if to anything,
to normal forms with more than one normal phrase marker -- (21).
Finally, a normal form with only one normal phrase marker
obviously contains only normal lexical items -- (19); more
significantly, a normal form with more than one normal phrase
marker contains at least a restructuring lexical item -- (18).
Any normal phrase mark~r in a normal form we say restructures
to another, or indeed, the two are mapped on to the other by
restructuring, (22).
At this point, assuming we ar~ correct in what
precedes, the one question open i~ the relation of
restructuring phrase markers to PF and LF markers. Are
restructuring phrase markers mapped to PF and LF markers under
the same principles under which normal phrase markers are, or
are special principles needed in the case of restructuring
phrase markers? Specifically, are PF and/or LF markers
representable by tree structures? And if so is some principle
required to map restructuring phrase markers into tree-
representable PF and/or LF markers? In the interest of
concreteness we will postpone answering these questions
to chapter 3 after the discussion of the syntax of middle
constructions. In particular we will discuss in chapter 3
under what principles restructuring phrase markers of the
type of (14) and (15\ map to PF and LF markers. In general
we will assume that the results obtained in chapter 3 hold
true for every case of restructuring.
2. 2 ~eanalysis
Our starting point in this section is the~notion of
reanalysis defined in essence by the discussion of French
causatives in Rouveret & Vergnaud (1980); our end will be
defining our own notion of reanalysis. To begin with, we
will introduce the relation Case assignment, with
condi'tions on its domain and range, (1) and
the notions of Case assigner and nominal phrase; at the same
time we will subsume Case assignment into a more general
relation Case, (2), and the notion of Case assigner into
a more general notion of Case element, (3). Next, we will in~
traduce the relation cosuperscripting,
notated by cosuperscripting, with conditions on its domain
and range, (4), and again we will subsume cosuperscripting
into the more general rel?tion Case, (5). Finally we will
introduce the relation reanalysis, with conditionson its
domain and range, (6), and the notion of rearlalyser; once more,
we will subsume reanalysis into the more general relation
Case, (7), and the notion of reanalyser into the more general
notion of Case element, (8); at the same time we will intro-
duce a related condition on Case assigners, (9). At this
point we will define the relation Case, (10), as subsuming
Case assignment, cosuperscripting,and reanalysis, and the
notion of Case element, (11), as subsuming the notions of
Case assigner and reanalyser. We will then introduce the
government condition on Case assignment and reanalysis, (12)
the Case filter on lexical nominal phra~es, (13),
and parallel to the Case filter a new condition on
Case elements, i.e.
In addition, we will
Case assigners and reanalysers, (14),
introduce the.adjacency condition on
Case assignment and reanalysis
as a condition in the mapping from s-structure to PF, (17).
Twice we will make reference to Manzini (1983): first,
condition (14) is in essence introduced there in the context
of a theory of empty categories, here as in (15) and (16);
second, in the same context a theory of of insertion is intro-
duced under the same informal assumptions under which (17)
is introduced here.
To begin with, we assume, essentially as
in ChomsKy (1981; 1982), that a-structure includes a
binary relatioll Case assignment, and
that Case assignment can only hold between a Case assigner
and a nominal phrase, in other words that if an element
Case assigns an element a , a must be a Case assigner and a
a nominal phrase, as in (1):
(1) If a Case assigns a
a must be a Case assigner and
a must be a nominal phrase
We further assume that'
being a Case assigner is a feature of a lexical item. For
example, we assume that love is a Case assigner,
that to is a Case assigner, and so on.
Give is a slightly more complicated example: not
only is it a Case assigner, but it also defines a relation
of some sort to to, where to is again a Case assigner, as ~ve;
hence give is in a sense twice a Case assigner, once properly
and once by the selection of the other Case assigner to.
Furthe~ we assume a nominal
to be an N or projection of N, hence in particular NP, or
anINFLor projection of INFL, hence S and so on. In a
more principled way we can assume a nominal to be an element
which includes features N, or, recursively, an element which
includes a nominal. If so, N's and their projections
are nominals in that they obviously include N features; on
the other hand, INFL's and their projections, S, etc.,
are nominals in that they include a set of features, AGR,
which in turn includes N features and is therefore a nominal.
What ultimately makes the difference between the cases in
which AGR surfaces, as finite S's, and the cases in which
AGR does not surface, as in infinitivals, could be simply
that in the former cases AGR includes person number and
gender features and in the latter cases it does not, the
consequence being that agreement with a subject actually
takes place in the former cases and not in the latter cases.
On the other hand, whatever the exact defini tiOl1 of nominal, "'t..
we assume in the obvious way that a nominal
phrase is the m~ximal projection of a nominal
and hence in particular an NP or an S.. Given then our
assumptions on Case ssignment, Case assigners and 110minal
phrases, an obvious example of Case assignment is Case
assignment by love to~ as in I love Mary, where love, a:3
above, is a Case assigner and the NP Mary is a nominal
phrase; other obvious examples are Case assignment by give to
a book and Case assignment by to to~ as in I give a book
to Mary, ~ve and to being Case assigners, as above, and the
NP's a book and Mar~ nominal phrases; and so on. Finally,
it is our assumption
that there is a more general relation
Case subs~ing Case assignment, indeed that every instance
of the relation Case assignment also is an instance of the
rela tion Case, though not vice versa, a s in (2). Correspolld-
ingly, it is our assumption that
there is a more general notion of Case element subsuming
the notion of Case assigner, indeed that every Case assigner
is a Case element, though not vice versa, as in (3):
(2) If a Case assigns a
Cttse (a , a
(3) If a is a Case assigner,
a is a Case element
;In SUlTIlla..rY, we assume the existence of a relation Case
assignment, whose domain is restricted to Case assigners
and whose range is restricted to nominal phrases, as in
We further assume that being a Case assigner is a feature
of a lexical item; we also assume that a nominal phrase is
the maximal projection of a nominal and nominals and
N's and INFL's with their projections; hence nominal phrases
are NP's and S's. Finally we assume that there exists a gener:'
relation Case and a class of Case elements; we assume that
Case assignment is subsumed into the relation Case, as in
(2), and that Case assigners are subsumed into the class
of Case elements, as in (3).
Next, we assume that s-str~cture includes a relation
cosuperscripting, the relation notated by cosuperscripting
and we f assume that the
relation cosuperscripting is restricted to pairs of nominal
phrases, as in (4), where, as above, we assume that nominal
phrases are maximal projections of nominals, hence NP's or
SI s:
(4) If a and a are cosuperscripted
a and a must be nominal phrases
We further assume that cosuperscripting is like Case assign-
ment in that it is subsumed into the more general relation
Case; in other words that every instance of the relation
cosuperscripting, similar in this to an instance of the
relation Case assignment,is an instance of the general
relation Case, as in (5):
(5) If a and Bare cosuperscripted
Case (a , B
~e can notice here that two
nominal phrases related by cosuperscripting, hence by
Case, in sharing cosuperscripting and Cas~ , share the same
abstract position, a nominative pos.ition,or an accusative
position, or a !2 object position, ,etc.; alld
in sharing the same abstract posi tion they are in a sense,
the same element. In turn
this could offer the key to eliminating
all stipulations about the particular pairs of
nominal phrases which can actually enter cosuperscripting.
To begin with, it is only natural to assume that,given
two elements which share Case llence the same abstract
position and are in this sense the same element,
they must share all features and all relations; or else
one of them must be in some sense a dummy element with
respect to features and relations. Butif so, taking dummy
element in the relevant sense to be synonimous with expletivu,
that cosuperscripting can hold between two elements one
of which is an expletive does not need to be stipulated.
Furthermore, that cosuperscripting can hold between two
elements one of which is an AGR or a clitia does not
need to be stipulated either, for AGR or clitia elements
obviously share all properties wi th the naninals they are cosUJ;)er·'
scripted with. On the other hand, it seems that only AGR's
or clitics can enter cosuperscripting with another element
under the sharing properties heading; indeed, assuming, as is
natural, that this has to do with their being generated in
A-position, only elements in A-positions can enter cosuper-
scripting with another element under the sharing properties
heading. Whether this can also be derived or not we will l~a-
ve as an open question.
In summary, we assume the existence of a relation
cosuperscripting, notated by cosuperscripting, restricted
to pairs of nominal phrases, as in (4). We further
assume that the relation cosuperscripting, in this simllar t~)
Case assignment, is subsumed i~to a general
relation Case, as in (5). Finally we suggest that, this
much said, further stipulations on which pairs of nominal
phrases enter cosuperscripting and indeed Case are
unnecessary.
Next, we assume that a-structure includes the relation
reanalysis; where we assume that if reanalysis holds in the
order of an eleme.nt a and an elentent e ,C( must be a
reanalyser and a a Case element, as in (6):
(6) T 17 a reanalyses wi th a
~ must be a reanalyser and
a must be a Case element
We assume further that being a reanalyser, exactly as being
a Case assigner, is a defining property, or
a feature, of a lexical item. Going one step further in the
definition of the relation Case, we assume that reanalysis,
as Case assignment and cosuperscripting, is subsumed by it,
as in (7); similarly, going one step further in the
definition of the notion of Case element,
we assume that every reanalyser,as every Case assigner,
is a Case element, as in (8):
(7) If a reanalyses with B
Case ( ex , a
(8 ) If a is a reanalyser
a is a Case element
In addition, we assum~ that while normally the features of
an element a are associated
with a or its head in the lexicon, the features Case assigner
can be associated wi th an element ex in the lexicon, as in
the normal case, or can be associated with an element ex
irlJependently of the lexicon if some reanalyser y reanalyses
wi th ex, as in (9) :
(9) If a is a Case assigner
a must be a Case assi0~~h in the lexicon
or for some rennnlyser y ,Y must
reanalyse with a
So, for example, in French, if section 4.1 below is correct,
faire (to make) is a reanalyzer. In sentences like J'ai fait
ecrire una lettre (literally "I made write a letter" or "I
made someone wri te a letter"), reanalysis holds of ai fa! t
("made") and ecrirs ("wri te"), where eC1.·iA~e is a Case assigner
in the lexicon. In sentences like J'ai fait aller Marie, on
the other hand, (literally "I made go Marie" or "I made Marie
go"), reanalysis holds of ai fait ("made") and aller
("go"), where aller is not a Case assigner in the lexicon,
but becomes a Case assigner in a-structure due to reanalysis,
and as a Case assigner enter Case assignment with the
nominal phrase Marie. Finally, in sentences like J'ai laisse
faire ecril'e una lettre (literally "I let make write a
letter" or "r let someone make someone write a letter")
reanalysis holds of ai laisse and faire, where laisser
(to let) is at least optionally a
reanalyser and faire is a reanalyser as usual, hence
obviously a Case element; and reanalysis holds further of
faire and the Case assigner ecri~e ,
In summary, we assume the existence of a relation
reanalysis whose domain is restricted to reanalysers and
whose range is restricted to Case elements, as in (6);
we further assume that being a reanalyser is a feature of
a lexical item On the other
hand we assume that, as Case assignment and cosuperscripting,
reanalysis is part of the general relation Case, as in (7);
and that, as Case assigners, reanalyzers are Case elements,
as in (3). Our final assumption is that while features
such as a Case assigner are generally lexical features, an
element a can acquire the feature Case assigner
in s~structure if reanalyzed with, as in (9).
At this point, we notice that while according to (2),
(5) and (7), the relation Case includes the relations Case
assignment, cosuperscripting and reanalysis respectively,
the relation Case is not itself defined. We then a::lsume, as i,
(10), that the relation Case includes in turn only the relatlf,)J\~
Case assignment, cosuperscripting and reanalysis. If so,
the relation Case is simply defined by (2), (5), (7) and
(10) as the union of Case assignment, cosuper-
scripting and reanalysis:
(10) If Case( a, a ),
ex Case assigns a ,or
a l.s cosuperscripted with a ,or
ex reanalyses wi th a
Similarly we assume, as in (11), that all Case elements are
Case assigners or reanalysers. Given that according to (3)
and (8) all Case assigners and reanalysers are Case elements,
(3), (8) and (11) together thpn identify Case elements with
the union of Case assigners and reanalysers:
(11) If a is a Case element
a is a Case assigner, or
ex is a reanalyser
In summary, the relation Case is the collection of the
relations Case assignment, cosuperscripting and reanalysis,
and the notion of Case element is the collective notion for
Case assigners and reanalysers.
Next, we assume that various conditions hold cf various
subclasses of the relation Case, or of the various
classes of elements whioh enter them, in particular case elemernts and
nominal phrases.
To begin wi th, we recall tha t according to Chansky (1981; 1982), if
Case assignment holds of a Case assigner a and a nominal
phrase a , the Case assigner a must govern the nominal
phrase 6 . Here we ~ssume, as in (12), that if Case holds
of two elements a and a , one of which is a Case element
a , the Case element a must govern the other element a •
If so, given Case ~ssignment between a Case assigner a and
a nominal phrase a , t;1e Case assigner a must indeed govern
the nominal phrase a but in addition, given
reanalysis between a reanalyser a and a Case assigner or
reanalyser a , the Case assigner « and the Case assigner
of reanalyser a must govern each other:
(12) If a is a Case element and
Case (a , a ) or Case ( a , a
a must govern B
Let us exemplify. In the s-structure (~JOhn [vp!OV~~ tvlary. ~ ]
under the government condition (12), the Case assigner love
can be related by Case, or Case assignment, to the nominal
phrase Mary, but not to the nominal phrase John; for,
under the definition of government love governs Mary but
not John. On the other hand, if section 4.1 below is
correct, in French a sentence like J'ai fait ecrire una lettre
(literally "I made write a letter" or "I made someone write
[ !-
a leter") is associated wi th an s-structure like §,Je Vp at fa 1 i:
[vpe.q~ir! ~ne ~ettre 11: where the higher VP but not the
lower one is a maximal projection .If so the reanalyser
faire can be related by Case, or reanalysis, to the Case
assigner ecrira under the government condition (12); for,
no maximal projection interven~~ between the two, faire
governs ~crir~e and ecrire governs faire under the defini tion
of government. Of course, if instead of a VP nc)n-rnaximal
projection, an S were enlbedded under faire, faire could not reanc.~1~/i..4~
with the embedded verb under the government condition (12);
for, under the definition of government, the maximal
projection S intervening between faire and the embedded
verb would prevent them from governing each other.
Next, 'lie recall that according to Chansky (1981;1982) for every
lexical nominal phrase a there must be a Case assigner l
and only one such that Case assignment holds of the Case
assigner y and the nominal phrase a (our ph.rasing); where
this condition is referred to as the case f i1ter. Here we assure, as
in (13), that under the Case filter for every lexical
nominal phrase there must be an element Y and only one such
that Case holds of y and a in that order; where Y must be
a Case assigner so that case assignment holds of y and a .,
or else y can be another nominal phrase so that
cosuperscripting holds of y and a , but if so there must be
a sequence of elements Y1 , • • t'Yn such that Y1 is a
Case assigner, Y
n
is y, and every Y i enters Case with every
(13) Case filter
If a is a lexical nominal phrase
there must be exactly one y such that
Case (y ,ex ) and
either y is a Case assigner, or
there are Y 1 ' • , Y n such ttlat
y = Y , and
n
for every i, Case ( Y i' Y i +1)' and
Y1 is a Case assigner
Let us exem~lify. In a sentence like *John to love
Mar~ would be a mistake, the lexical nominal phrase John
violates the Case filter; for, there is no Case assigner
entering Case assignment with John and no other nominal
phrase entering cosuperscripting with it. On the contrary,
in the sentence PRO to love Mary would be a mistake, PRO
satisfies the Case filter vacuously; for, PRO is a nominal
phrase but not a lexical one and the Case filter crucially
applies to lexical nominal phrases only. In the sentence
For John to love Mary would be a mistake, on the other hand,
the lexical nominal phrase John satisfies the Case filter
because there is a Case assigner £0£ entering Case assign-
ment with it. Further, in a sentence like There arrived
a man, the lexical nominal phrase a man satisfies the
Case filter by entering and cosuperscripting with the
nominal phrase there, while in turn the INFL surfacing on
arrived enters Case assignment with ~~; so that there is
a sequence of instances of the relation Case leading from
the Case assigner INFL to there and from there to the
lexical nominal phrase a man~ Finally, in a sentence like
*There arrived a man after PRO arriving some women, the
lexical nominal phrase a man satisfies the Case filter
exactly as above, and exactly as above the non-lexical
nominal phrase PRO is simply not sUbject to the Case filter;
but the lexical nominal phrase some women violates the Case
filter. Indeed, if PRO enters cosuperscripting with some women
a part of the Case filter is satisfied, but the Case filter
as a whole is not; for, PRO itself is obviously not a Case
assigner and, since there is no element entering Case wi th PRO,
there is obviously no sequence of instances of the relation
Case leading from a Case assigner to some women. We can
notice at this point that all our examples of violations
of the Case filter involve lexical nominal phrases of the
category NP.
Ehether S's also count as lexical nominal
phrases subject to the Case filter or not depends upon
whether for a nominal phrase to be considered lexical entails
that the nominal phrase must dominate lexical material or
its nominal part must, and then, under the second hypothesis,
upon whether the nominal part of an S or its INFL head, AGR,
is to be considered lexical or not. What the correct
answer is is an empirical problem and not one which need
concern us here.
Finally, to the government condition (12)
and to the Case filter (13), we add here a new
condition on Case elements, and hence on Case assigners
and reanalysers. Specifically, we assume that for every
Case element a there must be an element a and only one
such that Case holds of a and a in that order, as in (14).
Hence for every Case assigner a there must be a no~inal
phrase a such that Case assignment holds of a and a and
for every reanalyser a there must be another Case element
such that reanalysis holds of a andS
(14) If a is a Case element
there is exactly one a such that
Case(a,6
The idea obviously is that while the Case filter (13)
is the Case theory parallel to the part of the a-criterion
stating that every argument must be assigned exactly one
a-role, there is also a Case theory paralleJ to the part of the 8-critericl
that every 8-role must be assigned to exactly one argument,
precisely condition (14). Let us exemplify. If section
4.1 below is correct, in the French sentence J'ai fait
ecri~e una lettre (literally "I made write a letter" or
"I made someone write a letter") the reanalyser ai fait
enters reanalysis with ecrire, and the Case assigner ecrire
enters Case assignment with una lettre, hence both the
reanalyser ai fait and the Case assigner ecri~e satisfy
condition (14). In English, on the other hand, the word
by word translation of the French sentence above,*I made
write a letter, is ill~formed. In it, if section 4.1
below is correct, the Case assigner write enters Case
assignment with the nominal phrase a letter as
ecril·e wi th una lettre; but made
is a Case assigner, not a reanalyser like ai fait, hence
made cannot enter reanalysis with write, as ai fait with
ecrire
---I but rather must enter Case assignment with
some nominal phrase. If so, write satisfies condition (14)
,
as ecri~e does; but, there being no nominal phrase made
can enter Case assignment with, made contrary to ai fait
violates condition (14). Correctly,
the prediction is that I made someone write a letter is a
well-formed sentence, with write entering Case assignment
with the nominal phrase a letter and made entering Case
assignment with the nominal phrase someone; for if so both
the Case assigner write and crucially the Case assigner
made satisfy Condition (14).
We can notice at this point that condition (13) is
already informally introduced in Manzini (1983). Quoting,
"we obviously want to maintain with Chomsky (1981) that
there is a principle, the Case fj,lter, stating that every
lexical nominal must be assigned Case", in the present
terminology, that for every lexical nominal phrase a there
must be a Y such that Case holds of Y and a ,and so
on as in (13). Quoting again, "our idea, however, is that
there is an additional principle stating that every Case
up for assignment must be assiqned", in the present
that for every Case element a there must be one element ~
such that Case holds of a andf3, as in (14). In
Manzini (1983), the immediate context for the informal
introduction of what is essentially condition (14), is a
discussion of empty categories; the general context is a
discussion of the theory of control and of the theory of
binding. In this context, the possibility is explored
that the allowed combinations of the features ±anaphoric
and ±pronominal give three empty category types: the
+anaphoric type, redundantly (+anaphoric, -pronominal),
the +pronominal type, redunuantly (+pronorninal, -anaphoric),
and the (-anaphoric, -pronominal) type, as in (15);
so that Chomsky's (1981;1982)
(+pronominal, +anaphoric) type is excluded.
Cornplementarily, the possibility is explored to
introduce a definition of the +anaphoric empty category
type stating that an empty category ex is +anaphoric if and
only if it lacks Case, i.e. if
and only if there is no Y such that Case holds of Y and
a , as in (1&) ; and
correspondingly bo eliminate Chomsky's (1982) definition
of the +pronominal empty category type.
In this context, the introduction of a principle like (14)
is essential for the theory in (15)-(16) to work correctly:
(15) [+anaphoric] or~redundantly~[+anaphori~,-pro-
nominal]
[+pronominal] or, redundantly, (+pronorninal,
-anaphoric]
[-anaphoric, -pronominal]
(16) If a is an empty category, a is [+anaphoric] iff
there is no Y such that Case (Y ,a )
Consider for example the simple structure .John hit e,
example (103) in Manzini (1983). In such a structure, e
cannot be a variable, because by definition variables are
A-bound; aQd ! cannot be a pro, because pro's are subject
to identification and e is not
properly identified. fur~her, hit being a Case assigner,
if it enters Case with e e cannot be an anaphor
by definition (16); but if it does not enter Case with
! cT~~Lally condition (14) is violated. Hence there is no
empty category type ~ can belong to and the structure under
consideration is predicted to be ill-formed. On the con-
trary, in the minimally different structure John was hit e,
example (109) in Manzini (1983), hit, as associated with
passive morphology, is no longer a Case assigner, and
neither can nor must enter Case with!; hence e can be an
anaphor under definition (16), and the structure is predic-
ted to be well-formed. And so on.
In summary, according 'to the government condition (12),
if Case holds of a Case element and of some other element,
the Case element must govern the other element. Renee as under Cha,l-
sky's government condition, in Case assignment the Case as-
signer must govern the nominal phrase; but in addition,
under (11), in reanalysis the reanalyzer and the other Case
element must govern each other. Furthermore, according to
the Case filter (13), for every nominal phrase a , there
must be some element y such that Case holds of y and 0. in
the order, and either y is a Case assigner, as in Chansky's Case
filter, or, in additio~, y is not a Case assigner but
then there is a sequence Y1, ••• y such that Y =Y and Case
n n
holds of any Yi and Yi +1 and Y1 is a Case assigner. Finally,
according to the new condition (14), for every Case element
a, there must be some element a such that Case holds of a
and a in the order; hence, if a is a Case assigner, Case
assignment must hold of a and some nominal phrase a; if ex
is a reana1yzer, reanalysis must hold of a and of some other
Case element a. As we have pointed out,
condition (14) is essentially identical to a condition
informally introduced in Manzini (1983), in the context of
a theory of empty categories substituting (15) to Chomsky's
inventory of empty categories and eliminating Chansky' s defi-
ni tierl of +pronominal empty category · in favor of
the definition of +anaphoric empty category in (16); where
according to (15) there are no (+anaphoric,+pronominal)
empty categories, and according to (15) an empty category
a is +anaphoric if and only if it lacks Case, in other
words, there is no y such that y and a ill the order are
related by Case.
Finally, we recall that according to Chansky (1981; 1982), subject
to languaqe variation, if Case assignment holds of two
elements a and a , a and a must be adj acent. Here we assume
that't subj ect to language variation, if Case holds of two
elements a andS , one of which is a Case element, a and
a must be adj acent; hence if a reanalyzes wi th a ,
a and a also mus t be ad j acent . Further, we reca11 tha t ,
much as the government condition, the Case filter, etc.,
Chomsky's adjacency condition is a condition
on a-structure, or indeed on phrase markers; here we assume
however that the adjacency condition is
a condition in the mapping from
a-structure to PF. In other words, we assume that if Case
holds of two elements ~ and ~, one of which is a Case ele-
ment in a-structure, or indeed in a phrase marker jl, the two
elements a and B must be adjacent in PF, or indeed in the
~ ~PF-marker ~ of~, as in (17). Hence, given Case assign-
ment (or reanalysis) between two elements a and a in a given s-
structure, under Chansky's adjacency condition the structure is wellformed on~y
if a and a are adjacent; under (17)/ on the contrary, the
a-structure can be well-formed whether a and a are adjacellt
or not, and only the corresponding PF is ill-formed if a
and B are not adjacent there. In a sense, the adjacency
of two elements a and a is a condition on Case assignment
(or realJalysis) between a and a under Chansky's condition, bllt not lUl:\=.l~
(17); rather, under (17), the adjacency of two elements a
and a is in a sense a "phonological realization" of Case
assignment (or reanalysis) between a and a:
~ ,~(17) If ~ is a phrase marker and in ~ Case (a,a)
and a or a is a Case, if ':i" is the PF-marker
of ·Y, in f~' a and a must be adj acent
To exemplify, if section 5.1. below is correct, French
has structures of the type of
~. ,
(5 Je [vp ~Lfait [vp [vp ecrlre a Pierre~ t-.1arie ]]]
(literally "I made write to Pierre Marie" or "I made Marie
~
write to Pierre") where ai fait reanalyzes with ecrire and
ecrire Case assigns Marie; but while ai fait and ecrire are
adjacent, !£rir~ and ~\rie are not and cannot be moved around
so as to be. On the othe~ hand, it is a fact that the
strl1cture surfaces as J • ai fait ecrire Marie a Pierre
(literally "I made write Marie to Pierre"), ,,.,here not only
ai fait is adjacent to ecrire but also ~crire is adjacent to
Marie. Assuminy, as it is only natural to assume, that the
order of elements ca~ be rea~range~to an extent to be made
precise~in the mapping from a-structure to PF, this is cor-
rectly predicted by the adjacency condition (17); for, under
(17), in s-structure ~crire can Case assign ~ie without
,
being adjacent to it, but given tl1at ecrire Case assigns
Marie in a-structure, ~crire and Marie must be adjacent in PF.
We can notice that in Manzini (1983), in the context
again of the discussion of the theory of empty categories
here in (15)-(16), the idea is advanced, quoting, "that +N
elements, and in particular nouns, assign Case exactly as -N
elements, in particular verbs "I in other words, that the
feature Case assigner is in no way restricted to -N elements;
and "that ... of insertion is the realization of object Case
assigned by a noun" or an adjective to an NP.
!:o t\slder for instance the nominal *Rome' s destruction
(of) e in the active reading of destruction. In it, ~
cannot be a variable because trivially it is not A-bound;
and it cannot be a pro because trivially it is not properly
identified. If! cannot be an anaphor either, every possible
type of empty catego~y being excluded, the nominal is cor-
rectly predicted to be ungrammatical, exactly as the sentence
*John hit e is. In turn, the only reason why e cannot be
an anaphor is that it is assigned Case; hence it must be the
case that e is assigned Case, and assigned Case by the
nominal that governs it. But how? The first hypo-
thesis which comes to mind is that, admitting a process of
of insertion to account for the presence of of in fLont of
-.-
the NP object of a +N head, this process is not an optional
one, but an obligatory one; if so, since of is a
Case assigner, that e is Case assigned automatically follows.
But why intuitively should of insertion be obligatory?
Another hypothesis comes then to mind, precisely
the hypothesis in Manzini (1983): that not only -N elements
can be Case assigners, but al~o +N elements, and indeed
elements of all categories; and that of insertion
or, generalizing, insertion of a genitive preposition is
just a "realization" of Case assignment when involving a
+N Case assigner and an NP. Under one point of view, of
insertion is a precondition on Case assignment from a +N
element to an NPi under another point of view, precisely
the point of view in Manzini (1983), of insertion is rather
a "realization" of Case assignment from a +N element to an
NP. The similarity with the discussion of adjacency above is
evident: under Chansky's condition , the adjacency of two elements
a and a is a condition on Case assignment (or reanalysis)
between a and a, but under (17), the adjacency of two elements
a and a is in some sense a "phonological realization" of
Case assignment (or reanalysis) between a and a4 The same
line of thinking can obviously be extended from of insertion
or adjacency to Case morphology, in languages which indeed
include it, making of Case morphology yet another ~honolo­
gical realization of a-structure Case; and so on. If so,
an explanation begins to emerge for why adjacency, or in
general ordering constraints on Case assignment, and overt
Case morphology pretty much never cooccur in a language, but
in each given language either one of them must occur. Indeed
both adjacency and Case morphology being realizations of
a-structure Case, when one is present, the other need not
be; but under the assumptjon that phonological realization
of abstract Case is obligatory, one or the other must indeed
be present. Along the same lines, an ~xplanation begins to
emerge for the configurational vs. non configurational
parameter, and smaller parameters within it. But this is
decidedly beyond the scope of out investigation here.
In summary, according to (17), if Case holds in s-
structure of two elements a and a, one of which is a Case
element, subject to language variation, the two elements a
and a must be adjacent in PF; hence, in particular, if Case
assignment or reanalysis holds of a and a in a-structure,
subject to language variation,a and a must be adjacent in PF.
As we noticed, this makes adjacency between two elements a
and a much like a "phonological realization" of Case assign-
ment or reanalysis between a and BIas like a condition on
it. As we also noticed, this is suggestive of the idea in
Manzini (1983) that +N elements can be Case assigners exactly
as -N elements can; and that of insertion or, generally, the
insertion of a genitive preposition, is again a "realization"
of object Case assigned by a +N element to an NP. As we
finally suggested, the key to the parameters configurational
V8. non configurational may lie in this direction of thought;
though this obviously goes beyond the scope of our
investigation.
We can now give a general summary_ To begin with, we
have introduced the relation Case assignment, restricted by
(1) to pairs of a Case assigner and a nominal phrase; and
with the relation Case assignment, we have introduced the
notion of Case assigner and of nominal phrase.
Next, we have introduced the relation cosuperscripting,
restricted by (4) to pairs of nominal phrases. And finally,
we have introduced the relation reanalysis, restricted by
(6) to pairs of a reanalyzer and another Case assigner or
reanalyzer; and with the relation reanalysis, we have intro-
duced the notion of reanalyzer, and a condition (9), allowing
a non-Case assigner to become a Case assigner under reanalysis.
We have then introduced a general relation Case, defined by
(2), (5), (7) and (10) as the union of the relations Case
assignment, cosuperscripting and reanalysis; and a general
class of Case elements, defined by (3), (8) and (11) as the
union of Case assigners and reanalyzers. Next, we have intro-
duced the government condition as in (12)1 where,
according to (12), if Case involves a Case element, hence a
Case assigner of a reanalyzer, the Case element must govern
the other element involved. Similarly, we have introduced
the Case filter as in (13); where according to (13),
for every lexical nominal phrase a, there must be some
element y such that Case holds of y and a in the order, and
either Y is a Case assigner or from Yl to Y=Y n ' there is a
sequence of Case relations Case (Yi'Yi+l) and Yl is a Case
assigner. Next, we have introduced a new condition, (14),
stating that for every Case element a, there must be some
element a such that Case holds of a and a in the order. And
finally, we have introduced, to take the place of Chansky's adjacen"·
cy condition on a-structure, a condition stating that if
Case holds of two elements in a-structure, the two elements
are adjacel1t in PF, as in (17). Parenthetically, we have
also noticed that a principle very much like (14) is infor-
mally introduced in Manzini (1983) in the context of a d~s­
cussion of a theory of empty categories, here in (15) and
(16); and that in the same context a line of t:hinking is
adopted on the subject of 2! insertion, very much like the
line of thinking adopted here on the subject of the adjacency
condition,
3. Middle Constructions
3.1
.-64-
Italian ~ and ~ constructions
There are three major generally recognized types
of Italian constructions involving!! and/correspondingly,
three major recognized types of 51: the impersonal type,
the middle type, also known as the passivizing type, and the
reflexive type. Each of these three major types of si and
5i constructions will be taken into consideration here. In
additio~a fourth major ty~e of !i and!! construction will
be introduced: the middle-reflexive type, as we will call it.
For each type of !i, we will indicate the semantic and syntactic
properties as well as those phonological pronerties which we
judge of some interest; correspondingly/for each type of 81
construction we will indicate what structures it is associated
with. Most notably we will argue that middle ai is a
restructuring lexical item and middle !i constructions are
associated with restructuring phrase markers; and we will
introduce middle reflexive si and si constructions as a
restructurinq lexical item and constructions associated with
restructuring phrase markers respectively. As our last point,
we will finally show how the four different types of s1 reduce
to one 81. This same unified 5i will be our startin~ ~oint
in section 3.2.
To begin with, we take into consideration impersonal
ai and impersonal!! constructions, both exemplified in (1):
(1) Si lava con facilita i bambini
'One washes easily the children'
Our problem is obvious: what are the properties of impersonal
si? And correspondingly: what kind of structures are
associated with impersonal si constructions?
The PF properties of impersonal 81 do not directly
concern us here; whatever they are, we write them /si/. ~lith
respect to the LF properties, on the other hand, impersonal
si is the equivalent, among lexical items, of the class of
empty categories PROarb . Concerning the LF ~roperties of
PRO
arb , we say that PROarb
is a "free variable", i.e. a "variable" not bound by an operator
ranging "freely" or "arbitrarily" over individuals, except for
the restriction that it ranges over
human individuals. Concerning the LF properties of impersonal
si, we say much the same, that impersonal!! is a free variable,
etc. Example (1) already shows that si is interpreted as a
free variable, ranging arbitrarily over human individuals; in
(1), however, its ranging over humans as opposed to non-human
individuals could be a by-product of the meaning of the
predicate or of our knowledge of the world. This is no longer
true in an example like (2), where neither the meaninq of the
predicate nor our knowledge of the world restrict the subject
to humans, but impersonal si is indeed so restricted:
(2) 5i riceve facilrnente dei c0191
One receives easily blowa
Impersonal si and PRO
arb are indeed equivalent not
only with respect to their meaning, but also with respect to
an essentially PF level phenomena of agreement ,interesting
to us here in this respect only. As is well known, Italian
has overt agreement in person, number and gender: finite
verbs agree with nominals in person and number and adjectives
and participles agree with nominals in number and gender.
Obviously the case in which a PRO b agrees with a finite
, ar .
verb never arises, whether because PRO's cannot be governed,
or because anaphoric empty categories in general cannot
be assigned. Case. OIl the oth.er hand,in the case in which a PROarb
agrees with a adjective or a participleJ the adjective or
participle surfaces with plural masculine features. An example
is in (3):
(3) E' facile PRO
arb essere nervosi
It is easy to be nervous
Now, impersonal 5i can be in agreement with
both a finite verb and an adjective or participle. If it agrees
with a finite verb, this surfaces with the features 3rd person
singular, if it agrees with an adjective or participle, this
surfaces with the features plural masculine. An example is
in (4) :
(4) 6i e nervosi facilmente
One is nervous (pl. masc.) easily
How aqreement works in examples like (2) and (3) with PROarb
and impersonal !i respectively is not particularly interesting.
We can straightforwardly say that PROarb and impersonal !i are
associated with unspecified person, number and gender features,
until at a certain point in the derivation, essentially PF,
these unspecified features assume a predetermined conventional
value: 3rd person in any case for person agreement, masculine
ill any case for gender agreement, and, for number agreement l
singular if a verb is involved, plural if an adjective or
participle is. It is rather interesting, however, that at
least with adjectives and participles, PRO b and impersonalar
si show exactly the same agreement, and that this results,
in the case of impersonal!! in a tensed sentence, as in (4),
in the clash of singular agreement on the verb and plural
agreement on the adjective or participle. This particular
type of agreement is not known to occur otherwise. Furthermore,
the agreement in number of a PRO
arb and an adjective or
participle is subject to language variation: it is agreement
in the plural in Italian/as we abundantly saw, but is agreement
in the singular in Spanish. Remarkably, the agreement of the
impersonal lexical item, !i in Italian and se in Spanish/is
subject to exactly the same language variation: !i, as we
saw, agrees in the 91ural, se agrees in the singular. Spanish
examples are in (5)-(6):
(5) A qui es posible PRO
arb vivir contento
Here it is possible to live happy (ag. masc.)
(6) Se viva siempre nervoso en eate pais
One lives always nervous (5g. masc.) in this
country
Once rid of the PF and LF properties of impersonal
!!, we can then begin to consider its syntactic properties.
To begin with, impersonal!! falls within the class
of arguments; so that,as an argument, it both can and must be
assigned a a-role, either directly or through non-arguments
in a chain. Indeed, that impersonal si is an argument,and as
such able and needing to receive a e-rol~ is a consequence
already of its semantic properties. Furthermore, impersonal
si includes the categorial features N,and falls within the
class of nominals,as well as the class of nominal phrases,and
of lexical nominal phrases; so that, as a nominal phrase it can,
and as a lexical nominal phrase it must, be assigned Case,
either directly or through cosuperscripting. That impersonal
s1 includes the categorial features N we naturally stipulate
as one of its syntactic properties and we simply write it
N ", that it is a leAical nominal phrase and as
such is able and needing to receive Case is indeed a consequence
of its having categorial features N, of its being a maximal
projection and of its being lexical. Example (1)
already shows that impersonal si can and must be assigned
a a-role and Case. In (1),in particular/the subject a-role
assigned by the predicate lava i bambini ("washes the children U )
can and must end up with impersonal si, and similarly the
nominative Case assigned by the INFL surfacing on lava ("washes")
can and must end up with impersonal ai again. The same point
is further shown in (3) and (4), where once more
the subject a-role and the nominative Case end up with impersonal
!.!; and so on.
Next, i.t in (1), (3) and (4) impersonal 81
ends up with the subject a-role and the nominative Case, it
-6'\ ..
can otherwise end up with a a-role other than the subject
e-role; it must always, however, end up with the nominative
Case. So aside from the case exemplified in (1), etc., in
which impersonal ai ends up with the subject a-role and the
nominative Case, impersonal a1 can only end up with nominative
Case and object a-role, as in (7). Obviously (7) is associated
with the partial structure in (8), where the empty category
fills the object position and is related in one way or the
other with impersonal si, so that impersonal ai ends up with
the object e-ro!e through the empty category:
(7) 51 ~ invitati facilmente aIle mie feste
One is invited easily to ~ parties
(8)
,
8i e invitati facilmente e aile roie feste
t t
Complementarily, impersonal s1 cannot end up with accusative
Case and object a-role, as shown in (9), and cannot
end up with accusative Case and subject a-role, as shown in
(10) :
(9) *5i invito volentieri alle roie feste
'One I-invite eagerly to my parties'
(10) *5i vidi lavare con facilita i bambini
'One I-saw wash easily the children'
Apparently,tiwn, among the other syntactic properties of
impersonal s1 we must write that impersonal 6i is necessarily
associated with nominative Case.
- l-o ..
Finally, impersonal ~ is a clitia on a verb.
That impersonal 8i is a clitic on a verb as a PF property
is proved by any of the examples including it from (1) on;
~
but this is of little interest to us here. On the contrary;
what is of interest to us here is to prove that impersonal ai
is a clitic on a verb as a syntactic property. Indiciary
evidence at least suggests that this is indeed the case. First,
we take it to be an established point that object clitics,
dative clitics, locative clitics, genitive clitics and in
general complement clitics on a verb are syntactic clitics:
so, for example, Italian!2 (him/it), etc., or French 1e
(him/it), etc., are syntactically clitics on a verb. Second,
we observe that French also has a class at non,inative clitics,
or sUbject clitics, as they are generally known, for example
i1 (he/it), etc. Now, in simple declarative sentences at
least, French subject clitics surface, with respect to the other
elements in the sentence/in the same position in which a
non-clitic subject would surface. So, for example, French
subject clitics always surface before all complement cl.itics;
and while complement clitics surface after the negati.on particle,
~ubject elitics surface in front of it. This behavior is
schematically exemplified in (11)-(14). (11) shows that
the subject clitic !! (he; precedes the complement clitia
l (there); (12) shows that the negative particle ~ precedes
l; (13) shows that i1 precedes ~, (14) finally shows from
left to right, i.l, ne and l in the order:
-~,-
(11) II Y a vu Marie
He there has seen Marie
(12) II n' a vu personne
He not has seen anybody
(13) Marie n'ya vu personna
Marie not there has seen anynody
(14) lIn' y a vu p(~rsonne
He not there has seen a~ybody
The fact that at least in simple declarative sentences, French
subject clitics have the distribu:ion of non-clitia subj~cts
rather than that of complement clitics iROSt naturally follows
if subject clitics are generated in a-structure in exactly
the same position in whi.ch non-clitic subjects are, and are
cliticised from there in PF only. Thus while (11)-·(14) and
similar examples do ~ot necessarily prove that French subject
clitics are phonological clitics they can be constructed as
indiciary evidence in favor of such a conclusion. But what
about impersonal si? Its surface distribution is exemplified
in (15)-(18), and contrasted tllere with the surfaJe distributlon
of non-clitia subjects and clitia complemuntsi (15) shows that
non-clitia subjects appear ill front of the negative ~, (16)
shows that complement eli tics like Ii (them) appear after ~,
(17) shows that impel~sonal ai appears after ~, and finally
(18) shows that impersonal a1 appears after 11:
(15) Mario non lava volentieri i bambini
'Mario not wdshes eagerly the chIldren'
_ 1t w
(16) Non Ii lava v01entierr
'(He) not them washes eagerly'
(17) Non 8i lava volentieri i bambini
'Not one washes eagerly the children'
(18) Li 8i lava volentleri
"Them one washes eagerly'
Obviously, if the distribution of French sUbject clitics most
naturally follows from the assumption that they are just phonological
clitics, the distribution of impersonal a1 does not at all
naturally fo1lo\\,' from the same assumption . Thus, again, whi 1e
examples like (15)-(18), by contrast to (ll)-(l4)tdo not necessarily
prove that impersonal 8i is a synt~ctic as well as a phonological
--
clitic, they can be constructed at least as indiciary c3vidence
in favor of this conclusion. On the basis of such evidence,we can
then write that irnpersunal ai is a clitia on a verb among
its syntactic properties.
One problem is left. According to what precedes,
impersonal si can be associated with the subject 9-role, must
be associated with the nominative Case and, on top of that,
must be a clitic on a verb. The problem then is: how does
a clitia on a verb end up with the nominative Case and
eventually the subject a-role? The obvious answer is that
there must be a subject in a~ impersonal!! construction which,
first, receives the nominative Case and transmits it to imper-
sonal !!; se~ond, enters with impersonal 8i a chain which
eventually receive~ the subjeot J-role from the predioate. The
problem, then, further reduces to the following: can there be
such a subject, and indeed such a transmission of Case,and such
a chain? Obviously there can be such a subject, an expletive,
and, in an empty subject (pro-drop) language like Italian,
an expletive pro. The expletive pro can then be cosuperscripted
with impersonal ai, and impersonal 51 end up with the nominative
Case; and the expletive pro and 51 can form a chain which
is then assigned the subject Q-role if there is one to be
assigned. This last problem solve~we can then finally provide
structures for impersonal ai sentences. Specifically, we can
conclude that the partial structure in (19) is associated with
all impersonal s1 sentences, including (1), (7), etc.; where in
(19) 5i is a clitia on a rerb, its subject is an expletive pro
and the two are related by cosuperscripting:
(19) s
/~
proJ Vp
/
sii+v .
In addition, sentences like ( 7), where the object position must
also be an empty category and
~,
form a chain with impersonal
are associated with the partial
structure in (20); where we assume that the empty category in
object position is also a pro, and also cosuperscripted with
impersonal !!,as empty categories in object po~ition forming
a chain with a clitic generally are:
(20)
In other words, while the subject-verb structure in (20)
obviously overlaps with (19), the structure of the VP is
essentially identical to the structure of a VP containing an
object clitic of the type of Ii (them), exemplifIed in (16)
and (18). The only difference
is that/in the case of an object clitic/the pro in object
position is assigned accusative Case
and transmits it to clitic; while in the case
of impersonal si, impersonal si is assigned
nominative Case by cosuperscripting with the subject pro and
transmits it by cosuperscripting to the object pro.
It is easy to see at this point that
saying that impersonal a1 is necessarily associated
with nominative Case, is equivalent to saying that impersonal
!! is necessarily bound to its subject,i.e. to the subject of
the verb impersonal si is a clitic on, by cosuperscripting.
Consider again examples like (1) or (7). We already saw that
if we say that impersonal si must be associated with nominative
Case/it follows that it must be c08uperscripted with its subject;
for, cosuperscripting with its subject is the way for impersonal si to get
nominative Case. It is easy to see that if we say that
impersonal !i must be oosuperscripted with its subject, it
follows that it must be associated withifor , nominative Case is
the Case transmitted by cosuperscripting from the subject
position. But what about examples in which, unlike in (1)
or (7), the subject of impersonal !i is not directly or in~irectly
assiqned the nominative Caseor is notavailable for cosuperscripting?
One case in which the subject of impersonal si is not assigned
nominative is the case in which the sUbject of impersonal 5i
is a PRO, as in (21):
(21) *E' facile PRO j lavar-si j
It~is easy one-to wash
i bambini
the children
volentieri
eagerly
In this case, whether it is a property of impersonal ai to
be associated with nominative Case or to be bound to its subject
by cosuperscripting, does not make any difference. If we
stipulate that impersonal qi must be associated with nominative
Case, (21) and the like are excluded because, whether impersonal
8i is cosuperscripted or not with PR~ there is no nominative
Case for si to be had. I~ on the other hand,we stipulate that
impersonal si must be bound to its subject by cosuperscripting I
(21) and the like are equally excluded; indeed !i and the PRO
can be cosuperscripted, but since PRO is not assigned Case,
impersonal si isn't/and the Case filter is violated. The other
case in which the subject of impersonal s1 is not assigned
nominative is the case in which the subject of impersonal
a1 is instead asa qned accusative/as in small clauses , as for
example, in (22):
(22) *Vidi e j lavar-gi j
'I-saw one-wash
i bambini
the children
con faoilita '
easily
In this case, as in the preceding one, whether it is a property
of impersonal 5i to be associated with nominative Case/or to
be bound to its subject by cosuperscripting/does not make any
difference. If we stipulate that impersonal si must be associated
with nominative Case, (22) and thd like are excluded because~
whether impersonal 8i is cosuperscripted or not with its sUbject
empty category/and whatever its subject empty category actually
is,there is no nominative Case for 51 to be had. But if we
stipulate that impersonal 8i must be bound to its subject by
cosuperscripting, (22) and the like are equally excluded; indeed,
(22) and the like are excluded independently of the cosuper-
scripting requirement. FO~ in (22) the empty category in the
subject position of the small clause gives rise to ungrammaticality
whatever its exact nature: if a PRO, it cannot by definition
be assigned accusative Case or be governed; if a trac~
it cannot be assigned accusative Case by definition and/or it
cannot be free; if a variahle, it cannot be A-free, if
a pro/finall~ it must be properly identified and it is not.
~t this point then we are left with the cases in which the subject
of impersonal 8i is a nominative but not accessible to cosuper-
scripting, already illustrated in (9) and (10); where (10) is
the same as (22) except that impersonal ai is cliticized on the
higher rather than on the lower verb:
(9) .S1 invito volentieri aIle mie feste
One I~invite eagerly to my parties
(10) ·Si vidi lavare con facilita
One I~saw wash easily
i bambini
the children
-1.1-
In this case as well, the stipulations that impersonal si
must be associated with nominative Case/and that impersonal si
must be bound to its sUbject by cosuperscripting/~reobviously
equivalent. Assume first that impersonal 8i must be associated
with nominative Case; in (9) or (10) or the like, in order to
get nominative Case it must be cosuperscripted with its subject.
Now/we know that/when cosuperscripting holds of two elements
one of which is an AGR or a clitic, the two elements must share
all features and all relations, so for example, person, number
and gender features and a-role assignment
relationA. But if so, cosuperscripting of impersonal 8i with
its subject is impossible in (9) and (10) or the like; for in
(9} or (10) the subject is an element, pro=io ("I")
which cannot share with impersonal !i features or 9-relations
or anything_ Andif cosuperscripting between impersonal ~
and its subject is impossible, so is nominative Case assignment
to impersonal si. Assume now on the other hand that impersonal
si must be bound to its subject by cosuperscripting; obviously
the argument that it cannot is just a piece of the argument above.
To repeat ourselves, cosuperscripting,when involving a clitic~
implies an agreement-like relation; but in
(9)-(10) the subject is pro;:;io ("I") and no
agreement-like relation can hold between io and impersonal ai;
hence, in (9)-(10) and the like cosuperscripting between
impersonal ai and its subject is impossible.
In summary, we started by a~king two questions: what
are the properties of impersonal s1? and what kind of structures
-l~-
are associated witll impersonal si constructions? Our answer
to the first question is ~t~eaving aside its phonological
properties, /si/, impersonal 51 is semantically a free variable and
syntactically a clitia on a verb, an N, and a nominative
element o~equivalently/an element bound to its subject (the
subject of the verb it is a clitia on) by cosuperscripting; as
in (23):
(23) impersonal 8i = Isl/,
free variable,
N,
clitic on a verb,
nominative/bound to its subject
by cosuperscripting
We then answered the second question by structures like (19)
and (20) or/to be concrete,like (24) and (25); where (24) is the
structure of (1) and (25) the structure of (7):
•
(24) s
",~ ...
/'
p;oj Vp _
./
si J+ lava i bambini
(25) s
.r/" ""-.,
pro j Vp
/ ""-"
"
Next,we take into consideration middle 5i and
middle 8i constructions, both exemplified in (26):
(26) I bambini si lavano con facilita
The children wash(middle) easily
Our problem takes an already familiar shape: what are the
.
properties of middle si? And correspondingly: what kind of
structures are associated with middle ai constructions?
Since/on the other han~we already know the properties of
impersonal si, as enumerated in (23), we can ask first: are
the properties of middle 5i the same as the properties of
impersonal si? Or are there properties which belong to the one
but not to the other? Or are their (non-phonological) properties
completely different?
First, though phonological properties are scarcely
of any interest to us here, impersonal s1 and middle s1 are
phonolgically identical; any two impersonal a1 and middle s1
examples show the point, (1) and (26) or any other two. t-1ore
interestingly, middle!! as impersonal 8i is not only a
phonological clitic on a verb but also a syntactic clitic on
a verb. Indeed, the surface ordering evidence is exactly the
same for middle!! as for impersonal!!; (27) for example
shows that the negation ~' the complemerlt clitic vi (there)
and middle si surface in the order, non before y!, and vi
before middle 51:
(27) I bambini non vi 5i lavano volentieri
The children not there wash (middle)
Next, there is at least one syntactic property which
middle si does not share with impersonal si, and this is that
middle si is a passiviser. a passiviser
associates with a verb which is a Case assigner and in turn forms
a predicate phrase which
and as associated to such a verb,
is a subject a-role assigner
yields a category which is
not a Case assigner and forms a predicate phrase which
is not a theta-role assigner. In Italian as in English and in other languages
the affix forming the passive participle of a verb is the obvious
example of a J?assivizer. That middle si is a pass:"vizer is easy to argue.
Consider for example (26) again. In (26), i bambini ("the
childrfJnn ) is evidently associated with the object Q-role
assigned by lavano ("wash"); at the same time, however, it can
be easily proven that it is associated with the nominative Case
assigned by the INFL surfacing on lavano. For, while in
(26),in the presence of the plural i bambini, lavano agrees in
the plural, (28) shows that/when i bambini is substituted by
the singular un bambino (na child") lava ("washes") agrees in
the singular. Hence i bambini in (26), and un bambino
in (28), agree with the verb, lavano and lava respectively
-
But since in Italian only nominatives agree wi.th verbs, the
comparison of (26) and (28) already proves our point that
! bambini in (26), un bambino in (28), etc., are
assigned nominative Case. Similarly, (29) shows that i bambini
can be substituted by a pro; since in Italian only a nominative
position can be occupied by a pro, our point that i bambini
in (26), etc. is assigned nominative Case is proven once more:
(28) Un bambino s1 lava con facilita
A child washes (middle) easily
(29) Si lavano con facilita
they - wash (middle) easi ly
If/on the othAr hand,in (26) i bambini is assigned object theta-
role and nominative Case, it must, first, be
in the subject position, so that it can receive the nominative Case
of INFL; and, second, bind a trace in obj ect posi tion, so that it
can receive the object 9-role of lavano within a chain. In
other words, i bambini in (26) must be moved from the object
into the subject position. If so, in (26) t.he verb
cannot be a Case assigner and the predicate phrase it forms
cannot be a a-role assigner. But since lavare ("to wash") ill its
active form, including lavano both is a Case assigner and forms
---I
a predicate phrase which is a a-role assigner, some passivi-
zer mllst be . associated with lavano. T".his passiviser in tLlrrl
can only be middle !!i we thus include being a passiviser
among its syntactic properties.
middle si,
At this point, if what pr~cedes is correct, an,l
pllonological properties aside, is a eli tlc on
a verb and a passiviser, we have at least a partial answer not
only to our . question what are the properties of middle
5i but also to our question what kind of ~tructure
is associated with middle 5i constructions. Though there are
at least a couple of properties of impersonal si which we have
not discussed as properties of middle si, we know already not
only that, phonological properties aside, middle 51 is a clitia on
a verb and a passiviser but also that correspondingly middle 81
constructions are associated with passive-like structure, say
(26) concretely with (30):
(30) s
/ "'"I bambini. VP
1/ "',
si+lavano t.
1
Next, the two properties of impersonal 61 which we
have not yet discussed as properties of middle ai are, first,
the property of being semantically a free variable and hence an
argument, with what follows for the purposes of 9-role assignment;
second, the property of being an N and indeed a lexical
nominal phrase, with what follows for the purposes of Case
assignment; and,in addition, the property of being specifically
associated with nominative Case or,equivalently,of being bound
to its subject by cosuperscripting_
Consider, first, the property of impersonal 81
of being an argument, specifically a free variable, hence
of ending up with a e- role. There is at least one direct
piece of evidence that this is a property of middle ai as well .
We showed above that middle 51 is a passiviser and we mentioned
that the other obvious passiviser in Italian, as in other
languages, is the affix forming the passive participl.e. As we
saw, both middle 8i and the passive participle affix associate
wi th a verb which is a Case assigner and in t\lrIl forms a predicate
phrase which assigns a subject a-role; and both middle ai
and the passive participle affix yield,in conjunction with
such a verb~an element which is neilher a Case assigner nor
forms a predicate phrase which is a a-role assigner. BU~ in
the presence of a passive participle/the 9-role which the
predicate would otherwise assign can still be assigned, in
Italian as in other languages, through a preposition, da in
Italian, ~ in English, etc.; on the contrary, J.n the presence
of a middle s1 a da phrase is excluded. This is exemplified
in (31 ) - (33) • ~31) shows a passive participle construction
without da phrase, (32) a passive participle construction with
da phrase; (33)/ to be compared with (26)1 shows that a middle 61
construction is n~t compatible with a da phrase:
(31) I bambini sana stati lavati con facilita
The chi ldren tlave been washed easi ly
(32) I bambini sana stati lavati con facilita
The children. have been washed easily
dai genitori
by the parents
(33) *I bambini 81 lavano con facilita dai genitori
The children wash(middle)easily by the parents
Why is middle si incompatible with ~ ja phrase? If middle si as
impersonal si is an argument, specifically d free variablo, the
answer follows straightforwardly. To begin with/in (33) as
in (26), the obj ect a-role ends up wi th i bambini. Suppose then
that middle si,being" an argument, is assigned the subject
a-role; as an immediate consequence the same a-role is not
availaole for assignment through da to i genitori (the pareuts);
and, i genitori being an argument, (33) is ill-formed under the
a-criterion. Suppose on the other hand that i genitori is
assigned the sUbject a-role through the preposition da; as a
consequence1 the same e'-role is not a\'all able to middle 8i;
and/middle 8i being an argument, (33) is ill-formed under the
theta-criterion again. On the other hand, a chain
including both middle s1 and i genitori ,if both middle si ~nd
i gen! tori are arguments is also obviously impossible.
Thus the ungramrnaticali ty of (33), and in general the incompatibi 1i ,:..y
of middle 8i wi th da phrases I are easily accounted for if middle
s1 as impersonal .!! is an argument, specifically a free variable; if, on
the other hand this is not the case/the ungrammaticality of
(33), and in general the incompatibility of middle ai and da
phrases/remains unexplained. Thus, we can conclude l
on the basis of rather direct evidence/that impersonal ai
and middle !!. share semantic properties. One pI-oblem l1.c:1Never i left.
how are the properties of a free variable, an argument, and
the properties of a passiviser compatible? We will address
this problem shortly.
Consider now, on the other hand, the property of
impersonal si of being an N, a lexical nominal phrase, with
what follows for the purposes of Case assignment; and more
I
specifically the property of being associated with nominative
Case o~ equivalentlY,of being bound to its subject by cosuper-
scripting. Once more, there is at least a direct piece of
eviJence that this is a property of middle si as well. Example
(21) repeated below and example (34) show that, of the two
constructi.ons we have beel'l comparing to middle s1 constructions,
impersonal 5i constructions cannot and passive constructions
~an be embedded in a control context, respectively; example
(35) shows that middle 51 constructions pattern with impersonal
a1 constructions in this respect again, in that as impe~sonal
61 constructions they CarulOt: be embedded in a control context:
(21) *~, facile lavarsi volentieri i bambini
It is easy one to wash eagerly the children
(34) E'facile easere laveti volentieri
It is easy to be washed
(15) *E'fac11c lavarsi volentieri
It is easy to wash(middle; eagerly
The wel '.-formedness ,~ (34) is self explanatory. The ill-formed-
ness of (21) follows straightforwardl~as abov~ under the
assumpti~~ thpt !1 must be associated with nominative Case or
must be bound to its subject by cosuperscripting. For, ira
a cOutrol context there is no nominative Case for ai to end up
with. Equivalently, if 3_ is coruperscripted with PRO,
since PRO is not assignea any Case, middle si cannot be
trnnsmitted
any, hence the Case filter is violated with respe(~t to middle
51. What then about (35)? The answer is straightfoLward
if middle !i/as impersonal ai/must be associated with nominative
Case ortequivalently,bound to its subject by cosuperscripting.
If so, as impersonal !i, middle si is excluded from control
contexts because it canrlot be assigned nominative Case ~
Equivalently, if it is cosuperscripted with its subject PRO,
since PRO itself is not assigned any Case,
middle si cannot be trallsmi tted any, hence
the Case filter is violated with respect to middle 51. Obviously,
if this is the answer to middle 81 not being embedded in control
contexts/we expect middle s1 to be embedded/on the contrarY1
in raising contexts, where there is a nominative Case available
through cosuperscripting from the matrix subject.
as example (35) shows, this expectation is filled:
Indeed,
(35) I bambini sambrano lavarsi con facilita
The children seem to wash (rniddle) easily
Thus the impossibility for middle a1 to appear in control contexts,
aA well as its actual appearance in raising context~ is direct
evidence in favor of middle !i and impersonal !i sharing the
property of being N's, and indeed lexical nominal phrases,
~nd, more specifically, the property of being
associated with nominative Case or,equlvalently, bound to their
subj ects by c.:osuperscripting. There is however one problem left, which taAe~
an already familiar form: how can the proparties of a lexical
nominal phrase, associated with the nominative Case
or bound to its subject by cosuperscriptingbe compatible with
the properties of a passiviser? We will address this problem,
together wi th the earlier one concerning the cOIT,patibi li t.y of
the properties of passiviser and free variable, or in general
argument, immediately next.
To repeat ourselves once again, the question we are
faced with at this point is: assuming that middle si is on
the one hand a passiviser and on the other hand an argument, in
particular a free variable, and an N, in particular one associated
with nominative Case or equivalently bound to its subject by
cosuperscripting, how is the first property compatible with the
latter two? Recall we already concluded that, if middle
5i is a pas~iviser, a middle 8i construction is associated with
at least a passive-like structure, and con~retely an example like
(26) is associated with a strl1cture like (30). To make our
question more concrete we then ask: how are the semantic and Case
or binding properties cf middle si compatible with a passive-
like structure like (30)? Obviously these properties cannot
be mapped directly to (30). For one thing, assuming that
middle si in (30) is an argument, a free variable, there
is no way it can be assigned a a-role, the consequence being a
violation of the a-criterion. Specifically, once the object
i-role is assigned to i bambini, middle si must be assigned
the subject a-role. But the sUbject a-role is not available
to middle s1 from the predicate for the simple reason tha~
middle!! being a passiviser,the predicate does not assign any;
and, needless to say, the subJect i-role is not available to
middle 81 from the object of a da (by) phrase either. Hence,
- -
unless our assumptions about subject 9-role assignment are
changed, subject a-role assignment to middle si in (30) is
impossible. Thus middle si in (30) cannot be an argument, a
free vaI'iable; for, unless our assumptions about 9-role assign-
ment are changed, it cannot be assigned a a-role, in viola-
tion of the a-criterion. In addition, if middle ~ in (30)
is a naninal, and indeed a lexical nominal phrase t there is no way it can
be assigned a Case, the consequence being a violation of the
Case filter; nor a fortiori, is there a way it can be assiqned
nominative Case or ,.equivalently, be boW1d to its subject by
cosuperscripting. To begin with, middle si in (30) cannot be
cosuperscripted wi th its sUbj ect. For, if cosuperscripting holds between
two elements one of which is an AGR or a clitia like middle ~,
the two elements must share all features and relations, for
example person, number and gender features or 9-role assignment
relations; but the
subject in (30), i bambini, and middle 8i
obviously cannot. In t·lrn, if in (30) middle !.!.
cannot be cosuperscripted with its subject, it cannot be
associated with nominative Case either; for, it cannot end up
with nominative Case through cosuperscrioting with its subject,
and,obviously, being a clitic a~d not in subject position, it
cannot be assigned nominative Case directly. And finally, if
in (30) middle!! cannot be assigned nominative Cas~ it cannot
be assigned any other Case; for no other Case is assigned at all,given
tllat the acousative Case of the verb is eliminated by ITLiddle si
in its capaoity of passi"iser. Thu~ unless our assumptions
about cosuperscripting and/or nominative Case assignment are
changed, middle ~ in (30) cannot be bound to its subject
by cosuperscripting, nor be associated with norninQtive Case, nor
be associated with any Case at al~ hence in turn be a nominal
and indeed a le.'<:ical naninal phrase for the ptU.l;Oses of the case filter. In
conclusion, the semantic and Case or binding properties of middle
si cannot be mapped directly to (30) or to any similar passive-
like structure. Does this mean that the semantic and/or Case
or binding properties attributed to middle si arc incompatible
with the passiviser properties also attributed to it?
This is the time to go back to section 2.1.
Admittedly, the properties we attributed to middle ai cannot all
be map~ed to a normal phrase marker, a phrase marker representable
as a tree structure. But can the properties we attributed to
middle 8i be mapped to a restructuring phrase marker, a phrase
marker not representable by a tree structure? First,we know
that under condition 2.1(5) a restructuring phrase marker must
have a normal form, i.e. a set of normal phrase markers/tre~
structures it is in some sense equivalent to. The question ~hen
is: can the properties we attributed to middle ~ be mapped
to a set of tree stxuctures? Consider example (26) again. We
already know that it must be aSuociated at least with the tree
structure in (30)
since, phonological
pttoperties aside, (30) preserves the property of middle 81
of being a passiviser, what we are looking for is a ~ree
structure which preserves the semantic and Case or binding
properties of middle !i. And since normal forms are subject
essentially only to condition (7), stating that for each
two normal phrase markers in a normal form one must be
derivable from the other, what we are looking for, further,
is a tree structure which can be obtained from (30) by movement
or deletion or can yield (30) by movement or deletion. But we
already have such a tree structure, namely (24) above, the
structure we associated with the impersonal s1 construction
(1). Fo~ it is easy to see that in the set comprising (24)
and (30), at last, all of the properties of middle ai are
mapped, the passivizer property in (30) and the argumen t and Case
or binding properties in (24); and at the same time condition
2.1(7) is satisficJ/since there is a derivation by movement from
(24) to (30). It is worth noticing that, apparently/in (30) a
plural AGR with i bambini substitutes for a singular AGR with
impersonal si in (24); in reality we can assume tha~ while
the agreement relation, say a subcase of cosuperscripting, is
established in a-structure, the actual person, number and
gender feat\lreS are filled in in PF. If so, in a-structure tt ~re
is no substitution of features, which would violate 2.1(7),
but only different indexing, which does not count for the
purpose of 2.1(7). Thus the set cons:lstiJlg of (24) and (30)
is the answer to our original question: what kind of structure
is associated with middle!! constructions and concretely, what
kind of structure is associated with a middle ~ construction
like (26). But the set consisting of (24) and (30) is not a
normal phrase marker, rather the normal form of a restructuring
phrase marker
... ~l' ..
ence it is part of our answer that middle 8i
constructions are associated with restructuring phrase markers,
and that middle si is a restructuring lexical item, a lexical
item which can only be mapped to a restructuring phrase marker.
We notice at this point that one last property "f
middle s1 has not been taken into consideration yet. Th~~ is
illustrated by examples (36)-(39), which show that, in middle
5i constructions, the subject can never be 1st or 2nd person,
whether singular or plural, or indeed, that it must always
be 3rd person, as in (26) and other examples above:
(36) *5i invito volentiari
'I-invite (middle) eagerly
(37) ·5i inviti volentieri
'you-invite(middle,sing.) eagerly
(38) *S1 invitiamo volentieri
'We-write (middle) eagerly
(39) *81 invitate volentieri
'You-invite(middle,pl.) eagerly
What excludes (36)-(39)? Needless to say, E:.~~amples point by
point ide~tical, except that the veIb is a passive rather than
a middle, are perfeotly well-formed; and so are the impersonal
si counterparts
to (36)-(39). Now, we
notice first that person, number and gender features are obviously
associated with middle ai as a nominal and not as a passiviser;
second, we recall that in pairs of tree structures like (24) and
(30), the verb agrees in one tree (the impersonal!! tree) with
!!' and in the other tree (the passiviser si treE)with the
derived subject, ~ambini in (30). These two simple observations
offer us a key to the solution of our problem. We recall we
assumed above that agreement i~ an s-structure process as long
as the establishment of the agreement telation is concerned,
say a subcase of cosuperscripting, but is a PF process when it
comes to the filling in of the actual features. We now assume
that this is so for the number and gend,sr features , but that, as
for the person feature,agreement is an ~-structure process in
all of its aspects. Recall further we assumed above that
impersonal si, hence we add here middle si, is associated with
unspec~fied person, number and gender features, which are
assigned fixed values in PF, including 3rd person, etc. We
now assume that again this is so for the number and gender
features, but that, as for the person feat\lre, impersonal and
middle 6i are associated wi th 3rd pet'son to begir~ wi th. Under
these simple assumptions we already have a solution to the
ungrammaticalityof (36)-(39)/ as opposed to the gramrnacicality
of (26) and other sentences above. Consider a normal form
consisting of an impersonal!! structure, say (24), and a
passiviser si structure, say (30). In a-structure, in the
impersonal a1 tree !! cosuperscripts with AGR and, under
the assumption that it is associated with a 3rd person feature,
its 3rd person feature is £i lled in in /\GR. In the pass!viser 81
tx·ee the derived subject, i bambini J.• n (30), cosuperscripts
wi th AGR, and its person feature , 3rd perfJon in the case of
i bambini in (30) is filled in in AGR. NClW, the cosuperscripting,
of different nominals with /\GR in theimpersoflal and passiviser !.!
trees does not compromise the well-formedness of the middle
s1 normal form which contahs them under condition 2.1(,); but
under condition 2.1(7) if different features are filled in in
I
in the impersonal and passiviser 51 trees, the well-forrned-
ness of the middle 8i norloal forn, which conta.ns them is
compromised, since what amounts to a substitution process is
taking place between them. Hence, if in a middle s1 normal
form, as in the normal form consisting of (24) and (30), the
feature 3rd person, which is filled in in AGR in the impersonal
8i tree,
-
where si is the agreeing elemen~ is fjlled in in
AGR also in the passivi&er ai tree, the normal form is
well-formed; but if/as in the normal forms corresponding to
(36)-(39), the feature 3rd person is filled in in AGR in the
impersonal 5i tree, and the feature 1st or 2nd person
is filled in in AGR in the passiviser 51 tre~, the normal
form is excluded by 2.1(7). Thus middle 81 is compatible only
with 3rd person subjects. On the other hand, under the assump-'
tion that number and gender !~atures are filled in in AGR in
PF, what number and gender the subjects in middle ai construc-
tions are is obviously irrelevant.
In summary, in turn.t"g to
middle 8i and middle 8i constructions our first problem was:
what are the properties of middle s1? Our answer was that middle
s1 has all of tIle properties of impersonal si, and the one
additional property of being a passiviser; as in (40):
(40) middle 5i = Isi/,
free variable,
N,
clitic on a verb,
nominative/bound to its subject
by cosuperscripting,
passivizer
Our next problem was: what kind of structures are associated
with middle si constructions? Our conclusion was tha~ phonolo-
gical properties aside, the property of middle 5i of being a
passivizer maps to tree structures like (30); but the other
properties of middle si map to a different tree structure, an
impersonal 51 structure like (24). Altogethe~ then, the
structure associated with a middle 8i construction is a set
-
of tree structures, i.e. a restructuring phrase markeri in
the case of example (26),
(24) and (30), as in (41):
the set consisting precisely of
(41 )
s
---- ........~ piO j vp
1 f ~"~ siJ+fava i bambini
S
I barnbini i VP'-..~
si+lavano
)
J
The reason for the existence of a middle ai structure inaludlng
the impersonal !!' structure (24) but not of a middle si
structure including the other type of impersonal 81 structure,
(25), scarcelyneeds~entioning: in (25), the verb is already
associated with passive morphology, making it impossible for
the passivizer properties of middle ai to be realized.
Next, we take into consideration reflexive 81 and,
correspondingly/reflexive si con$tructions, both exemplified
in (42):
(42) I bambini 5i lavano con facilita
The children themselves wash easily
Our problem takes the familiar shape: what are the properties
of reflexive 8i? and correspondingly: what kinds of struc-
tures are associated with reflexive si constructions? Since,
on the other hand, we already know the properties of impersonal
and middle si, as enumerated in (23) and (40) respectively, we
can, to begin wi th, ask other questions wi th an already
familiar shape too: are the properties of reflexive si the
same as the properties of impersonal 01: nlidcle a1? () rare
there properties which belong to one and 110t to the other?
Or are their properties completely different?
To begin with, evidently, reflexive si is not a free
variable; example (42) already shows that reflexive!! is not
interpreted as ranging arbitrarily over the set of human indi-
viduals. On the contrary, example (42) shows that reflexive 8i
is interpreted as having exactly the same value as its s\1bject
i ba~~,~i (j r l.ndeed as being referentially dependent on its
S\lt:>ject,: i..u I,")t.,ber words, reflexive si is, as we write among i~s
p ....,Jp~x;ti(~ s, ,,-\ t:)(,und var iable. Thus, impersonal or
Iniddle si and reflexive ai have different semantic properties;
these different semantic properties, however, obviously con-
verge in that they both define impersonal or middle !! on the
one hand, and reflexive si on ttle other hand, as variable-like
elements. Indeed, not only impersonal or middle ~/as free
variables/are an exact counterpart among lexical elements of
PRO
arb empty categories; but impersonal or middle si together
with reflexive si are an exact counterpart among lexical
elements of anaphoric empty categories in general, since these 3150 are
variable-like elements which differentiate into free variables,
PROarb , and bound variables, control PRO and trace.
Next, reflexive si, like impersonal or middle si,
is a syntactic clitic on a verb. The ordering of reflexive
8i wi th respect to the negation ~ aIld to various complement
clitics proves this point; for example, as (43) shows, ~
appea~s in front of vi (there) and vi in front of reflexive ~:
(43) I bambini non vi 5i lavano con
The children not there themselves wash
facilita
easily
Thus we write that reflexive 51, as imper'sonal at middle si,
is a clitia on a verb/among its syntactic properties.
Next, like impersonal or middle si, reflexive ui has
categorial properties N, hence, ultimately, is a lexical no-
minal phrase, and as such caa and must end up with Case.
Obviously, being a eli tic, ref lexive si, like imperSOJlal or
middle a, cannot be assigned Case directly; rather, as in the
case of impersonal or middle si, in the case of reflexive s1
there can and must be an empty category pro cosuperscripted
with it, so that it ends 1.1P with Case by c06uperscipting.
However, contrary to impersonal or middle si, reflexive a1
is not associated with nominative Case nor, equivalently,
cosuperscripted with its subject. Indeed, (42) already shows
that reflexive !! ends up with the accusative Case
assigned by lavano. Thus, we write among the properties of
reflexive si, as with impersonal or middle si, that it is an
- -
N; but, as for the property of beirlg associa ted wi th nomi-
native Case or, equivalently, being buund to its sUbject by
cosuperscripting, imperuonal or middle 5i on the one hand and
reflexive 5i on the other hand, diverge. We notice, however,
that, in order to be semantically bound to some element,
reflexive si must first be syntactically bound to it by 00-
subscripting .. We notice further that Leflexive si/not
only can be semantically bound, and syntactically bound by
cosubscripting, to its subject, as already exemplified in (42),
but must also be. Consider for example (44)-(45). (44),
where reflexive s1 is a dative complement bou~ by cosub-
scripting to its subject, hence referentially dependent upon
it, is perfectly wellformedi (45), which is point by point
identical to (44), except that reflexive 81 is bound by cosub-
scripting to an object, hence referentially dependent upon it,
i~ completely ungrammatical:
(44) Mario 6i affid~ i bambini
Mario to-himself entrusted the children
(45) *Mario 8i affid~ i bambini
Mario to~themselves entrusted the children
Thus the Case properties of impersonal or middle 81 and of
reflexive !! still diverge in that the former two are
associated with nominativ~ Case and the latter is not
~owever, their binding properties converge in that the three
of them are bound to their subjects, though impersonal or
middle 5i by cosuperscripting, and reflexive si by c05ub-
scripting. We thus write among the properties of reflexive
8i that it is bound to its subject by cosubscripting,much as
we write among the properties of middle or impersonal 5i thdt
they are bound to their subjects by cosuperscripting.
Next, in the case of impersonal or middle !!.., being bound
to their sUbjects by cosuperscripting is equivalent to being
associated with the nominative Case; in the case of
reflexive si, being bound to its subject by cosubscripting can be S!IUWAA
to imply not being cosuperscr ipted wi th its subj ect, hence not
being associated with the nominative Case. Fo~we recall that
two elements in a cosuperscripting relation, in sharing Case,
share in a sense the same position and are in a sense indeed
the same element. So, one of
the two elements involved in a cosuperscripting relation must
be an Agr or a clitic~or else an expletive; and
if an Agr or a clitic is involved, the two elements
must share all features and all re-
lations -- for example person, ~umber and gender features,
a-role assignment relations and obviously cosub-
scripting relations.
But if so, suppose reflexive ai was bound to its
subject by cosuperscripting and was in a sense one element
with it; its subject could still bind it by cosubscripting,
but then it would have to bind itself by cosubscripting as well
and trivially no interpretation ~uld be available for such a configuration.
'ltlus, assuming that reflexive 6i is oound to its subject by cosub-
scripting, it indeed follows that it cannot be oound to its subject
by cosupelL-scripting; and since it cannot be round to its subject by cosuper-
scripting it cannot recelve naninative case. Rather, reflexive si rtU.lst be cosuper-
scripted with some element pro filling the accusative or
another complement position,and end up with accusative Case,
as shown already in (42), or another complement Case, speci-
fically dative, as shown already in (44) .
.
Finally, reflexive 6i can also be shown to be an
argument ending up with a a-role. To begin with,
we know that every position assigned a complement Case is also
assigned a complement a-role, since no complement position can
be moved into. Hence, if reflexive si is cosuperscripted with
a pro assigned a complement Case, the chain formed by reflexive
si and pro is always assigned that complement a-role; hence
reflexive ai must
be an argurnent. This is already exemplified in (44),
where reflexive 51 ends up
~ith the dative a-role. Further, for every accusative
Case assigned into an object position, since no object position
can be moved into, an object a-role is also
assigned into it. H~nce, if reflexive 8i is cosuperscripced
with a pro assigned accusative ~ase in an object position, the
chain that the reflexive !! and the pro form is always assigned
object e-role; hence middle reflexive !i must be
- to'\, ..
be an argument. This is ~lready
exemplified in (42), where reflexive 6i ends up
with object a-role~ Finally the one
case is left in which reflexive 5i is associated
with accusative Case not assigned into an object position, but
into the one other possible position, the subject position of
a small clause. For this case, we recall that every verb which
assigns accusative Case also forms a predicate which assigns
subject a-role, hence whose subject position is filled by an
argumen~or a place-holder in a chain with an argument .. Hence
in any case in which reflexive 8i is associated with accusative
Case, in being bourld to its subject by cosubscripting, it is round
to an argument, and consequently it is an argurrent itself; where th.e possibili-
ty that reflexive si serves as a trace of its subject, i.e.
enters a chain with it instead of being an independent argument
is eliminated by reflexive 61 and its subject having
different Cases. Hence obviously, if reflexive 81 is
cosuperscripted with a pro assigned accusative Case in the
subject position of a small clause, the chain formed by the
reflexive 8i and the pro is always assigned a a-role. Tnis
is exemplified in (46);
(46) Mario si vide sorridere
Mario himself saw smile
Thus, in general, reflexive si is indeed an argument, and lC
indeed ends up with a theta-role.
There is one problem left from what precedes. While
we established above that it is necessary to stipulate that
reflexive si is bound to its sUbject by cosubscripting, this
stipulation is apparently not sufficient. More precisely,
indeed, reflexive 51 must be bound to a nonderived subject,
as in (42)-(46), and not a derived subject, as in (47):
(47) WI bambini si furono affidati
The children to-themselves were entrusted
Now, by wt.at we know already of reflexive 81 and
of passive, the structure of (47) must be as in (48), where ~
is the trace of i bambini and reflexive 5i is cosuperscripted
with pro and cosubscripted with its subject, i bambini again.
(48) [8 I bambini i [VP sil+furono affidati t i proll]
- tOL·
In order for 9-role assignment tq give the correct result in
(48), i bambini and t must form a chain. But under the
definition of chain, any element in a chain must be locally
bound by the element immediately preceding it in the chain.
Now, in (48), while i bambini correctly binds ~, it does
not, incorrectly, bind it locally; rather, the pro locally binris ~.
Hence, i bambini and ~ cannot form a chainj and
under any other arrangement of chains, there is no proper
assignment of a-role under the a-criterion Thus, that.
reflexive si must be bound by cosubscripting to a nonderived
subject does not need to be
stipulated, but can be deduced.
Finally, the phonological properties of 81 are
identical to the phonological properties of impersonal or
middle si, /si/. There is one apparent problem in this respect,
assuming the relative ordering of clitics with respect to
each other to be essentially a PF level ph~n. The problem
is illustrated in (19) and (49). While the ordering of
reflexive si with respect to complement clitics like Yi (there)
is the same as the ordering of impersonal or middle si, as is
illustrated with middle ai in (27) and with reflexive si in
(43), (19) shows that impersonal ai is ordered after an accu-
sative clitic like!! !them), (49) shows that
(dative) reflexive s1 12 ordered before an
accu&ative clitia like 1i:
(19) Li si lava volentieri
Them one washes eagerly
(49) Mario se ,Ii affidb
Mario to-himself them entrusted
That the problem is only apparent is easily shown. We have
already established that impersonal and reflexive 5i differ
in that impersonal si is associated
with nominative Case and reflexive si with accusative Case, or dative
Case as in (49). The different ordering of impersonal si
in (19) and (dative) reflexive!! in (49) with respect to
an accusative clitia is then naturally attributed to their
different Case properties,
Next, we can recall
that, in discussing essentially PF level phenomena of agreement,
we reached the conclusion that impersonal or middle 81 are
associated with a 3d person feature and unspecified number and
gender features; and that person agreement
is an s-structure process, while number and gender agreement
actually are PF level processes. With respect to person, number
and gender features, reflexive!! is once more identical to
impersonal or middle sit Examples (50)-(53) show that reflexive
!! is not compatible with a 1st or 2nd person subject, whether
singular or plural. Examples (48), (43) and (44), (46), (49)
already show that reflexive!! is compatible with a plural 3d
person subject, i bambini, or a singular 3d person subject,
Mario; and it could as easily be shown that reflexive !! is
_ to~ ~
compatible with both masculine subjects, as in all of the
above examples, and with feminine subjects:
(50) *Si lavo volentieri
Myself I-wash eagerly
(51) *Si lavi volentieri
Yourself you-wash(sg] eag~rly
(52) *Si laviamo volentieri
Yourselves we-wash eagerly
(53) *5i lavate volentieri
Yourselves you-wash[pl) eagerly
If reflexive si, like impersonal or middle si, is associated
with a 3d person feature and unspecified number and gender
features, its compatibility with only 3d person subject~
though of any number and gender, is obviously explained. For,
if reflexive ai is bound to its subject by cosubscripting,
and a bound variable of it , it must agree wi th it in all
granunatical features. Hence, if reflexive a1 is itself 3d person
it obviously cannot agree with 1st or 2nd person elements,
hence it is incompatible with 1st or 2nd person subjects. If
on the other hand reflexive si has unspecified number and
gender features, it can agree in number and gender with any
element, hence it iscompatible wi th subj ects of any number and
gender. Thus reflexive ai is indeed associated with
a 3d person feature and unspecified number and gender features,
and in this respect is once more identical to
impersonal and middle !!.
_ to.,.
We can notice at this point/before concluding, that,
in attributing to reflexive si the properties of being a bound
variable and being bound to its SUbject by cosubscripting, we
have never mentioned what the status of reflexive s1 is with
. -
respect to the binding theory or with respect to such notions
as anaphor or pronominal. In general, we maintain that the
notions of (A-Pound varUWle and of anaphor are closely related
but not identical 9
Rather, we
maintain that the notion of (A-)oound variable is a t;emantic
notion, while the notion of anaphor
is a syntactic notion; and that being a bound va-
riable implies being an anaphor, but being an anaphor does not
imply being a bound variable. For example, if we maintain, as
in Manzini (1983), that the empty categories generally
designated as PRO
arb , controlled PRO, and trace are all ana-
phors, it is
clear that there is at least one class of anaphors, PROarb ,
which are not bound variables. Correspondingly, if we m,~intain
as in Manzini (1983), that there are positions in which ana-
phors can be free under binding condition A, it is clear that
for such elements as English himself/herself~.. or Italian
!!. (stesso) I!! (stessa) / ••• etc. •• it is insuf f icient to stipu-
late that they are anaphors; rather, it is necessary
to stipulate that they are (A-)bound variables. On the other
hand, if we maintain that all (A-)bound variables are also anaphors,
-I(~ •
we do not need to write among the properties of
an element that it is both a (A-)bound variable and an anaphor; ra-
ther,we can simply write that it is a(A-)bound variable and deduce
from this that it is an anaphor as well. In deed the impli-
cation from being a (A-)bound variable to being an anaphoJ: can
be naturally interpreted as some sort of redundancy rule be-
tween semantic and syntactic properties of an element. If so,
going back to reflexive si, the fact that it is a (A-)bound
variable already implies that it is an anaphor. As an anaphor,
reflexive!! is predicted to be bound in its governing category
by binding condition A . Obviously, assume that the
governing category for reflexive si is tha first sentence
which contains it, counting the verb on which it is a clitic
as its governor and the subject of the verb on which it is a
clitia as its sUbject and accessible subject. Since
by independent stipulations, reflexive 8i is bound to its
subject by cosubscripting, the prediction that it is bound in
its governing category necessarily holds true. Thus we con-
clude that reflexive ~ is an anaphor and that
follows from its being a (A-)bound variable. Thus, the
properties of reflexive ai diverge from the properties of
imperson~l or middle a1 in that it is an anaphor, but the
source of this divergence is once more a property, the property
or being a bound variable, with respect to which reflexive 8i
actually converges with impersonal or middle si, in that they
all are variable-like elements.
In summary, when we
turned to ref~exive si and reflexive 8i constructions our
probleln was first: what are the properties of reflexive ai?
and more specifically: what are the properties of reflexive
!! in relation to impersonal and middle si? Our answer is that
reflexive si, as impersonal or middle si , is phonologically Isi/;
is sanantically a b:>und variable, hence, as impersonal or middle 5i, a
variable-like element; like impersonal or middle si, is
an N and a clitic on a verb; and finally is bound toits subiect
by cosubscripting, hence, like impersonal or middle si, bound in generaJ
to its SUbject, as in (54):
(54) reflexive 8i = Isi/,
bound variable,
N,
clitia on a verb,
bound to its subject by
cosubscripting
Our problem was then: what kinds of structures are associated
with reflexive!! constructions? The answer is obvious; (42) ,
for example, is associated with structure (55~ and (44) with
structure (56), refelxive !! being accusative in (42)/(55) and
dative in (44)/(56):
( 55) ~s
i bambini i ~P.____ '
sir+lavano prof
(56)
--
Mario i
s'
si~+affidO
1
VP
i bambini pro~
1
Now, according to the lexical entries in (23), (40)
and (54), impersonal, middle and reflexive si respectively,
are largely identical and differentiate one from another in
essentially two ways. On the one hand, impersonal si and
middle 8i group together against reflexive si in that the
former two are bound to their subjects by cosuperscripting
and are semantically free variables, while the latter is
semantically a bound variable and is bound to its subjec~ by
cosubscripting. On the other hand, impersonal ai and re-
flexive si group together against middle ai in that the latter
has/and the former two do not have,passivizer properties. But
if the three major generally recogniz~d types of !! group as
indicated, a fourth type can logically be expected: a!i,
which, phonological properties lsi/ aside, is, like all si's,
an N and a clitia on a verb; is a bound variable and is bound
to its subject ~y cosubscripting like reflexive aii and is
a passivizer like middle si. To give it a name, rniddle-
reflexive si can be expected, as in (57):
(57) middle reflexive 8i = Isil,
bound variable,
N,
clitic on a verb,
bound to its subject by
cosubscripting,
passivizer
If middle-reflexive 5i then
.. \ o~ ..
exists, impersonal and middle si
pattern against reflexive and middle-reflexive 8i in that the
former two are free variables and bound to their subjects by
cosuperscripting, while the latter two are bound variables and
bound to their sUbjects by cosubscripting; and impersonal ana
reflexive si pattern against middle and middle-reflexive a1 in
- . -
that the former two are not passivizers, and the latter two
are.
Let us assume that middle-reflexive a1 indeed exists.
The next question is of course: what kinds of structures and
constructions is middle-reflexive s1 associated with? We
already know that middle si, in that it is a clitic on a verb
and a passivizer, gives rise to structures like (30). In the
case of middle-reflexive si, we can conclude that, as a clitic
on a verb and a passivizer, it also gives rise to structures
like (30):
(30) S
i bambini i VP
si+lavano t i
Once accepted structure (30), in the case of middle a1 we
then argued that its other semantic and syntactic propertie~
i.e. that it is an N and bound to its subject by cosuper-
scripting and a free variable, cannot be mapped to a tree
structure like (30) together with its passivizer property.
Rather, we argued that its properties as a whole can only be
- ,,\) ..
mapped to a restructuring phrase marker, whose normal form
consists of a passivizer si tree like (30), and, in
addition, of an impersonal s1 tre~ as in (41).
What about middle-reflexive si? Consider again (30). Can
8i in (30) be cosubscripted with its subject and attri-
buted the other properties of middle-reflexive !!,in addition
to the passiv1zer property? To begin with,
as a pas-
sivizer, middle-reflexive s1 associates with a verb, lavan0
in (30), which is a Case assigner and forms a predicate which
assigns the subject a-role; and yields a category which is not
a Case assigner and forms a predicate which does not assign
the subject a-role. Next, as an N and a lexical nominal phrase,
middle-reflexive!! must end up with a Case; and as cosub-
scripted with its subject, it must end up with accusative or
another complement Case, as proven above for reflexive si.
But how can middle-reflexive 51 end up with accusative Case
while taking it away as a passivizer? Clearly it cannot~
hence a violation of the Case filter ari3es, unless
some of the basic assumptions are changed.
Next, middle-
reflexive 5i must end up with a a-role, as proven above for
reflexive !1 again. Now, since the trace in (30) is locally
bound by middle-reflexive si, if it is cosubscripted with
its subject, middle-reflexive 5i can form a chain with the
trace in object position and end up with the object 9-role.
- \
But where does this leave the sUQject of middle-reflexive ~,
i bambini in (30)? Clearly, nowhere; i bambini cannot be
assigned object a-role, which is taken by middle-reflexive si
and cannot be assigned the subject a-role,
which is taken by middle-reflexive 81 again as
a passivizer. Fence, a violation of the 9-criterion arises,
unless some of our basic assumptions are changed. Thus in
the case of middle-reflexive si, as in the case of middle =1.1
we reach the conclusion that its pa5sivizer property and its
other semantic and syntactic properties are not compatible in
a normal phrase marker, a phrase marker representable by a
tree structure. Can the properties of middle-reflexive si,
like the properties of middle si, be represented in a restruc-
turing phrase marker? or, under condition 2.1 (5), in a
normal form, i.e. a set of tree structures which in turn,
under condition 2.1 (7), are related by movenlent or deletion or
else are phrase structure identical? If in the case of
middle si the normal forms it is associated with consist
of a tree like (30\, where middle 5i is a passivizer,
and of an impersonal ai tree, we can by analogy expect that
in the case of middle-reflexive s1 the normal forms it is
associated with consist of, again, a tree like (30) where
middle-reflexive si is a passivizer and of a reflexive !!
tree. Indeed, it is easy to ~heck that if the passivizer
.
properties of middle-reflexive si are mapped in a tree like
(30), all of its other properties are properties of reflexive
s1 as well, and are mapped in a reflexive ~ tree.
At this point, then, we only have to find a reflexive 5i tree-such L~t
a normal form consisting of it and, say" (3.0) satisf ies con-
dition 2.1(7~But we already have such a tree, namely (55); for,
it is easy to check that (30) and (55) are phrase structure
identical. Putting together (30) and (55) we obtain (58); where
the tree vn the lett is the reflexive !! structure reproduced
from (55) and the tree on the right the passivizer
!! structure reproduced from (30) j we then take (58) to
exemplify the type of structures associated with middle-
reflexive 5i:
VP
(58 )
s
.~' i bambini i
L sif+lavano
s
1 bambini i
si+lavano
VP
In what precedes, we have shown that an element
middle-reflexive!! associated with the properties in (57)
could existiand that, correspondingly, middle-reflexive 5i
structures of the type of (58) could exist.
But do middle-reflexive si and middle-reflexive 5i
constructions actually exist? In the case of impersonal,
middle and reflexive!! and si constructions, we started with
constructions and elements whose existence
was generally recognized; and
the question to solve was what the properties of these elements
· \, 1 ..
and constructions were. In the case of middle-reflexive ~,
we already know what its prcperties are and what the proper-
ties of middle-reflexive!! constructions are. Our problem
is the reverse of the preceding one: to find actual
examples of middle-reflexive si and middle-reflexive 8i
constructions. In this section, we will leave the problem
open.
Ultimately then, if we are correct, there ~re
four types of si's, impersonal !l, middle ~, reflexive si
and middle-reflexive !!,with the properties indicated in (23),
(40), (54) and (57) respectively. Correspondingly, there
are four types of si constructions: impersonal!i construc-
tions/as in (24)-(25), middle si constructions ,as in (41),
reflexive !i constructions, as in (55)-(56), and
middle-reflexive si constructions/as in (58).
But, if we are indeed correct, among the four types
of si's, impersonal 81 and reflexive ai have identical or
- - -
converging properties: they both have the same phonological
properties; both are nominals; both are clitics on a verb; both
are variable-like elements, though impersonal si is a free
variable ~ refl~ve si a bound variable; and both are bound
- "l,.
to their subjects, though impersonal si is bCtund by cosuper-
scri.pting and reflexive 5i is bound by cosubscripting. More-
over, middle si and eventually middle-reflexive ai have
- -
exactly the same properties as impersonal and reflexive 81
respectively, with the only difference that they are in
addition passivizers. If so, there is one obvious next step
we can take: in place of the four different types of sits, we
can introduce one only !i, with the propert.ies which impersonal
and reflexive !i have in common or converge on, plus an op-
tional passivizer property. This one !i, phonological pro-
perties lsi/ aside, is then a nominal; it is, by the way,
associated with 3rd person, unspecified number and gender
features; is a clitia on a verb; is semant.ically a variable-
like element, notated "x"; is bound to its subject; and
finally, as an optional property notated in parentheses, is
a passivizer, as in (59):
(59) a1 = /si/,
"x",
N, 3d person, unspecified number and gender,
clitic on a verb,
bound to its subject,
(passivizer)
Conversely, the unified!! in (591 ) can easily be
shown to correctly diversify into the four ty'pes of si' s iden-
tified above, where the existence of middle-reflexive !!
is now positively predicted. If, given th~ si in (59), its
obligatory properties are mapped to a phrase marker, but not
its optional passivizer property, impersonal or refl~xive s1
are obtained; if both its obligatory and its one optional
property are mapped, middle or middle-reflexive !! are
obtained. Further, given the properties of si of being a
variable-like element, "x", and of being bound by its subject,
impersonal or middle 8i are obtained if 51 is a free variable
and bound to its subject by cosuperscripting; if 8i is a
bound variable and bound to i~s subject by cosubscripting,
reflexive or middle-reflexive 8i are obtained. As it is easy
to see, there is just one problem with this deduction of
impersonal, middle, reflexive and middle-reflexive si from
the one si in (59). If the properties of impersonal or middle
!! are enumerated separately from the propertes of reflexive
or middle-reflexive si, the grouping of free variable pro-
perties with binding by cosuperscripting properties is just
stipulated;and so is the grouping of bound variable properties
with binding by cosubscripting properties. If, on the other
hand, the properties of 61 are enumerated together as in (59),
what prevents a !! from being a free variable and bound to
its subject by cosubscripting or, complementarily, a bound
variable and bound to its subject by cosuperscripting? Con-
sider first the first part of the question; this is illus-
trated by sentences like (60), where!! is bound to its
- "b.,
subject by cosubscripting and si is a free variable. What
makes (60) and similar sentences impossible?
(60) *I bawbini 1, si~ lavano pro~ con facilit~1 1
The children one wash '9asily
The answer is trivial: in general, we know that if an element
~ binds an element ~ by cosubscripting, ~ is referentially
dependent upon .~; in particular then, if, as in (60), !!
is bound to its subject by cosubscripting, 8i is referentially
dependent upon its subject, o~ given its variable-
like properties, a bound variable of its subj ect; hence it can
under no circumstances be a f:['ee varia 1)1e. Consider now the
second part of the question; this is illustrated by sentences
like (61), where si is bound to its subject by cosuperscripting
but is also bound to another nominal by cosubscripting, hence
referentially dependent upon it or a bound variable of
it. What makes (61) and similar examples impossible?
(61) *Marioi dice che pro
j
sil
Mario says that he(self)
i bambini
the children
"lava con facilita
washes easily
The answer is also evident, if in general an element which is an
(A-)boundvariable must also be an anaphor; hence in particular
a1 when a (A~)bound variable must also be an anaphor, as we moti-
vated above for reflexive al. For, assume
being a bound variable, !! is also an anaphor. If so
- "'\.
by binding condition A, 51 must be bound by cosub-
scripting in its governing category, where its governing
category, as motivated above for
reflexive si, in tIle embedded sentence.
Bl1t 81 is not bound in the embedded sentence
by cosuscriptingi hence binding condition A is violated.
Thus, (61) is excluded and so are all examples in which ~j is
a bound variable and not bound to its subject by cosubscripting.
~ then is a bound variable if and only if it is bound to its
subject by cosubscripting; cornplementarilY1 s1
is a free variable if and only if it is bound to its sUbject
by cosuperscripting. Thus, ultimately, the unification of
the different types of sits into the 81 in (59) can be upheld.
__ It ~ _
3.2 More Ii and other constructions
In the preceding section we proceeded from the
examination of maximally simple examples of impersonal, middle
and reflexive si constructions to the determination of the
properties of impersonal, middle and reflexive si, then to the
introduction of middle-reflexive 5i and 5i constructions,
and finally to the unification of impersonal, middle, reflexive
aDd middle-reflexive si in one lexical item 8i. In this section
we will start where we left in the preceding section, with the
unified ~, and go on to discuss both more complicated examples
of 5i constructions and examples of impersonal/reflexive/ middle
constructions in languages other than Italian. As for more
complicated examples of 5i constructions, we will take up again
from the preceding section the interaction of
ai with agent phrases,with control, with raising, and with
Exceptional Case Marking/small clauses, and we will deal in
addition with the interaction of si with "small
clause relatives", and with inversions. All the relevant examples,
we will argue, follow naturally under our assumptions; most
interestingly, the interaction of ai and"srnall clause relatives"
follows only if the existence of middle-reflexive si is assumed.
As for examples of impersonal/reflexive/middle constructions
in languages other than Italian,we will then take into considera-
tion ~ constructions in French
and ~ constructions in Icelandic. French se and
Icelandic -at, we will argue, have essentially the same
properties as Italian si; most interestingly, the differences
among the ~ee languages depend simply upon which ones of the
properties of the impersonal/reflexive/middle element are
taken to be obligatory.
To begin with, we recall that if our conclusions in the preceding
section are correct, the lexical itan si is associated with the properties in (1):
(1) ai = /si/
"x"
N, 3d person, unspecified number,
unspecified gender
clitia on a verb
bound to the subject of the verb that it
is a clitia on
(passivizer)
Furthermore, if our conclusions in the preceding section are
correct, depending upon whether si is a bolUld or a free variable,
whether it is bound to its subject by cosuperscripting or
by cosubscripting.and whether it is a passivizer or not,
the four different types of si are obtained: impersonal si,
middle si, reflexive 8i and middle-reflexive 8i. In particular,
if si is a free variable
cosuperscripting,
and bound to its subject by
impersonal or middle 8i are
obtained1 if 8i is a bound variable and bound to its subject
by cosubscripting, reflexive or middle-reflexive
si are obtained. Furthermore, if si is not a passivizer,
impersonal or reflexive!! are obtained; if si is a passivize~
middle or middle-reflexive 81 are obtained. Hence impersonal ai is si
when a free variable,bound to its subject by cosuperscripting
and not a passivizer; middle 51 is s1 when a free variable,bound to
its subject by cosuperscripting and a passivizell reflexive si is s1
when a bound variable, bound to its subject by cosubscripting and
-Il.~.
not a passivizer; middle-reflexive si is 81 '-Jhen a bound variable, bolU1d
to its subject by cosubscripting and a passivizer. This we
sum up in (2):
(2)
non-passivizer
pas5ivizer
free vbl/bound
to its subject by
cosuperscripting
impersonal 81
middle 5i
bound vbl/bound
to its subject
by cosubscripting
reflexive 81
middle-reflexive
si
Consider first the interaction of si constructions with
agent phrases. In impersonal and reflexive 81 constructions
agent phrases are trivially excluded by the a-criterion. For
in impersonal !i constructions, if the subject 9-role is
assigned to !!, it cannot be assigned to the object of ~(by),
and vice versa if it is assigned to the object of ~, it cannot
be assigned to si, in both cases violating the a-oriterion, as
in (3). Similarly in reflexive si constructions, if the subject
a-role is assigned to the subject, it cannot be assigned to the
phrase, and vice versa if it is assigned
to the da phrase, it cannot be assigned to the subject, in both
cases violating the a-criterion, as in (4);
- \t\_
(3) * ~roj [si j mangia volentieri Ie me Ie] dai bambini1
One eats eagerly the apples by~the children
(4) * [I bambini i [Sit Iavano volentieri pro j] dai genitori J
The children themselves wash eagerly by~the parents
,
In middle and middle-reflexive si constructions, ~, agent phrases
are excluded by exactly the same reasons by which they are ~luded
in ~rsonal Md reflexive 8i constructions. In particular,
in middle 8i constructions, as for example in (5), an agent phrase
can appear in the passivizer 5i tree, as in the lower tree
in (5), but, 'because of the theta-criterion, not in the i.mperson~l si tree, as
L~ the upper tree in (5): hence, because it is excluded in the impersonal
8i tree, the agent phrase is altogether excluded in the middle
si construction. Similarly, in middle-reflexive 81 construc-
tions, as for example in (6), an agent phrase can appear in the
passivizer !! tree, as in the lower tree in (6), but, because
of the theta-criterion, not in the reflexive 8i tree, as in the upper
upper tree in (6); hence, because it is excluded in the ref lexiva
!! tree, the agent pbrase is altogether excluded in the rniddle-
reflexive ai construction:
(5) * 5 rpro j [si j mAngia volentieri Ie meIe1dai bambind ~
l fLe melei[si mangiano volenticri t ildai bambini)
The apples eat (mid) eagerly by the children
-tll~
(6) * IfI bambiniifsi i lavano volentieri pr~jJdai genitori]l
[I bambinii[si lavano volentieri proJ]dai genitori 1 ~
The children wash(mid-refl) eagerly by the parents
Consider next the interaction of si constructions with
control constructions. To beqin wi th, control constructiOl\S
are incompatible with impersonal ~! constructions, as in (7);
furthermore, control constructions are incompatible with
middle si constructions, as in (8):
(7) * E l difficile [PRO j knvitarsi j volentieri gente]]
It is difficult one to invite eagerly people
(8) * {E1difficile [PRO j [invitarsi j volentieri e ]] J
lEI difiicile [PROi [invi tr.~si volentieri ti J
It is difficult to invite (mid) eagerly
Obviously enough, the incompatibility of impersonal 8i
constructions and control constructions, as in (7), is
accounted for by the Case filter. Indeed if, as in (7), the
subject of impersonal !! is a PRO and impersonal ai and the PRO
are cosuperscripted, the Case filter is violated, since impersonal
si is neither assigned Case directly nor assigned
Case through PRO, PRO lacking Case by definition. Similarly
the incompatibility of middle 81 constructions and control
oonstruction, as in (8), is accounted for by the Case filter again.
Indeed si violates the Case filter in the impersonal tree,
as in the upper tree in (8), exactly as it does in impersonal
Jj constructions; hence, since the impersonal si tree is excluded
by the Case filter, the middle ~ construction as a
whole is excluded.
Next, consider the interaction of si constructions
with raising constructions. Raising constructions are
incompatible with impersonal si constructions, as in (9):
(9) * pro j risulta [pro j Lnangiar~ij volentieri le mele) J
It turns out one to eat eagerly the apples
Obviously enough, in (9) and in similar sentences involving
raising and impersonal !i, the sUbject of the raising sentence
and of !i must be a pro, as indicated; indeed, given that
impersonal !i must be cosuperscripted with its subject and
Case assigned through it, its subject must itself be directly
or indirectly Case assigned.
In turn the subject of a raising sentence can be
indirectly Case assigned through cosuperscripting with the
subject of the matrix sentence, as also indicated.
But a pro subject of a raising sentence can
be easily argued not to be properly identified; if so, the sUbject
of a raising sentence cannot actually be a pro. Hence in (9)
and in similar sentences the embedded subject roth must and cannot be
a pro; therefore, that raising constructions are incompatible wi th
impersonal !! constructions is correctly predicted. On the
other hand, raising constructions are perfectly compatible
with middle a1 constructions, as in (10):
(10) ~proj risulta[proj\~man:iarsijvolentieri le mele)J 1
11e mele i risul~anoL t i lmangiarsi volentieri t i ] J
The apples turn out to eat (mid) eagerly
If impersonal 51 is incompatible with raising in (9), the
question arises how impersonal si can be compatible with
raising in the upper tree in (10); rather obviously the answer
can be argued to lie in the nature of the identification
conditions for pro's, and in particular in the level they
belong to. Recall we assumed that in (9) and similar examples
the pro subject of the raising sentence and of the impersonal
8i is not properly identified. Suppose now we assume that the
identification conditions for pro's do not belong to a-structure,
as is implicit in the discussion of (9), but rather to PF.
If so, examples like (9) are still correctly predicted to be
excluded; for they are now predicted to be well-formed in
a-structure, but they are still predicted to be ill-formed,
under the proper identification conditions for pro's, ance
mapped to PF. In addition, examples like (10) are n0W
correctly predicted to be well-formed; for in a-structure
both the passivizer si tree and the impersonal 8i tree are
now predicted to be well-formed, wr~lcin PF the passivizer 8i tr~~
obviously also predicted to be well-formed. Hence, that raising con-
structions are canpatible with middle 5i constructions is correctly predicted.
Next, consider the interaction of si constructions and
Exceptional Case Marking/small clause constructions. Whether
the propos! tional complements of verbs like perception '1erbs
are sentences subject to Exceptional Case Marking or small
clauses, they are incompatible with both impersonal si and
middle !!, as in (11) and (12) respectively:
(11) if Vidi rpro j hnangiarsi j vo1entieri 1e me1e j J
I saw one eat eagerly the apples
(12) if SVidi [pro j fmangiarSi j vo1entieri 1e me1e 1]1
eVidi [1e me1e i fmangiarSi vo1entieri t i 1]
I saw the apples eat (mid) eagerly
Minimally, examples like (11) are ~xcluded by the proper
identification cond'itions on pro's, exactly as examples like (9)
are. Indeed in (ll) the embedded subject can and must be
assigned Case by the matrix verb and transmit Case to impersonal
!! through cosuperscripting; hence,give~ that it must be an
empty category, it must be a pro rather than a trace or PRO.
But an accusative pro not associated with a clitia can be easily
argued to be excluded under any possible conception of prcp~r
identification for pro's. Hence minimally examples like (11)
are excluded because the embedded subject pro is not
properly identified. But, as examples like (9),
examples like (11), if excludt.!d only by the identification
conditions on pro's, are excluded only in PF if the
identification conditions on pro's belong to PF. If so,
the question arises why examples like (12) are not wellformed,
as examples like (10) are. For, under the identification
conditions on pro's, in s-structure both the passivizer
si tree and the impersonal si tree are well-formed; and
while the impersonal si tree would be ill-formed in PF under
the identification conditions for pro's, if only the passivizer
!! tree is mapped to PF, it is well-formed there. Evidently, if
examples like (12) are to be excluded, the reasons must be
other than the lack of proper identification for the embedded
subject pro in the impersonal si tree. Now,
the passivizer 8i tree in (12) as in (10) can only be well-formed
at all levels. For, passive morphology and passivizer 8i are
essentially equivalent; but if passive mor~hology is substituted
for passivizer 81 i~ the lower tree in (12),
a structure is obtained corresponding to a well-formed
sentence, though a (semantically) odd one.
Ultimately then, if examples like (12) are to be excluded,
the impersonal si tree in (12), and indeed the impersonal si phrase marker
in (11), must be excluded by sare s-strueture condition. Which
conditio~ is an open guess; may be, since accusative expletive
eli tics must also be excluded in some way, whatever condition excludes
them , also excludes accusative expletive pro's independently of proper iuentificr~·r:irj'
Next, we consider the interaction of 81 constructions
with "small clause relatives". But
first we take into consideration "small clause relatives"
themselves. "Small" clause relatives" are
expressions headed by a participle, hence "sInall clauses",
and mOClifying a noun or ~p in the way of restrictive relatives,
hence, "relatives" or properly "restrictive relatives". Crucially, t}1e
participle heading a "small clause (restrictive) relative"
must either be a passive participle, as in (13a), or the
participle of an ergative verb, as in (13b)i and can neitller be the
participle of an intransi tive -:1erb, as in (130), nor of a transitive
verb, whether the transitive verb has an. ordinary '::>bject, as in (13d),
or an anaphoric object,as in (13e), or
object, as in (13f):
(13) a. Un \~mo lavato dalla pioggia
A man washed by the rai.n
b. Un uomo venuto da Rama .
A man come from Rome
c.*Un uomo te1e fonato a Maria
A man telephoned to Maria
d.*Un uomo lavato i1 pavimento
A man washed the floor
e.*Un uama lavato se stesso
A man washed himself
f.*Un uomo 1avatolo
A man washed it/him
a cliticized
On the other hand, in addition to "small clause (restrictive)
relati'ves", expressions headed by a participle are found which IOCX:1ify
an NP in the way of non-restrictive relatives; these "small
clause" non-restrictive "relatives" can be headed by any kind
of participle, passive, ergative, intransitive, and transitive,
as in (14):
_\ l..l-
(14)a. Mario, lavato dalla pioggia . . .
Mario, washed by the rain
b. Mario, venuto da Rama, . . .
Mario, come from Rome
c. Mario, telefonato a Maria,
Mario telephoned to Maria
d. Mario, lavato i1 pavimento,
Mario washed the floor
e. Mario, lavato se stesso,
Mario washed himself
f. Mario, lavatolo, •..
Mario washed it/him
Our problem is what structures "small clause relatives" like
(13) and (14) are associated with. To begin with, in (140)-
(14£) the participle is understood to have a subject, identified
wi th the I'lP
The subject
the sma:.l clause relative modifies.
of the partici.ple must be an empty
anaphor,since it is easy to see that, whether Jirectly or
indirectlY,it cannot be assigned Case; and must in particular
be a PRO, since it is easy to see that it is not dependent
upon an antecedent in a-role assignment. Further-
more, the sUbject of the participle must be interpretively
related to the NP the participial expression modifies,
though it is unclear how, whether it is by cosubscripting under
the conditions on binding or by soma other mechanisms under
some other conditions. On the other hand, in (14a)-(14b) and
- lL~-
(13a)-(13b) the participle has an object understood to be
identical to the NP the participial expression modifies. Since
the participle does not assigne Case, its object can and must
be a trace or a PRO; whether it is a trace or a PRO depends
upon whether the participle has a subject PRO, as we established
for (140)'- (14f) or no sUbject: if the participle has a subject
PRO the object is its trace, if the participle has no subject
the object is itself an argument and a PRO. By analogy with
(140)-(14f) we can assume that in (14a)-(14b) and (13a)-(13b)
the participle must have a sUbject, though under what
conditions is once more unclear. Finally, (130)-(13£) remain to be
taken into account. The only difference between (lJa)-(l3b)
and (130)-(13£) seems to be that the participles in (13a)-(13b)do not
assign accusative case and subject a-role, while the participles
in (13c)-(13f) assign subject a-role and eventually object
Case. We can then asswne that n small c,lause re latives" of the
restrictive type in (13) can only be headed by participles not
assigning object Case and subject a-role, and not by participles
aosigning subject a-role and eventually object Case. In particular,
we can assume that a condition of some sort restricts modifiers
of a noun/NP to expressions belonging to certain categories
only, and that such a condition, whatever its exact nature, is
able to discriminate between participles which assign object
Case and/or subject a-role and participles which do not.
Agam, not every aspect of our account is clear;
our concern here however
- t '>0 ~
is not "small clause
relatives'~ but rather the interaction of "small clause relatives"
with 5i constructions.
-
Consider then the interaction of "small clause relatives"
and 5i constructions. Trivially, "small clause relatives" of both
the non-restrictive and the restrictive kind are incompatible
with both impersonal 5i constructions, as in (15), and middle
8i constructions, as in (16):
(15) * Un uomo [PRO j
A man
(16) *~un uomo (PRO j
{un uomo [PROi
A man
(1avato si j i1 pavimento j 1
one washed the floor
[1avato si j e )) I
[1avato si t i ]]
washed (mid)
Indeed if, as indicated in (15) and (16), "small clause relatives"
are control constructions, they are incompatible with impersonal
and middle 8i constructions for the same reasons for which other
control constructions are, as in (7) and (8). S pacifically,
in (15) as in (7), the Case filter is violated because
impersonal !!. does not receive Case neither directly nor indirectly
through cosuperscripting wi th PRO, since PRO i t';.self, by
definition, is not Case assigned. Similarly, in (16) as in (8),
the passivizer si tree is excluded once more for the
reasons for which the impersonal a1 constructions in (7) and (15)
are; hence the middle 8i construction as a whole is excluded.
Not much more interestingly, reflexive 8i constructions are
predicted to be compatible with "small clallse relatives" of
the non-restictive variety and incompatible with "small clause
relatives" of the restrictive variety, as in (17):
(17) * Un uomo ( PROi [lavato si1pro j J)
A man washed himself
Reflexive 8i constructions are just ordinary transitive construc-
tions wi th an object eli ticised and anaphoric. Since, as
we saw in (14d)-(14f), transitive constructions are in general
compatible with "small clause relatives", including
transitive constructions with cliticised objects as in (14f)
and with anaphoric objects as in (14e), reflexive 61 construc-
tions can only be compatible with non-restictive "small clause
relatives". Furthermore since,as we saw in (13d)-(13f),
restrictive "small clause relatives" are incompatible with
transitive constructions, and in particular with
transitive constructions with cliticised objectsfas in (13f),
and with anaphoric objects,as :.n (13e), reflexive si constructions
can only be incompatible with restrictive "small clause relatives".
Quite inteI~stingly, however, the terminal string in
(17), associatad with the interpretation indicated there,is
acceptable n.:>t only as a non--restrictive "small clause relative"
but also as a restrictive "small clause relative". Barring the
possibili ty that restrictive "small clause re latives" are actually
compatible with reflexive!! constructions, the one
possibility left is that middle-reflexive a1 constructions
are compatible with both restrictive
and non-restrictive "small clause relatives", as in (18):
(18) S Un uomo [PROi llavato 5ii pro
j J1 l
l Un uomo [PROi [lavato 5i i t i )] J
A man washed (mid-refl)
As a non-restrictive "small clause relative" (18) is obviously
well-formed; for, the impersonal a1 tree is well-formed exactly
as the impersonal ~i construction in (17) is, and the passivizer
si tree is well-formed exactly as a passive construction like
(l4a) is. But how can (18) be well-formed as a restrictive
"small clause relative"? To begin with, the passivizer si
tree in (18) is obviously well-formed, since passive construc-
tions like (13a) in general are. The question then is how the
reflexive si tree in (18) can be well-formed; for, as a
restrictive "small clause relative" the reflexive 81 construc-
tion in (17) is ill-formed, and in general transitive construc-
tions are, no matter whether their objects are c11ticised or
anaphoric. The key to the answer lies in the
condition which, whatever its exact content, restricts the heads
of restrictive "small clause relatives" to participles not
assigning accusative Case and subject a-role. We can recall
th.at in our discussion of ( 9) and (10) we solved the apparent
contradiction between the incompatibility of raising constructions
and impersonal ~ c~nstructions and the compatibility of
raising constructions and middle ~! constructions by
postulating that the conditions violated in the interaction of
raising and impersonal 6i are conditions in PF.
By analogy,we can then hypothesize that the condition which,
whatever its exact content, restricts the heads of restrictive
"small clause relatives" to participles not assigning accusative
Case and subject a-role, is a condition in PF. If so, it is easy
to see that a reflexive s1 construction like (17) is still
predicted to be ill-formed as a restrictive "small clause
relative" in PF. On the other hand, a middle-reflexive
si construction like (18) can be predicted to be well-formed
as a restrictive "small clause relative" if the
passivizer si tree is mapped to PF and not the reflexive 81
tree. Thus we know too little about "small clause
relat1ve~' themselves to work out a full theory of their interac-
tion wi th !! constructions; but if our approach is correct they at least
provide a context in which reflexive ai constructions are
excluded and middle ai constructions acceptable.
This in turn is an important piece of evidence that middle-
reflexive s1 constructions, which our general theory of 8i
constructions induces us to postulate, actually exist.
Consider finally the interaction of !! constructions
ana subject inversions. With respect to impersonal!! construc-
tions, the question of the compatibility or incompatibility
with subject inversions scarcely arises; for, impersonal si
constructions obviously have cliticised subjects, the impersonal
sits themselves, and cliticised elements obviously fill a fixed
position. Middle!! constructions, on the other hand, are
obviously compatible with subject inversions; in particular
in the passivizer si trees, instead of movement from the object
into the subject position, there can simply be cosuperscripting
between the subject and the object position, creating a
subject inversion construction, as in (19):
(19){[pro~ [ai j mangia volentieri Ie mele~] !
[pro) [ai mangiano volentieri Ie mele)]J
As for reflexive si
eat (mid) eagerly the apples
constructions, CbVlO~~1Y/as other transitive constructions,
they are compatible with inversion of
the subject in post-VP position; equally obviously, on the
other hand, as other transitive constructions,
they are incompatible with inversion of the subject
in object position, the object position being independently
filled. Finally, then, middle-reflexive si constructions are
left; are middle-reflexive !! constructions compatible or
incompatible with subject inversions? In general middle-
reflexive!! constructions are compatible with subject
· ,~~ -
inversions; more particularly, in the padsivizer si trees,
exactly as in the passivizer si trees of middle si construc-
tions, the subject, instead of being moved from object
position, can fill the object position, creating a subject
inversion construction
position', as in (20):
into object
(20)1rI b~mbinii [sii lavano volentieri p~oj 11l
[proJ[si lavano volentieri i bambini J ]J ~
wash (mid-refl) eagerly the children
At this point we can recall that in non-restructuring construc-
tions, there is a one-to-one correspondence between subject
inversion into object position and the possibility of
cliticization of ~, the genitive clitia, from a subject. The
question naturally arises whether the same correspondence holds
for restructuring constructions. To begin with, in middle 5i
constructions which have subject inversion into object position
in the passivizer ~ tree, ne cliticization from what can be
described as the object in the impersonal si tree and as the
inverted subject in the passivizer si tree is obviously
possible, as in (21):
(21)5(pro j fse j nek mangia volentieri [molte prok JJ 1
I [ pro j l:se nek mangiano volentieri [molte prokJ j ] ]
of them eat (mid) eagerly many
· t ~6 •
But is E! cliticization possible in middle-reflexive 5i
constructions which have subject inversion in the passivizer
si tree, from what can be described as the inverted subject
in the passivizer 81 tree but only as the subject in the
reflexive si tree? The answer obviously depends upon what
conditions exactly account for the possibility of ne cliticiz-
ation from an object or an inverted subject in object position,
but not from elements in other positions, and upon what level
these conditions belong to~ If the conditions which exclude
ne cliticization from positions other than the object belong to PF,
then ne cliticization is predicted to be canpatible with middle-reflexive
si structures; for, if the passi,vizer ai tree is mapped
to PF and not the reflexive !! tre~
ne eli ticization is obviously possible in it fran the subject
inverted into object position. On the other hand, if the
conditionswhich allow ne cliticization only from the object
posi tion belong to a-structure, then ne cl Lticization is J;)re1.icteU to be
incanpatible with middle-reflexive ai structurerJ; for, no matter what haPI;eI1S ~n
t.ne passivizer !! tree, in tie reflexive a1 tree ne cliticization
is impossible from the subject. The data are
controversial;~t~rjudgement is that middle-reflexive ai
constructions, as reflexive 81 constructions, are incompatible
with E! cliticization, as in (22):
(22) *~ f[ Molti prok ] i [ sel nek lavano pro j JJ ~
{ [ pro j [se nek lavano [molti prok1j 11
nf ~h~m washCmid-refl\ manv
_ 1~1-.
At this point, then, we are l~ft with the problem
of impersonal/reflexive/middle element~ and impersonal/
reflexive/middle construction~ in languages other than Italian.
Does our theory of 81 and si constructions extend to these
elements an' constructions as well?
Consider first French. The French element se seems
to be identical in all respects to Italian si,with the
one exception that it cannot be associated with impersonal
constructions, as in (23):
(23) *Se lav~ facilement les enfants
Or1e washes easily the children
Can we extend the theory of Italian si to French ~I and
at the same time account for the impossibility of imper-
sonal se constructions? It is easy to see that the answer
is positive. To begin with, we know that,quite independently
of ai/se and ~~~ constructions, Italian and French differ
in that Italian is a "null subject" or "pro-drop" language ,
and French is not; indeed,in Italian the Agr of a tensed
sentence can properly identify a pro in the subject position,
which is not the case in French. If so, it is easy to see
that
can be
impersonal ~ constructions in French
excluded, contrary to impersonal 5i construc-
tiona in Italian, on the grounds of the "pro drop" or "null
SUbject" parameter; so that se in French ~_ n
have exactly the same properties as si in Italian,
~ '~ ,
J " '- • ~
- "~"
and their otherwise similar behavior can be straightfor-
wardly accounted for. Indeed,we saw already that in the
Italian counterparts to examples like (23) the subject
position is filled with an expletive pr~ cosuperscripted
with impersonal si and properly identified by the Agr of
the sentence. In French examples like (23) ,however,no
pro can fill the subject position; for, under the "pro
drop" or "null subject" parameter, the Agr of the sentence
cannot properly identify it. It is true that in French
the consequences of the "pro drop" or "null subject" para-
meter can sometimes be escaped in the case of expletive
I
subjects/by using,in the place of the expletive pro of
languages like Italian,a lexical expletive; but this is
not generally the case. Indeed, in French the lexical exple-
tive il seems to be able to coexist only with a quantified
subject; if so, however, examples like (24), where i1 is
cosuperscripted with se/are obviously excluded:
(24) *Il se lave facilement les enfants
One washes easily the children
Furthermore, we have seen already that/quite independently
of how Italian 81 and French se relate to each other, the
proper identification conditions on pro's must be postulated
to be conditions in PF and not in s-structure.lf so, the
prediction correctly is that/though impersonal ~ structures
like (23) are illformed ,
the middle se structures which contain them are wellforrned,
as in (25):
(25) Les enfants se lavent facilement
The children wash(mid)easily
Indeed if the proper identification conditions on pro's are in PF,
examples like (25) are wellformed in s-structure exactly
as their Italian counterparts are; and in the same way they
are obviously wellformed in PF I given that only
the passivizer se tree is mapped there. 'rhus, to begin with,
we can assu~e that Italian si and French se have axactly
the same propertiesland explain on these grounds their
largely similar behavior, while at the same time accounting
for the impossibility of impersonal ~ constructions on
the grounds of the independent.ly needed "pro
drop" or "null subject" parameter.
There is however a second way to extend the theory
of Italian si to French !!. Suppose we assume that French
se has the same properties as Italian si, except that,while
for Italian 81 the passivizer property is optional, for
French se the passivizer property ~s as obligatory as the
nominal properties. It is easy to see that, under such
assumptions, !! can be associated with middle construc-
tions but not with impersonal constructions again. Indeed
we saw already that,in Italian~impersonal a1 constructions arise
when the obligatory naninal properties of ai are mapped to
s-structure but not its optional passivizer property.
If in French the passivizer property of se is an obligatory
property, there is no way of mapping only its nominal
properties to s-structure without violating the Projection
Principle; 'hence again impersonal se constructions are
exclude~. Thus, as a second option we can assume that
Italian 6i and French se differ mjnimally in that the
passivizer property which both include is optional in
Italian but obligatory in French; from which, as we just
saw, the impossibility of impersonal!! constructions
straightforwardly follows. It is not difficult to s~e,
however, that the two different extensions of the
theory of Italian 5i to French!! suggested here while'~valent
Mdboth correct with respect to impersonal and middle construc-
tions, actually differ with respect to reflexive
and middle-reflexive constructions. If, as we suggested first,
French!! has exactly the same properties as Italian ai/and
the impossibility of impersonal se constructions is to be
explained solely on the grounds of the proper identification
conditions on pro's, reflexive and middle-reflexive se con-
structions are obviously predicted to be both found in French.
If on the other hand, as we suggested next, French se
minimally differs from Italian s1 in that a1 has an
optional passivizer property/while se has an obligatory
passivizer property, the prediction obviously is that
French has middle-reflexive but not reflexive se constructions.
For, if the impossibility of Fr~nch impersonal si con-
structions is predicted solely on the grounds at the
proper identification conditions on pro's, then these
conditions are simply irrelevant in the case of non impersonal
constructions. On the other hand, if the impossibility of French
!! constructions depends upon the fact that in French all of
the properties of !! are obligatory, including, contrary to s1
in Italian, its passivizer property, tllen reflexive se con-
structions are impossible for the same reason impersonal se
constructions are, because only the nominal properties of
se are mapped to s-structure and not its passivizer property,
in violation of the Projection Principle. Unfortunately, though
in principle there is a straightforward way of telling apart the
two hypothesis of solution advanced here, in practice we know
of no context in French which allows for reflexive but not
middle-reflexive se constructions. If in such a context a reflexive
!! construction were actually wellformed, this would support
our first hypothesis; if it were not, our second hypotheois
would be supported. But in absellce of such a context, which
one of the two hypotheses is the correct one remains untestable.
Cons;.der then Icelandic. Icelandic has an element -at
which, like French se and unlike Italian ai,gives rise to
middle but not to impersonal constructions, what is ,more,
in Icelandic/contrary to French there
actually is a way of telling that -at gives rise to middle-
- \~t ..
reflexive but not reflexive constructions. So, for
example, there actually is a way of telling that in Icelandic the
~ construction in (26) is a middle-reflexive and not a
reflexive cOflstruction:
(26) Keisarinn kl~dist nyjum fotunn
The emperor dressed (mid-refl) in new clothes
Two sets of facts of Icelandic enter into showing
that~tructions of the type of (26) are middle-reflexive
and not reflexive -at constructions. First, Icelandic
much lik~ English,·Italian, etc.
has Exceptional Case Marking and small clause constructions.
Second, Icelandic crucially is an overt Case marking
language, with abstract Case relations surfacing in overt
Case morphology. The key observation then is that Icelandic
has wellformed sentences of the type of (27), but not
wellformed sentences of the type of (28):
(27) Hann telur sig (vera) sterkan
He says himself to-be strong-ace.
(28) *Hann telst (vera) sterkan
He says (mid-refl) to-be strong-ace.
Obviously, Icelandic (27) is wellformed as its English counter-
part is, with the addition that 1n Icelandic the embedded
predicate adjective overtly agrees in accusative Case with
its subject. If Icelandic had reflexive -at constructions
the prediction would obviously be that sentences like (28)
are wellformed, with the embedded predicate adjective
- ,~;.
agreeing in accusative Case with an embedded subject pro, which in
turn. still receives . accusative Case and transmits
it by cosuperscripting to -st. On the other hand, if
Icelandic does not actually have reflexive -at construc-
tions but only middle-reflexive -st constructions, the
ungrammaticality of examples like (28) is correctly
predicte~and so is the gramrnaticality of examples word
by word identical to them, except that the embedded predicate
adjective is overtly Case marked nominative and not accusative,
as in (29):
(29) Hann telst (vera) sterkur
He says (mid-refl) to-be strong-nom
For, , assuming that underlying (29) is a middle-reflexive -at
structure and that its passivizer -st tree
surfaces in (29), the embedded predicate adjective,in
agreeing with its subject,agrees with the trace of the
matrix subject, hence,
under obvious assumptions about Case agreement,with the
matrix subject itself. But since the matrix subject
is obviously marked nominative, the embedded adjective also is.
Thus, empirical evidence leads us to conclude
that Icelandic has middle and middle-reflexive -at construc-
tions but not impersonal and reflexive -at constructions.
If so, the theory of Italian si obviously extends to Icelandic
-st in the second way we have seen it to
eventually extend to French !!, by simply assuming that
- '4~"
Icelandic -st has the same properties as Italian 5i and
indeed French !!i but for Icelandic -st,
unlil<:e for Italian 6i I though possibly like as for French ~,
all properties are obligatory, passivizer property included.
For , we saw that in Italian impersonal and reflexive
si constructions arise when only the nominal properties of
5i are mapped to a-structure and not its optional passivizer
property; if in Icelandic the passivizer property of -at
is obligatory, there obviously is no way of mapping to
s-structure only its nominal properties without violating
the Projection Principle.
3.3 The PF and LF of Italian ~ constructions
In the preceding sections we introduced two major
types of restructuring phrase markers, middle!! phrase
marke~and mid~le-reflexive si ohrase markers. In this final
---- '"
section, we will concern ourselves with the ma9ping of middle
s1 and middle-reflexive 8i phrase markers to PF and LF.
-'
Concretely, we can take into considerRtion,as an
exal'\ple of a middle !.! restructur inq phrase l'\arker, the phrase marker
associated with the normal form in (1) and/as an example of
a middle-reflexive 5i re5tructurinQ phrase marker, the phrase marker
associated with the normal form in (2):
(1) /~
{
oroj VP
. ,
./~
siJ+lava i bambini
-~
i bambini! VP
/"'-
si+lavano t i
(2) /-----..
bambini i VP,
. /~.
sil+lavano pro J
Our first problem then is how a re-
structuring phrase marker/or indeed a normal form/of the
type of (1) and (2) maps to PF.
To begin with, there is no way both of the two
different lexical strings in (1) can be mapped to PF. For,
trivially,if one of the lexical
strings in (1) is uttered over a segment of time, the other
cannot simultaneously be uttered. Hence, in this respect,
our problem is which one of the two different lexical
strings in (1) is mapped to PF, and obviously
according to what principles. On the other hand, we
assume that PF markers are not only phonological strings,
but have syntactic structure to them. So, for exam~le, the
requirement that Case assigning and Case assigned elements
be adjacent, or
the req~irement that pro's be ~coperly identified are
PF level principles, as in sections 2.2 and 3.2 respective-
ly; and so are syntactic-like conditions on phonological
processes, such as on French liaison, etc •.. If however PF mar-
kers have syntactic structure, this must be
such that only one terminal string is included,.
b~t 1£ so, PF markers must ultimately be reore-
sentable as tree structures. Hence,in this respect,Qur
problem is not only which one of the two different lexical
strings in (1) is mapped to PF, but also which one
of the two different tree structures in (1) as in (2)
is ,
anQ/obviously, according to what principles.
In ~eneral, given again the normal forms (1) and
(2), it is not evident at all that one of the
two trees must be mapped to PF rather than the other.
_ :~ 'L_
Consider for example (1). If the passivizer 5i
tree is mapped to PF, a wellformed middle si sentence sur-
faces; if the impersonal 8i tree is mapped to PF,
a wellformed impersonal 5i sentence
surfaces. Consider on the other hand (2). In general,
there is not even a way to tell apart the sentence in which
the passivizer 6i tree surfaces, a middle-reflexive 5i sen-
tence, and the sentence in which the reflexive 8i tree sur-
faces, a reflexive 5i sentence. Nevertheless, in sections
3.1 and 3.2 we led our discussion under the tacit
assumption that, whatever the principles which account for this
are, in middle si normal forms it is the passivizer si
. -
tree which gets mapped to PF; and, analogously, it is the
passivizer si tree which gets mapped to PF in middle-
reflexive!! phrase markers. This line of thinking is only
natural if we take the reverse point of view of the deriva-
tion of a-structure from PF. From this point of view, given
an impersonal!! sentence and a middle 51 sentence, it
is natural to assume that, while the middle si sentence
obviously maps to a middle si ohrase marker, the reflexive
- -
!! sentence simply ma9s to a reflexive!! phrase marker,
and not again to a middle si phrase marker. Analogously, given
a reflexive and a middle reflexive 8i sentence,
it is natural that the reflexive
!! sentence maps to a simple reflexive!! phrase marker and
not to a middle-reflexive!! phrase marker. Suppose ttlen
that we maintain that, as implicit in section 3.1. and 3.2.,
of the two tree structures in a normal form like (1), it is
the tree structure on the Light, the passivizer !! structure,
which maps to PFi and,similarlY,of the two structures in
a normal form like (2), it is again the tree on the right
and again the passivizer !! tree which maps to PF. The
problem is left to determine the principles according to
which this is so.
Consider first (1) again. What principles determine
the pass1v1zer a1 tree to be mapped to PF, and not the .i.mper-
sonal s1 tree? There are at least three possible answers to
this question. First, we notice that in (1) the condition
2.1. (7) on normal forms is satisfied by the existence of a
derivation by movement from the impersonal si tree to the
passivizer s1 tree. In such a derivation, the imrersonal
si tree is the basic tree, the passivizer !! tree the derived tree.
It is not difficult to see ~t from this observation, we can
extract a principle with exactly the desired consequences
for the mapping of (1) to PF. Suppose in ~eneral that ~
is a restructuring phrase marker, l' is its normal form
and ']l' • .,1n are the normal phrase markers in 3' ordered in such
a way that 1i is derived from JI-l" Suppose we stipulate
that, given'] and l' and 1 1 , • ",1~ as above, 1 n and only S>n
is mapped to PF. According to such a principle, of the
two trees in (IJ
tree is mapped
the passivizer 5i
to PF, precisely because it is derived
from the impersonal s1 tree, and not vice versa. Thus, exactly
the desired result is obtained. Next,
we notice that in (1) not only the passivizer 5i tree
has a derivation from the impersonal si tree
t but the passivizer si tree also
has a longer derivation from D-structure than the imper-
sonal si tree. Suppose . indeed we define the length
of a derivation from a phrase marker 1. to a phrase marker1
7. to be the number of the movement and/or deletion mappings
J
yielding 'J j from 9 i' In (1), assuming
s-structure clitics are generated as such in O-structure,
the D-structure of the impersonal!! tree is exactly iden-
tical to the impersonal 81 tree itself. Hence, the length
of the derivation from D-structure to a-structure in the Case
of the impersonal!! tree in (1) is null. On the
other hand, the D-structure of the passivizer !! tree in (1)
differs from its a-structure in that i bambini, which is
in sUbject position in s-structure, is in object position in D-.;tructure
Indeed the passivizer !! tree in ,~) has a derivation from
D-structure by movement of i bambini from object into subject position;
hence the passivizer si tree has a derivation fran D-structure of len9th one.
Thus, in (1), the passivizer !! tree has a lengthier deriv-
ation from D-structure than the impersonal s1 tree. That
from this observation we can derive a principle which,
given (1), has the correct consequence of mappinQ
to PF the passivi~er !! tree and not the impersonal
si tree
.. \;0 ·
is not difficult to show. As above, suppose in
general that'S' is a restructuring phrase marker, '1' is its
normal form and )'1' ••,'Y
n
•. are the normal phrase markers in '3' I
~ ~
where however J 1 , •. ,') n are ordered in such a way that if
~i has a derivation from D-structure of length ~ and ~i-l
has a derivation from O-structure of length i, k is greater
than i. Suppose then we stipulate that, qiven
'3' ~. and ~ ~ ? ~, , ~ l' · · · , n n and only ~n is mapped
to PF. According to such a principle, of the
two normal phrase markers in (1) the passivizer si phrase
~1laXker is mapped to PF, since it has a lengthier derivation
from D-structure than the imnersonal si Qhrase marker.- _....
Thus, again, the desired result is obtained. Finally, we notice
that in (1), apart from the fact that tIle passivizer s1 tree
can be derived from the impersonal a1 tre~ but not viceversa,
and that the passivizer a1 tree has a longer derivation
from D-structure than the imoersonal s1 tree, it is also the case
.. -
that the passivizer ai tree includes an element morphologi-
cally more complex than the impersonal 81 tree. Indeed in the
passivizer si tree the verb lavano is associated with the
passive morphology element si, while in the impersonal si tree
the verb lavano is again associated with ai but as a nominal
element. Once more it is not difficult to extract from this
observation a princ1ple which correctly predicts that the
passivizer ai tree and not the impersonal si tree in (1) is
-11 , ..
..~
mapped to PF. Suppose again in general that ~ is a re-
r'()\
structuring phrase marker, J is its normal form, and
n ~ ~,~ 1' ••• '.) n are the normal phrase markers in j , where now
'1 1'··" '] n are ordered in such a way that ~ i contains
~
morphologically more complex elements than ~ i-I. Suppose
further we stipulate that 9iven ~, '3., and '3 ~1'···' """ n'
"J (7)
.) n and only ~ n is mapped to PF. Once more, according to
such a principle, of the two normal phrase markers in (1) the
passivizer si phrase marker is mapped to PF, because
it contains a morphologically more complex element than the
impersonal 8i tree. Thus once more, the correct result is
obtained.
Consider then the normal form in (2). Assuming that
the passivizer 8i tree in it is mapped to ~F, our question
again is: what principles cause it to be mapped and not the
reflexive si tree To begin with, we notice that, of
the two normal phrase markers in (2), neither one is derived
from the other by either movement or deletion, and in fact
the condition 2.1. (7) on normal forms is satisfied by the
two normal phrase markers being phrase-structure identical.
Consider then the first principle suggested above, that of
two normal phrase markers in a normal form derived one from
the other , the derived one maps to PF. Obviously, this principle is unable
to predict that in (2) the passivizer !! tree is mapped
to PF. On the other hand, we notice that, again assumin~
that a-structure clitics,aregenerated as such at o-structure,
the reflexive si tree in (2) is identical to its D-structure,
hence trivially has a derivation from D~structure of length
zero. On the contrary, the passivizer si tree in (2) is
associated with a D-structure with i bambini in object,
rather than in subject, position, and is indeed derived
from D-structure by movement of i bambini from the object
into the subject position; hence obviously, it has a
derivation from D-structure of length 1. If so, con-
sider the second principle suggested above, that of two
normal phrase markers in a normal form, if one has a leng-
thier derivation from o-structure than the other, the one
with the lengthier derivation is mapped to PF. This
principle makes exactly the right prediction: that of the
two normal phrase markers in (2), the passivizer ai one
is mapped to PF, not the reflexive!! one. Finally,
consider the third principle suggested above, that of
two normal phrase markers in a normal form, a normal phrase marker which
includes morphologically more complex elements than the
other is mapped to PF. This principle again makes the
right prediction, that of the two normal phrase markers
in (2~ the passivizer a1 phrase marker is mapped to p~
and not the reflexive a1 phrase marker. Indeed
in (2), as in (1), the verb lavano is associated with
the passive morphology element 81 in the passivizer a1
treeJ while in the reflexive a1 tree the verb lavano is
associated again with si, but 'there 81 is a nominal element J
· \ i>.> .,
In general, in the case of more complicated examples
of middle and middle-reflexive si construc~ions the same
conclusions hold as in the case of simple examples like (1)
and (2). The one exception are examples in which middle
and middle-reflexive 6i constructions interact with "subject
inversion" into object position, as in (3) and (4) respec-
tively:
(3 )
(4) ~~pro) VP (
/' --------- . \si+lavano i l:>ambiniJ .,J
Consider (4). In (4) it is easy to see that condition 2.1. (7)
is satisfied iu that the passivizer si tree can be derived
lJy movement from the reflexive 8i tI'ee; and that both the
passivizer s1 tree and the reflexive s1 tree have a derivation
from D-structure of length zero. Hence,unlike in (2), the
passivizer a1 tree cannot be predicted to map to PF on the
grounds that it has a lengthier derivation from D'''structure
ttlan the reflexive 8i tree; and, unlike in (2), the passivizer a1
tree can be predicted to map to PF on the grounds that it
is derived from the reflexive 8i tree. On the other hand, in
(4 ) as in (2),the verb lavano is associated with 81 as a passive
morphology element in the passivizer 81 tre~ but with 8i as a
nominal element in the reflexive si tree; hence in (4)
as in (2) , the passivizer si tree can be predicted to map
to PF on the grounds that it contains a morphologically
more complex element than the refelxive s1 tree. Consider
thel1 (3) • In ( 3) condition 2.1. (7)
is satisfied by the two normal phrase markers being phrase
structure identical; and that both the impersonal 81
phrase marker and the passivizer 5i phrase marker have a
deriviation from D-structure of length zero. Hence, unlike
in (1) the passivizer si phrase marker cannot be predicted to
map to PF neither on the grounds that it is derived from
the impersonal 5i phrase marker, nor on the grounds that it
has a lengthier derivation from D-structure than the impersonal
si phrase marker. On the other hand, in (3) as in (1), the
verb lavano is associated with si as a passive morphology
element in the passivizer s1 phrase marker, but with s1
as a nominal element in the impersonal a1 tree; hence finally,
in (3) as in (J.), the passivizer si phrase marker can be
predicted to map to PF 0.1 the grounds that it contains a
morphologically' more comple element, than the impersona 1. a1
phrase marker.
In summary, three different principles were suggested
above for the mapping of middle and middle-reflexive a1
phrase markers and normal forms to PF: a first principle eta-
ting that,of the two trees in the normal form/one .derived
from the other maps to PF; a: second principle stating that,
of the two trees in the normal rorm,one with a lengthier
derivation from D-structure than the other maps to PF; and
finally a third principle stating that,of the two trees
in the normal form, one with morphologically more complex
elements than the other maps to PF. Assuming that in both
middle and middle-reflexive si constructions the
passivizer s1 tree is mapped to PF, the correct predictions
are obtained in straightforward examples of middle si
constructions like (1) under any of the three principles;
in straightforward examples of middle-reflexive ai construc-
tions like (2) under the second and the third principle
but not the first one; in "inverted" examples of middle-
reflexive 5i constructions like (4) under the first and third
principle but not the second one; and in "inverted" examples
of middle si constructions like (3) under the third principle
but not the f .'.rst or sec ond one. I f so, then the obvious
conclusion to be drawn is that only the third principle,
the one based on morphological complexity, is compatible with
the data.
Consider then our second problem, which is according
to what principles restructuring phrase markers of the type
of (1) and (2), and eventually (3) and (4),are mapped to LF.
To begin with, much as in the case of the mapping
to PF, in the case of the mapping to LF, we need to know
what exaotly maps to it. Consider for example (1) again.
First, it hardly needs to be argued that, in the mapping
from s~structure to LF, e~role assignment configurations are
preserved. For, the information about what assigns a
a-role to what is crucial to LF, if any information contained
at s-structllre is. In de~d it is a-role relations which
determine what is the logical subject, object,etc ... of what
predicate or predicate phrase, as opposed to their surface
or Case sUbject, object, etc ... ; and a-role assiqnment
relations which ultimately determine what is interpreted as
the agent, the patient, etc ..• of what expressions. But
if Q-role assignment configurations are preserved from s-
structure to LF, we can conclude that, given (1), it cannot
be the case that only the passivizer si tree is mapped from
s-structure to LF. For, if only the passivizer 61 tree in
(1) is ma~ped, the object e-role assi~nment relation between
the verb lava and i bambini present in the passivizer si
- _ ..
tree as in the impersonal!! tree is preserved at LF, but
not the subject a-role assignment relation between the
oradicate lava i bambini and 5i oresent in the impersonal_00
si tree and not in the passivizer !! tree. On the contrary,
we can conclude that, given (1), at least the impersonal 8i
tree is mapped from s-structure to LF. For, if at least the
impersonal!! tree in (1) is mapped, both the object a-role
assignment relation from lava to i bambini and the subject
e-role assignment relation from lava i bambini to ai is
preserved at LF. Then, at this point, we take it to be
established both that e~role assignment confiqurations are
preserved form s-structure to LF, and that~ as a consequence,
in a normal form like (1), at least the impersonal si tree
is mapped to LF.
Next, once established that a-role assignment rela-
tiona must be preserved from a-structure to LF and that,
consequently, from (1) and similar phrase markers, at least
the impersonal 8i tree is mapped to LF, the question
ar ises whether the impersonal si tree can be loapped from (1)
.to LF to the exclusion of the passivizer 5i tree, or
whether, on the contrary, other configurations than a-role
assiqnment configurations must be preserved from a-structure
to LF, which impo~e mappinq to LF the oassivizer si tree tn ~l)
. -
as well. This particular question is settled by empirical
considerations. It is easy to see that, if in (1) or similar
phrase markers no configurations other than those present
in the impersonal 61 tree were relevant in LF, and conse-
quently only the impersonal 81 needed to be mapped onto LF,
the interpretation of (1) and similar ~hrase markers ought to
be identical to the interpretation of the impersonal a1 trees
they contain; so, for example, the interpretation of (1)
ought to be identical to the interpretation of (5):
(5)
i bambini
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However, the intuition about (1) and (5) is that they are
not synonymous. How precisely the interpretation of (1)
differs from the interpretation of (5) I and what configura-
tion present in the passivizer si tree in (1) but not in
the impersonal si tree determines,once mapped to LF, the
different interpretation, is a question of some interest in
itself. Intuitively, tue difference between (1) and (5) is
that in (1), if anything, the statement is about!! or,
semantically, the free variable. In (5), on the contrary,
the statement is obvioulsy about i bambini. More properly,
in (1), !! is not really what the statement is about, but
rather the statement is not about any expression in parti-
cular. Obviously, then, the confiauration present in the
passivizer !! tree and not in the impersonal s1 tree in (1)
which makes the difference between the interpretation of
the middle 5i structure in (1) and the
interpetation of the impersonal !!
structure in (5) must be a predication configuration in-
volving i bambini. For it is predication' ~onfigurations
I
which correspond to intuitive aboutness relations. !ndee~1
it is easy to see that in (1), there is a predication relation
between the subject i bambini and the predicate a1 lavano
in the oassivizer ai tree, which is obviously
not there in (5).
Rather, in (~), no predication relation is found, and
in particular no such relation between subject and predicate,
since the subject position is filled by an expletive and
all the arguments, including the one~impersonal ai, ending
up with the subject e-role, are internal to the VP. In
other words, with respect to predication, the difference
between the middle ai structure in (1)
and the impersonal s1
structure in (5) is comparable to the difference between
the passive structures correspondinq respectively to the
sentences in (6) and (7):
(6) I bambini furono la" ::lti
The children were washed
(7 ) Furono lavati i bambini
Were washed the children
In (7), as in the impersonal!! structure in (5), no predica-
tion relation is present, and in particular, no predication
relation between subject and predicate, since the subject
position is filled by an expletive, a null expletive pro,
and the one argument, i bambini, is internal to VP, and actually
fills the object position. On the contrary, in (6), i
bambini having m~ved from the object into the subject position,
a predication relation holds between the derived subject,
i bambini,and the predicate,furono lavati, as in the passiv-
izer !! tree in (1) a predication
relation holds between i bambini and 81 lavano.
otherwise, and in particular with respect to 9-role assign-
ment relations, (6) and (7) would be synonymous,
exactly as middle and impersonal 5i structures would.
Thus, the difference in interpretation between
the middle si structure (1) and tlie impersonal si
structure in (5) stems from the
presence/in the passivizer !! structure in (l),of a predica-
tion relation between subject and predicate absent from the imper-
sonal si structure in (5). On these ground~, or simply on
the ground that there is indeed a difference in interpreta-
tion between the middle si structure in (1) and the
impersonal !! structure in (5) we take it to be
established that, given a middle 8i phrase marker like (1),
not only the impersonal si tree/as established before, but
also the passivizer si tree is mapped to LF.
Repeating ourselve~ our conclusion with
respect to the mapping of the middle!! phrase marker in (1)
to LF is that both trees are rna~~ed/and not iust one as
in the case of the mapping to PF. But, if both normal
phrase markers in (1) are preserved
from s~structure to LF, the auestion according to what
principles (1) is mapped to LF in a sense does not arise.
Whatever those principles are, there dues not seem to be any
one of them especially concerned with the mapping
of (1) to LF1 in the way some principles must be especially
concerned with the mapping of (1) ~o PF.
_ ,\,1-
Indeed, in the case of the mapping to PF, we know that
some principle had to simplify the two different
lexical strings in (1) to a single string,
and the 'two different tree structures
in (1) to a single tree structure. In the case of
the mapping to LF, however, we have no reason to believe
that a phrase marker not representable by a tree like (1)
must be reduced to an LF-marker representable by one; on
the contrary, we have reason to believe that
given a middle 8i phrase marker like (1)
both its impersonal si tree and its passivizer si tree must be
mapped to LF. ~le notice on the other hand that our
line of argument leads to the prediction that,
for one type of middle si ohrase markers, only the imger-
-'.
sonal s1 tree needs to be roapped to LF, i~ other words,
that there is one type of middle a1 structures
synonimous with impersonal ai structures. These obviously a-
re middle s1 structures of the type of (3), with~subject in-
inversion~into object position.
Intuitively, our nrediction~ are correct;
middle ai structures like (8) are semantically equivalent
to impersonal!! structures like (5) rather than to
middle!! structures like (1). Indeed we saw
that in structures like (1), the one contribution that the
passivizer !! tree makes to the interpretation of the
structure is the subject-predicate relation created by
movement of the object into subject position. In structures
like (3), however, there, being no movement fran the object into
the subject IX>sition, in both the impersonal and passivizer si
trees all arguments are internal to the VP, and the subject
position is filled by an expletive; hence no 9redication is
to be found/and the passivizer si tree does not contribute
anything to the interpretation of the structure that the
impersonal si tree does not contribute already.
Finally, the mapping to LF of middle-
ref lexive si phrase markers like (2) I and eventually (4) I remains
to be considered. In what precedes, we have taAen
into consideration restructuring phrase fflarkers with normal
forms like (1), where both of the normal phrase markers must
be mapped to LF, and restructuring phrase markers with
normal forms like (3), where both of the normal phrase
markers can be mapped to LF, but the result is the same
if only one of them is, mapped, the impersonal !i one.
We have furthermore decided that, in general, there is no
special principle governing the mapping of restructuring
phrase markers to LF, as opposed to the mapping of
restructuring markers to PFi indeed an LF marker~exactly
as a phrase marker, and contrary to a PF marker, can but
need not be representable by a tree. In general, then, we
expect the mr~pin9 of a middle-reflexive !i phrase marker
to LF to present no problem~ It can be interesting to
wonder, however, whether b:>th of the nonna.l phrase ma.rkers in (2)
and (4) RUst be napped to LF, or only one must. In the case of (2), the anuwer
is rather obvious. From the point of view of a-role assiqnment
relations, once the reflexive 51 tree in (2) is mapped, the
passivizer si tree need not be. Indeed in both the
reflexive and the passivizer !! trees in (2), i bambini,
or equivalently a bound variable of it, is assianed the
object e-role of the verb lavano; while, in addition, in the
reflexive!! tree, i bambini is absigned the subject
a-role of the VP 8i lavano. From the
point of view of predication, on the other hand, the
reflexive and passivizer !! trees in (2) are equivalent,
i bambini being the NP predica ted of in both cases. Helloe,
predication does not change the conclusions arrived at with
respect to a-role assignment. In the case of (4), in turn,
the answer is also rather obvious. The one difference between
(2) and (4) is that in the passivizer 81 tree in (4~ there is
no movement from the object into the subject position, hence
no predication relation is to be found; correspondingly,
while in (2)the reflexive and passivizer si trees are
equivalent with respect to predication relations, in (4)
the reflexive !! tree contains a predication relation that
the passivizer ai tree does not contain. This, however,
does not change~ conclusion that only the reflexive a1
tree needs to be mapped to LF; on the contrary, it strengthens
it. Ultimately, our prediction is that intuitively/middle-
reflexive si structures both of the type of (2) and of
the type of (4) are synonimous with the reflexive 81
structures they contain, in the case of (2) and (4) the
reflexive si structure in (8); nor surprisingly, our pre-
diction turns out to be correct:
(8)
I bambini.
1
VP
./~, .
si~+lavano pro)
1
4. Causative Constructions
4.1 French cau~ative constructions.
Our topic here will be the constructions entered in
French by causative verbs faire (to make) and laisser (to
let) or similar constructions entered by other types of
verbs, notably perception verbs like voir (to see). To
begin with, we will take into consideration causative and
causative-like constructions involving standard word order
and Case marking, in particular constructions in which, we
will argue, a causative or causative-likE verb subcategorizes
for a small clause. Next, we will then take into consider-
ation causative constructions proper, i.e. causative con-
str~ctions involving non-standard word order and Case marking.
These constructions, we will argue, involve a causative verb
subcategorizing for a small clause and reanalyzing in ad-
dition with the emb~dded predicate. In particular, we will
take into consideration causative constructions proger in
which the element the causative verb reanalyzes with is, in
the order, a transitive verb, a transitive verb used
intransitively, i.e. an object deletion verb, a pure
intransitive verb, and an "ergative" verb. In concludinq
the section, we will finally take into con~ideration causative
constructions in which the causative verb reanalyzes with
another causative verb l the second causative verb in turn
enters reanalysis, and so on ad libitum.
To begin wi th, by causative constructions \/e mean
constructions involving a causative predicate and
the embedded verb is transitive,
the embedded verb is the same
as in (a)
_ U\'t-
but this time used intransi tively, in the (c)
ex~les th~ embedded verb is a pure intransi tive and in the (d)
examples, finally, the embedded verb is an "ergative"
(l)a. ~a a fait que Marie a ~crit une lettre
This made that Marie wrote a letter
b. ~a a fait que Marie a ecrit
This made that Marie wrote
c. f~ a fait que Marie a ri
This made that Marie laughed
d. ~a a fait que Marie s'en est allae
This made that Marie was gone
(2)a. Je vois que Marie ecrit una lettre
I see that ~arie is writing a letter
b. Je voia que Marie ~crit
I see that Marie is writing
c. Je vois que Marie rit
I see that Marie is laughing
d. Je voia que Marie s'en est all~e
I see that Marie is gone
On the other hand, when causative or perception predicates
subcategorize for infinitival complements, the standard worn
order and/or overt Case marking can be observed or not; the
cQsa in which it is observed is exemplified in (3) and (4)
with laisser and ~, where again in (a) the embedded verb
is transitive, in (b) transit;ve used intransitively, in (0)
intransitive, and in (d) "ergativa" :
(3)a. J'ai laiss~ Marie ecrire une lettre
I let Marie write a letter
b. J'ai laisse Marie ~crire
I let Marie write
c. J'ai laiss~ Marie rire
I let Marie laugh
d. J'ai laisse Marie s'en aller
I let Marie go
(4)a. J'ai vu Marie 'crire une lettre
I saw Marie write a letter
b. J'ai vu Ma:ie ~crire
I saw Marie write
c. J'ai vu Marie rire
I saw Marie laugh
d. Jlai vu Marie aller la-bas
I saw Marie go there
Our first question is: what kinds of structures are
associated with sentences like (3) or (4)1 and what proper-
ties do the matrix verbs laisser and voir have there? Part
of the answer is obvious. In all of (3) and (4), 1!:., a~l NP,
is the subject of the VP's ai laisse Marie ~crire una lettre,
ai laisse Marie 'crire, ••. , ai vu Marie ~crire una lettre, ...
and assigned the subject a-role by them/as well as the nomi-
native Case by the Infl surfacing on their head verb (or its
auxiliary). Further, the V's ai laiss~ in (3) and at vu in
(4) subcategorize for and assign the subject 9-role ~o the
propositions Marie ~crire una lettre, Marie ecrire, •.• Finally,
the NP Marie is the subject of the VP's ecrire una lettre, ...
and is assigned the subject a-role by them; and in the (a)
examples, the verb ecrire subcategorizes for and assigns the
object a-role and the accusative Case to the NP una lettre.
Another piece of answer i~ also fairly obvious: while sub-
categorizing for and assigning a a-role to Marie ~crire una
lettre, ••• ai laisse in (3) and ai vu in (4) also govern and
assign accusative Case to Marie. The only open question is
what category the propositions Marie ecrire una lettre, ...
belong to. Essentially, twq answers seem to be possible.
The first possible answer is that Marie ecrire une lettre, ...
are sentences, but exceptionally not a barrier to government;
if so, the structure of sentences like (3) or (4) is essen-
tially like tne structure of English sentences like (5),
where we write (8) to indicate a sentential cate90ry which
exceptionally does not count as such when it comes to govern-
ment and Case assignment:
(5) I believed [(5) Mary to be tired of it]
The second possible answer is that in (3) or (4), Marie
~crire una lettre, ••• are small clauses; if so, the struc-
ture of (3)-(4) or the like is much like the structure of
English (6), where the proposition Mary tired of it is
assigned the category, AP, of its predicate, tired of i~;
or, in other words, Marie is adjoined to tired of it:
(6) I believed [AP Mary [AP tired of itl)
If the first answer is chosen, (3)-(4) or the like have
much the same structure aR (5) with Marie ecrire une
lettre, • •• a sentence (5) exceptionally permeable tc:> govern-
ment and Case assignment. If the second answer is chosen,
(3)-(4) or the like have a structure analogous to (6), with
Ma~ie ecrire una lettre, •.• the same category, VP, as its
predicate ecrire una lettre, ••. Under both options, the
data in (3) and (4) are correctly accounted for. The small
clause option however is more likely to be right.
For, leaving aside causative and causative-like constructions
like the ones in (3) and (4), small clause constructions are
independently attested in French, as in (7):
(7) Je crois CAP Marie lAP fatiguee de ~a JJ
I believe Marie tired of it
On the contrary, constructions characterized by sentential
complements permeable to government and Case assignment are
not independently attested in French,
as showrl in (8) :
(8) *Je crois [(5) Marie ~tre fatiguee de !a]
I believe Marie to be tired of it
Thus, knowing no argument to the contrary, we maintain that
in sentences like (3) and (4), Marie 'crire una lettre, ...
are small clauses. If so, on the model of (6) and the like,
we can associate to causative and causative-like construc-
tiona of the type of (3) and (4) structures of the type of
(9) and (10), where the propositions Marie ecrire une
lettre, ••• are assigned the category, VP, of their predicates,
ecrire una lettre ... ; or indeed Marie is adjoined to
ecrire una lettre •.. ;
(9) s
je~vp
ai la;;:; ~vp
Marl.e VP
~
rire
s'en aller
(10) S
je~vp
aiVU~VP
Marie VP
~
,- .
ecrl.re
rire
s'en aller
But why are small clauses Apia, VP's, etc ... , not
maximal projections? In an example like (7), fatiguee de
£! obviously is the first projection of fati9ueei hence
fatigu6e de 2a is in absolute terms an A. Similarly in
(9)~(lO), 'crire una lettre, .•. ubviously are the first
projections of 'crire, ••• hence in absolute terms V's. Fur-
thermore, in (7), Marie fatigues de 9a is the ~ame category
as fatigu~e de s:a, hence in absolute tern~s an A again.
Similarly, in (9)-(10), Marie ~crire una
lettre, .•• are the same category as ~crire una lettre, ...
hence in absolute terms V's. Finally, in (7), croiR Marie
fatiguee de ra obviously is the first projection of crois,
hence in absolute terms a V_ Similarly, in
examples like (9)- (10) ai laiss~ Marie ecrire una lettre, ...
are the first projections of ai laiss~, ••• hence in absolute
terms V's once again. In relative terms, on the
other hand, in (7), fatiguee de ~a is a possible
maximal projection, i.e. an AP, as notated in (7), since it
is immediately dominated by another adjectival projection, but
one not higher in absolute terms than it is. Similarly in
(9)-(10) ~crira una lettre, ... are possible maximal projec-
tions, i.e. VP's, as notated in (9)-(10), since again they
are immediately dominated by another verbal projection but
one not higher in absolute terms than they are. Similarly
again, Marie ~crire una lettre, ..• are possible maximal
projections, or VP's, as notated in (9)-(10~ since they are
immediately dominated by another verbal projection but one
once again not higher in absolute terms than they are.
Furthermore, in relative terms, in (7), Marie fatiguee de
~ obviously is a possible maximal projection, an AP,as
anotated in (7), sinoe it is not immediately dominated by
- \1 1 -
any other adjectival projection, let alone an adjectival
projection higher than it is. Similarly in (7) creis Marie
fatiguee de fa and in (9)-(10) ai 1aisse Marie ecrire une
lettre, ••• are possible maximal projections, VP's, as
notated in (7) and (9)-(10) i since again they are not
immediately dominated by any other verbal projection, let
alone a verbal projection higher than they are. And so on.
Next, in (7), one of the two AP's which are possible maximal
projections must obviously be assumed to be an actual maximal
projection; and of the two AP's, the luwer and fundamental
AP can obviously be assumed to be one, rather than the higher
and adjoined one. Furthermore, in (7), the one possible
maximal projection VP must obviously be assumed to be an
actual maximal 9rojection~ Similarly, in (9)-(10),
one of the two lower VP's which are possible maximal projec-
tions must be an actual maximal projection, and the lower one
can be assumed to be, rather than the higher one; and
finally the highest VP must similarly be assumed to
to be an actual maximal projection.
Under our assumptions, it is easy to see that creis in
(7), ai laisse in (9) and ai vu in (10) govern Marie, hence
can assigll Case under the governmen t condi tion , as they must under
the Case filter and condition 2.2 (14). Under the same
assumptions, it is also easy to see why Marie in (7) or (9)-
(10) cannot be substi tuted for by all empty category. To
begin with, leaving aside the obvious case of varianles,
Marie in (7) or (9)-(10) cannot be substituted for by a
pronominal empty category, i.e. a pro, for the simple reason
that the pro would not be properly identified. On the other
hand, Marie in (7) or (9)-(10) cannot be substituted by an
anaphoric empty category either, i.e. a trace or a PRO. For,
if crais, as in (7), at laiss~/as in (9), and ai vu,as in
(lOu Case assign the empty category substituted for Marie,
as they can under the government condition,
by definition the empty category substituted for Marie
is not anaphoric; and if creis/as in (7), at laisse,as in (9~
and at vu~as in (lO~ do not Case assign the empty category
substituted for Marie, condition 2.2 (14) is violated. Now,
since we depend so crucially on Case, it is natural to wonder
what our predictions are if crois in (7), ai laisse in (9)
and ai vu in (10) are substituted for by passive counter-
parts. To begin with, it is easy to see that the
subject of the small clause cannot be lexical. For, a passive
verb, by definition, is not a Case assigner; and if the
subject of the small clause is lexical'and is not assigned
Case, the Case filter is violated. Furthermore, if crais
in (7), ai laiss' in (9), and ~i v~ in (10) are substituted
for by passive counterparts, it is equally easy to see that~
by definition, the subject of the small clause, if an empty
category, can only be anaphoric, i.e. neither a variable nor
a pro, precisely because as before it cannot be assigned
Case. Suppose then that the subject of the small clause
is an anaphori.c empty category; by binding condition A, the
anaphoric empty category must be bound in the matrix sentence, aince
the matrix sentence is its governing category, and there-
fore bound by the matrix subject. Suppose further that the
anaphoric empty category is bound by the matr1x subject;
since a passive verb by definition forms a VP which does not
assign the subject a-role, the matrix subject and the ana-
phoria empty category must share the a-role of the anaphoric
empty category. TQus, if crois in (7), ai laisse in (9)
and ai vu in (10) are substituted by passive couterparts,
we predict that the subject of the small clause can be an
empty categorY,if the empty category is anaphoric, bound to
the matrix subject and entering a chain with it~ in other
words, we correctly predict that the subject of the small
clause must be a trace of the matrix subject, as in (11)-(13):
(11) Marie est crue [AP t [AP fatiguee de cal)
Marie is believed tired of it
(12)a. Marie a et~ 1aissee [vp t [Vp ecrire une lettre))
Marie has been let write a letter
b. Marie a 'te laissee [vp t [vp ecrire))
Marie has been let write
c. Marie a et~ 1aiss~e [vp t [vp rirel)
Marie has been let laugh
d. Marie a 'te 1aissee [vp t [vp partir]]
Marie has been let go
-Il~ ..
(l3)a. Marie a et~ vue [vp t [vp ecrire une lettrell
Marie has been seen write a letter
b. Marie a ete vue [vp t [VP ecrire] ]
Marie has been seen write
c. Marie a ete vue [vp t [vp rireJ ]
Marie has been seen laugh
d. Marie a ~te vue (vp t [vp s'en aller] ]
Marie has been seen go
It is also easy to see that if, instead of
small clausE::!s in a complement position of some predicate
as in (7) , (9) - (10) , (11) - (13) , etc, small clauses in a
modifier position are considered, the correct predictions
once more follow under our assumpti.ons; in particular the
prediction that the subject of a modifier small clause can
never be lexical but must always be an empty category and
indeed a PRO, as in (14):
(14) Marie a 1aisse son travail [AP PRO fatiguee de 9~ !l
r1arie left her work tired of it
In (14), the subject of the small clause cannot be assigned
Case; hence lexical NPs and non a,aphoric empty categories
alike are excluded from the position, lexical NPs by the
Case filter, and non anaphoric empty categories by definition.
If, on the other hand, the sUbject of the small clause is
an anaphoric empty-category, it can only be indepedent in
e~role assignment from its eventual binders, hence a PRO.
Finally, as En.glish (6) straightforwardly trans l~ led in to
French (7), we obviously expect French (9)-(14) to translate
into English, under identical assumptions for both lc\nguages.
Indeed, French (14) straightforwardly translates into English
(15) and French (9)- (10) into English (16) - (17) :
(15) Mary left her work [AP PRO lAP tired of it]]
(16)a. I let [vp Mary [vp write a letter]]
b. I let [vp Mary [vp write]]
c. I let [vp Mary [vp laugh]]
d. I let [vp Mary [vp go tl]
(17)a. I saw [vp Mary [vp write a letter))
b. I saw [vp Mary [vp write]]
c. I saw [vp Mary [vp laugh)]
d. I saw [vp Mary [vp go t)]
Furthermore, French passive (11) straightforwardly translates
into English (18) ; unexpectedly, however, French (12) - ,13)
translate into English as ungrammatical sentences, as in
(19) - (20) :
(18) Mary was believed [ AP t [AP tired of it])
(19)a. *Mary was let [vp t [vp write a letter] )
b. *Mary was let [ VP t [vp wri -;e] ]
c. *Mary was let [vp t [ VP laugh) ]
d. "'Mary was let [ VP t [vp go t)]
- \\ 'oJ "'
(20)a. *Mary was seen [vp t [vp write a letter] )
b. *Mary was seen [vp t [vp wri te] }
c. *Mary was seen [vp t [vp laugh] ]
d. *Mary was seen [vp t [vp go t]]
~hether this is the right or the wrung move, here we will
simply disregard the problem.
In conclusion, our first question in this section,
what kinds of structures are associated with causative and
causative-like constructions of the type of (3) and (4) is
answered in (9)-(10). The related question, what 9roperties
are associated with causative and causative-like verbs like
laisser and voir, as used in (3)-(4), etc ... is then
easily answered. Leaving aside their phonological and seman-
tic properties, syntacticall~as far as constructions like
(3) and (4) are concerned, laisser, voir, etc ... are just
verbs, a-role assi9n~rs, and Case assigners.
Next, we can then take into consideration causative and
causative-like constructions characterized by non standard
word order and/or overt Case marking. In contrast with
causative and causative-like constructions in general, in-
cluding such examples as (3), (4), etc .. ~ we can call these
causative and causative-like constructio~s proper. On the
authority essentially of Rouveret and Vergnaud (1980), we
can assume that in causative and causativ~-like constructions
proper, the causative or causative-like verb is a reanaly=er.
Given then causative and causative-like construc-
tiona proper entered by causative and causative~like verbs, our
second and crucial problem in this section obviously is what
kinds of structures are associated with such constructions.
To begin with, we can consider the case in which
the verb enlbedded in a causative or causative-
like construction proper is a transitive verb;
this is exemplified with the causative verb faire
in (21) and the causative verb laisser in (22):
(21)a. J'ai fait ecrire une lettre a Marie
I made write a letter Marie
b. J'ai fait ecrire una lettre par Marie
I made write a letter by Marie
c. J'ai fait ecrire une lettre
I made write a letter
(22)a. J'ai laisse ecrire une lettre a Marie
I let write a letter Marie
b. J'ai laisse ecrire una lcttre par Marie
I let write a letter by Marie
c. J'ai laiss' ecrire une lettre
I let write a letter
... \~1-
Part of the structure of (21) and (22) is obvious: in (21)-
(22), much a~ in (3)-(4),or irldeed (9)-(10), the NP ~ is the
subject of ttle VPs ai fait ~crire una 1ettre ~ Marie, ... ai
laisse ecrire una lettre a Marie, ••• and assigned the subject
e-role by them as well as the nominative Case by the Infl
surfa~ing on ai fait and ai laisse. Furthermore, the Vs ai
fait and ai laisse subcatgorize fo~and assign the object
e-role t~ecrire una lettre ~ Marie, ecrire una lettre par
Marie, !crire una le~~; and,by analogy with (9)-(10), we
can assume that the expression that ai fa! t and ai laisse 3ubca-
tegorize in (21)-(22), ~cri~e une lettre a Marie, ... ,are VP
small clauses. What is more, we can assume that in (21)a
and (22)a, the VP ~cri~~ une lettre assigns the subject a-role
to Marie, while the preposition! assigns its Case to it a
'-
being releva~t with respect to Case assignment bu~ not 9-rola
assignment. Similarly in (21)b and (22)b, the VP ~cri~e une
lettr~ assigns the subject a-role to Marie through the pre-
position par and par assigns Mar.';-=. its Case. Furt.her-
more, th& verb 'cri~~ subcategorizes for the NP una lettre
and aSAigns the obj~ct a-role to it. Finally, we can recall
that it is our assumption that in causative constructions
proper, causative verbs like faire and laisser are reanalyzers.
Suppose that in (21) and (22) ai fait and ai lais~e
re8~ectively enter Case and indeed reanalysis, with 'crire1
if so, the nOll--standard wor" ordering and Cas" mark:lng
in (21) and (22) immedia~ely follows. To begin with, if
reanalysis holds of ai fait or ai laisse and ecrire, under
the adjacency condition on
Case assignment and reanalysis, ai fait and ai
laisse respectively must be adjacent to ~crj~. Next, ecrire
still has a Case to assign and,as in (3)a or (4)a, it can
assign it to una lettre, the two ending up adjacent to each
other. On the other hand, ai fait and ai laisse do no longer
have a Case to assign; hence in particular in (21) and (22)
(a) and (b) ai fait dnd ai laisse do no longer have a Case to
assign to Marie~ so t: .. ett Marie must be assigned Case by a
preposition, a in (21)a and (22)a/and par in (21)b and (22)b.
Various problems are left, however. First, we know
that in Case
nssignment and reanalysis, the Case e:ement must govern the
other alement involved; hence/in particular, if reanalysis
holds of ai fait or ai laisse and 'crire, ai fait or ai
!.c?iss~ and ecrire must govern each other. But can they? In
(7), we assumed that one of the the two possible maximal
projectiollS API and specifically the lower one, must be an
actual maximal projection, and so must be the one VP;
similarly/in (9)-(10), we assumed that one of the two lower
VPs must be an actval maximal projection, and so must be
the higher VP. The obvious principle behind tha
assumption is that for each head, i.e, each zero projection,
V, A, etc ••• , there is one actual maximal projection; so
in (7), the A fatigu'e must have one actual maximal
projection, the V crois must have one, and so on; in (9)-
(10) similarly, the V ecrire must have an actual maximal
projection, the V ai laisse or ai vu must have one, and so
on. Suppose now we assume that if two heads have some
relation to each other, there does not Ileed to be one actual
maximal projection for each of them; rathe~ there can
be one actual maximal projection for both of them. Thus,in
particular, in (21) and (22), if ai fait and ai laisse
reanalyze with ecrire, ai fait and ai laiss' respectively
and €crire can have the same actual maximal projection;
naturally, we assume that this is the one possible maximal
projection of the higher of the verbs, !!-fait or ai laiss~,
hence the matrix VP. But, if so, in (21) and (22), ai fait
and ~laisse respectively govern ~crir~ and,vice versa,
ecrire governs ai fait and at laissei hence, in turn, re-
analysis between ai fait or at laisse and ecrire satisfies
the government condition on Case assignment and reanalysis.
Next, we know that in general an expression can both
be assigned Case by the preposition par and be assigned the
subject e~role by a VP through par, that this is true
in English of the preposition EI, and so on. Thus, in particu-
lar, we expect that Marie in (21)b and (22)b can be assigned
Case by par and a e-role by the VP 'crire una lettre through
par But how can Marie in (21)a and (22)a be
assigned the subject e~role by the VP 'crire una lettre,
while being assigned Case by the preposition b? To begin
with, we can assume that the preposition! can and must
Case assign any nominal phrase in a complement position of
a verb, i.e. a position governed and not subcategorized by the verb
which \\Ould not othezwise be Case assigned. Suppose
further we assume that a can assign a 9-role or not.
The case in which! assigns a a-role we can identify with the
case of a benefactive a phrase. In the case in which a does
not assign a a-role, on the other hand, the object of a must
be assigned a a-role independently~ Indeed it is not hard
to show that in general a Case assigned object of a preposition
nust be an argunent and as such needs to be assigned a a-role,
for, the two essential types of non arguments, traces and
expletives, are excluded, expletives because they cannot bind another
elenent out of the prepositional phrase, and traces by hypothesis because
they are case assigned. But, this mtf:'ch establ ished, the one comple-
ment position in which a nominal phrase can receive Case
by a and a a-role independently, obviously is the position
of Marie in (21)a and (22)a.
Finally, one last problem is left. Given (9)-(10), or
indeed (7), we showed that Marie cannot be substituted by an
empty category, but what about (21) and (22)? To begin
with, Marie in (21) and (22) (a) and (b) cannot be replaced
by an empty category, for the obvious reason that the object
position of ~ or par is Case assigned, hence excluding an
... --
anaphoric empty category, and not properly identified, hence
excluding a pronominal empty category. On the other hand,
a Marie in (2l)a and (22)a and par Marie in (21)b and (22)b
cannot be replaced by an empty category for the simple
reason that, as we established before, an element in cornple-
ment position not otherwise assigned Case
is obligatorily assigned Case by!; hence, we are back
to the case in which an empty category substitutes for Marie
in the object position of !,
a case which we excluded already. Thu~ in (21) and (22) (a)
and (b), Marie or ~ Marie or 2ar Marie cannot
be substituted by an empty category. But, if so, in \21)0
and (22)0, in turn, the embedded small clause must consist
simply of the VP ecrire una lettre without any subject po-
sition to it.
Of course, from the point of view of Case
assignment, we already know that ai fait and ai laiss~ enter
reanalysis with &crire,so that no Case is left for assignment 1
furthermore, from the point of view of a-role assignment, we
already know that subject a-role assignment
is llAver obligatory. On the other hand, the (Extended) PrCf-
jection Principle must include some principle forcin~ the
obligatoriness of Aubject positions. In this respect, however,
we can assume that it is not predicates which need to have
subjects, but Infls or indeed the sentences projected from
In£1'8. If so, from the point of view of the
Extended Projection Principle, while finite and infinitival
sentences must have a subject position, small olauses again do not
have to; hence in particular in (21)0 and (22)0, ~crire une
lettre can be subjectless. once more~
Summing up, in (21)-(22), ~ is the subject of the VPs
ai fait ecrire una lettre a Marie, etc, ••. ,is assigned the
SUbject a-role by them and the nominative Case by the Infl
on ai fait and at laisse. Ai fait and ai laiss~ subcate-
gorize the VPs ecrire una lettre a Marie, etc' ... 1 assign
them object a-role, and enter reanalysis with 'crire. Ecrire
subcategorizes for une lettre and assigns object 9-role and
Case to it. And finally, in (21)a-(21)b, and (22)a-(22)b,
....Marie is assigned Case by a or par and the subject a-role
by the VP ecrire une lettre (through ! or par), while in
(21)0 and (22)c, the VP 'crire una lettre is 8ubjectless.
Thus, in conclusion, (21) and (22) and similar examples are
associated with structures of the type of (23)-(25), with
9 and Case relations as indicated:
VP __e_---~ a Mar ie~--_.. ·v
/ ~.~~ Case
ecrire --!.., une lettle
~
Case
Case
S
je~~vp
) a i fa i t I e VP
(. ai laiss' - >-
(23)
(24) S
. -----------Je Vp
Jai fait j
{ai laiss~
( 25)
Case
_---e~---..,~ VP~~
VP ~e .,par Marie
__/'-................. '....f!
~ Lase
ecrire e >une lettre
~
Case
s
je
Jai
tai
Case
vp
9 ~
~crire 97' une lettre
~
Case
At this point, 'Ne can notice that,while ea~ and laisser
pattern exactly alike in (21)-(22), and indeed (23)-(25),
laisser can appear in sentences like (3)a or structures like
(9)subcateg?rizing small clauses with standard word order and
overt Case marking; but faire cannot appear in analogous
structures, as shown in (26):
(26) *J'ai fait [vp Marie [Vp 'orire une lettre ] J
I made Marie write a letter
This follows straightforwardly from the assumption that while
laisser is an optional reanalyzer, faire is a reanalyzer obli-
gatorily. Indeed we have already shown that sentences of
the type of (21) and (22) are correctly derived if faire and
laisser respectively are reanalyzers, and that sentences of
4
the ty~e of ( 3) are correctly derived if laisser is simply
a Case al=5signer and not a reanalyzer. Tl1at eentences of the
type of (26) are illforrne<i, if faire i.s only a reanalyzer, can also
easily be shown. For, if ai fait in (26) assigns Case to
Marie, as ai laisse in (3)a, ai fait is not a reanalyzar;
but if ai fait in (26) reanalyzes with ~crire, Marie does
not recei~e Case from ai fait,as from ai laisse in (3)a,
and the Case filter is violated. Finally, our paradigm is
logi~ally completed by sentences like (27), with the structure
indicated:
(27)a. *J'ai fait [vp [vp &crire une lettreJ Marie]
;tI'! ", ib. *J'~i laisse[vp [vp ecr re una lettre] Marie]
Obviously, if faire and laisser are reanalyzers, (27) and
the like are excluded for the simple reason thnt Marie
is not assigned Case, in violation of the Case filter. If~
on the other hand laisser is not a reanalyzer and assigns
Case to ~rie under government, the two must be adjacent,
which they are not in (27); and the result again is ungramrna-
ticality.
Next, we can consider the case in which the verb embeddeL.
in a causative construction propay is a transitive verb
used
intransitively; this case is exemplified/with faire and
laisser respeotivelY/in (28) and (29):
(28)a. J'ai fait ~crire Marie
b. J'ai fait ecrire a Marie
c. J'ai fait ~crire par Marie
d. J'ai fait ecrire
(~9)a. J'ai laisse ecrire Marie
b. J'ai ~aisse ecrire a Marie
c. ?J'ai laisse ecrire par Marie
d. J'ai laisse ecrire
Given what we already know of (21)-(22), most of the structure
of (28) and (29) is obvious.ft Needless to say, the NP i!. is
the subject of the VPs ai fait ~crire Marie, ••• and assigned
the subject a-role by them,as well as the nominative Case by
the Infl on ai fait or ai laisse. More interestingly, ai
fait or ai laiss6 subcategorize and assign the subiect a-role
to the VPs ~crire f.1arie,... . In turn, i.n (28)a and (29)a,
Marie is the subject of the VP 'crire and assigned the sub-
ject a-role by it; similarly, Marie is assigned the subject
9-role by the VP 'crire in (28)b and (29)b, a bein~ relevant
for the purposes of Case assignmentonlYi and m(28)c and (29)c,
Marie is assigned the subject e-rol~ by the VP ecrire through
par. Crucially, ai fait or ai laiss' reanalyze with the verb
'crire, indeed being related by reanalysis, at fait or !!
laiss' and ~crire can have one same maximal projection, hence
govern each o,ther, and, being able to govern each other, ai
fait or ai laisse and 'crire can sa'tisfy th~ government
.. ,ct t".
condition on reanalysis and Case assignment. T'"'tnally,
if ai fait or ai laisse reanalyze with ecrire, they do no
longer have a Case to assig~ but €crire does. Hence, in
(28)a and (29)a, Marie can and must be assi,gned Case by
~crire, Marie being governed by and adjacent to ~crire. On
the othor hand, in (28)b and (29)b, Marie must be assigned
Case by!; an~in (28)0 and (29)0, Marie must be assigned
Case by par. But if ecrire is a Case assigner, can Marie be
assigned Case by ! or par without violating condition 2.2. (14)7
SimilarlY,in (28)d and (29)d, as in (21)c and (22)0, there
can be no empty category subject of the V? ecrirei first,
no anaphoric empty category (trace or PRO) because it would
be Case marked, wheth~r by ~crire, like Marie in (28)a and
(29)a, or by a, like Marie in (28)b and (29)bi second,
no pronominal empty category (pro)/because it would not be
properly identified. But, if so, and if ~crire again is a
Case assigner, can condition 2.2. (14) be satisfied?
The answer to our problem lies in the nature of the
verb embedded under at fait and at laisse, namely, ecrire.
As we stated above, ecrire in (28)-(29) is a transitive verb,as it
is in (21)-(22), but a transitive verb used intransitively,
in other words an "objt!ct deletion" verb. More l)recisely,
we can assume that veres which can be used both transitively
and intransitively, i.e. "object deletion" verbs, are a-role
assigners and Case assigners optionally, and,in particular,
ecrire is. If so, in (28) and (29), condition 2.2. (14)
n
is satisfied, whether ecrire assiqns Case, as in (2s)a and
(29)a to Marie, or does not dssign it, as in (28) and
(29)b-c, where Marie is assigned Case by ! or par, or where
the VP is subjectless
We can notice, on the other hand, that in (28) and (29),
ecrire does not assign any a-rolei hence an optional
a-role and Case assigner like ecrire can both
assign no a-role and no Case, or assign no a-role and
a Case, as in (28)a and (29)a. Further, we can notice that
in (21)-(22), ecrire assigns both Case and a-role to una
lettre; hence in yeneral, an optional a-role and Case as-
signer can assign both a-role and Case. Naturally, we can
then wonder whether an optional a-role and Case assigner, and
ecrire in particular, can assign Case and not assign a e-role.
The answer is that, obviously, it cannot. For example, wash
is a verb which can be used both transitively, as in "1 am
washing myself", or ttI am washing the laundry", or intransi-
tively, as in "I am wdshing n; if wash aasiqned a a-role but
no Case, its object position would be predicted to be filled
by an anapho~ic empty category, independent from the subject
in e-role assignment, hence a PR0, and under condition A,
coreferer4tial with the subject; but this, of course is iIT\possible.
Hence, we must assume that if an optional 9-rolA and Case
assigner does not assign Case, it does not assign a e-role
either, thus excluding the combination of no Case assignment
and a-role assignment.
Summing up, in (28)-(29), i! is the subject of ai fait
ecrire Marie, etc ..•. Ai fait and ai laisse subcategorize
the VPs ~orire Marie, etc ••• and assign them object a-role,
while reanalyzinq wi th ~cri.re. And finally, in (28) and (29)
a-o, Marie is assigned the subject a-role by the VP ecrire /
in (28) and (29)b-c through! and par respectively. In (28)a
and (29)a, Marie is assigned Case by ecrire, in (28) and (29)
....b-o, it is assigned Case by ! and e-ar respectively, while in
(28)d and (29)d, the VP ~crire is subjectless. Thus, examples
like (28) and (29) are associated with structures like (30)-
(33), with e- and Case relations as indi-
cated:
9 ) VP
~--VP e ~ Mb..cie
l ~
ecrire
---...JI"f
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je ~
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Finally, if we asSl.JIle that faire isan obligatory reanalyzer,
while laisser is an optional reanalyzer, we have an explana-
tion for the impossiblity of examples like (34), as opposed
to examples like (3)b, or (9), involvin~ laisser:
(34) *J'ai fait [Vp Marie , .[ ecr1re ]]
For, as we illustrated above with respect to (3)a (9), and
(26), if ai fait in (33) assigns Case to Marie, like ai
laisse in (3)b, ai fait is not a reanalyzer. If, on the
other hand, ai fait reanalyzes with ecrire and ecrire assigns
('QJ~ to Marie, llarie r:\ust be not only adjacent to ecrire,
...-,. ......-.....
but also to the right of 'crire, not to its left
as in (34), a consequence, we assume, of French being a "head
first" language, whatever this exactly means.
Next, we can consider the case in which the
verb embedded in a causative construction proper is a pure
intransitive verb ; this case is exemplified, with faire and laisser'
respectively, in (35) and (36):
(35)a. J'ai fait rire Marie
I made laugh Marie
b. J'ai fait rire
I made laugh
(36) a. J' ai laisse rire f1arie
I let laugh Marie
b. J'ai laisse rire
I let laugh
After what we established of both (21)-(22) and (28)-(29),
the structure of (35)-(36) is for the most part transparent.
Once mo~e, the NP i! is the subject of the VPs ai fait rire
Marie, ••. and is assigned the subject e-role by them as well
as the nominative Case by the Infl on ai fait or ai laisse.
Furthermore, ai fait or ai laisse subcategorize for and
assign their e-role to the VPs rire Marie, ..•. Finally,
ai fait or ai laisse reanalyze with the verb rire. Since
reanalysis holds of ai fait or ai laisse and rire, they can
have the same actual maximal projection and govern each
other, hence in turn satisfy the qovernment condition on
reanalysis (or Case assignment). And because re-
analysis holds of ai fait or ai laisse and rire, rire ,thou~h
------- .. --
not a Case assigner in the lexicon ,can be a Case assigner
in the syntax, thus in turn satisfying the restriction of the
range of reanalysis to Case elements. In addition, in (35)a
and (36)a, the NP Marie is the subject of the VP~ and is
a-role assigned by it as well as Case assigned by the verb
~. In (35)b and (36)b, on the other hand, the small
clause E!E! is subjectless. Indeed, an empty category
subject is excluded, an anaphoric empty category because the
subject position is assigned Case, either by rire or through
a insertion, and a pronominal empty category because it is
not properly identified. An olvious problem then arises.
If rire, due to reanalysis, is a Case assigner in (35)-(36),
under condition 2.2, (14), it must enter Case assignment with
some nominal phrase. In (35)a and (36)a, condition
2.2 (14) is satisfied by rire by entering Case assignment with
Marie. But if, in (35)b and (36)b the small clause is in-
deed subjectless, and rire does not enter Case assignment
with any nominal phrase, how can ccndition 2.2 (14) be
satisfied? Obviously, the answer must lie in the nature of
rire. To begin with, we observe that in (35)b-(36)b, while,
due to reanalysis,!!!! can be a Case assigner, there is no
a-role the Case it assigns can be associated with. On
the other hand, we already assumed that various dependencies
between Case assignment features and a-role features are
stipulated in the grammar, in particular, as in the discussion
of (28)-(29) above, that, given an optional Case assigner and
a-role assigner, it cannot enter Case assignment without also
entering a-role assignment. In this context, it is perfectly
natural to assume that if a Case assigner feature is not
matched by any e-role assigner feature, it automatically
counts as an optional feature; so that it can either define
a Case assignment relation or no Case assignment relation.
If so, our problem is obviously solved. On the one
hand, in (35)b and (36)b, rire can be a Case assigner under
-- '
reanalysis with ai fait and ai laiss~. On the other hand,
its Case assigner feature, not being matched with any a-role
assigner feature, is automatically optional. Hence rire in
(35)b and (36)b can enter no Case assignment relation and
still satisfy condition 2.2(14).
Summing up, then, in (35)-(36) ai fait or ai laisse
subcategorize and a-role assign the VP small clauses
rire Marie, .•• while entering Case and indeed reanalysia
with the verb rire. Finally, in (35)a and (36)a, the VP rire
assigns subject a-role to Marie and the verb rire assigns it
Case. In (35)b and (36)b, on the other hand, the small
clause is subjectless. Thus, in conclusion, sentences like
(35) and (36) are associated with structures like (37) and
(38) resp~ctively, with a-role and Case relations as
indicated:
.. \~, .
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Obviously, if as before we assume that laisser can
either function as a Case assigner or as a reanalyzer, but
faire is a reanalyzer obligatorily, the contrast between the
grammaticality of examples like (3)0 with the structure in
(9), and the ungrammaticality of examples like (39) with the
structure indicated, is immediately explained:
(39) *J'ai fait [vp Marie [Vp rire ]]
I made' Marie laugh
In fact, while the wellformedness of (3)0 depends upon ai
laiss' assigning Case to Marie, in (39), at fait being a
reanalyzer cannot Case assign Marie but must enter reanalysis
with!!£!. On the other hand, if rire Case assigns Ma.ie,
rire and Marie not only must be adjaoent, but Marie also must
...............
be to the right of rire, as in (35)a, and not to its left, as
-
with an intransitive verb like E!!!, are
(40)a. *J'ai fait [vp vp rire
b. *J'ai fait [vp vp rire
(41)a. *J'ai laiss' [vp VP rire
b. *J'ai 1ai88' [vp VP rire
a Marie
par ~1arie
a Marie
par Marie]
Why are (40) and (41) illformed? We can recall that we
assumed in the discussion of (35)-(36) that rire is a Case
assigner under reanalysis with a1 fail or ai laisst!, but an
optional Case assigner under the stipulation that Case assign-
ment properties not matched by a-role assignment properties
are optional. H '!nce rire satisf ies condi tion 2. 2 (14), both
if it enters Case assignment, as in (35)a and (36)a, and if
it does not, as in (35)b and (36)b. Going then back to
(40) and (41), ~'Ie can hypothesize that, there, the association
of the Case assigning properties of the verb rire with the
.. 40tJ •
9-role assigning properties of the VP rire prevents the verb
rire itself from being a Case assigner optionally. If so,
obviously, in (40)-(41), rire,being an obligatory Case
assigner, must enter Case assignment with some nominal lexical
phrase under condition 2.2 (14).
But it obviously cannot, Marie beinq independently
Case assigned by the preposition a or par. Hence, in (40)
and (41), rire actually violates condition 2.2 (14); and i11-
formedness arises.
Finally, we can consider the case in which the
verb embedded in a causative construction proper is an "er-
gative" verb, this case exemplified by (42) and (43) with
faire and laisser respectively:
(42) J'ai fait partir Marie
I made go Marie
(43) J'ai laiss~ partir Marie
I let go Marie
At this stage of our investigation, the structure of (42)-
(43) is immediately transparent. As usual, i! is the subject
of at laiss' partir Marie, ••• and assigned the subject a-role
and nominative Case in the standard way. More interestingly,
ai fait or !!-!aiss' subcategorize for and a-role assign
the VP small clause partir Marie. Ai fait or ai laiss', on
the other hand, reanalyze with the verb fartir. Reanalysis
between ai fait or ai laiss' and partir makes it ~ossible for
ai fait or at laisse and partir to govern each other and this
in turn makes it possible for partir to satisfy the govern-
ment condition on reanalysis .. Similarly, partir, though not a Case
assigner in the lexicon, can be a Case assigner in the syntax
due to the fact that it is reanalyzed with ai fa~ or ai
laisse, this in turn making it possible for it to satisfy
the restriction of the range of reanalysis to Case elements.
Finally, the verb partir subcategorizes Marie and assigns it
a a-role and Case. Ana the small clause partir Marie is
obviously subjectless, an anaphoric empty subject being ex-
cluded because there is no way for it to lack Case, a inser-
tion intervening if Case is not otherwise assigned, and a
pronominal empty subject being excluded because there is no
way for it to be properly identified. Thus, the structure
of sentences like (42)-(43) can be simply as in (44), with
e-~ole and Case relations as indicated:
e ., Vp
~
partir e 7,Marie
~
Case
)ai fai t I
7ai laiss~1
s
~~je ~VP
(44)
On the other hand, one can wonder '"hather another structure
is possible for (42)-(43), as in (45), where Marie is the
subject of the VP Eartir and the ?osition subcategolized
.. lu t --
by part;.:: is occupied by the trace of !1arie. In such a
structure, partir must Case assign Marie directly in subject
position, so that the trace correctly lacks Case~ while the
trace must be a-role assigned by partir, and Marie end up
with the object e-role of partir by forming a chain
wi th the trace. If this can indt!ed be the case, the struc-
ture in (45) can obviously be wellformed. However, indepen-
dently of any other theoretical consideration, it seems only
natural to assume that, if a verb assigns both 9-role and
Case, while in principle it can assign the e-role into a
subcategorized position and the Case into a higher
governed position, in fact it must be assumed to
assign the e-role and the Case into the same subcategorized
position.
excluded:
If so, obviously, a structure like (45) is
(45)a. [s Je (vp ai fait [vp'fVI' partir t) Marie))]
b. [s Je rvp ai laiss' (vp (VI' partir t 1 Marie J] 1
Predictably, on the other hand, examples of the type
of (46) are ill-formed, though similar examples with laisser
are wellformed, as in (3)d:
(46) *J'ai fait CVp Marie [vp partir t J]
I made Marie go
As we already motivated, the one syntactic difference between
laisser and faire is that laisser can be either a Case
· z. 0; "
assigner or a reanalyzer, while faire can only be a rea-
nalyzer. If so, in (46), ai fait ffiUst reanalyze with eertir
and cannot Case assign Marie as in (3)d; but if ai fait
reanalyzes with partir and partir assigns Case to Marie,
Marie must not only be adjacent to partir,
as in (46), but must also be to its right, as a
consequence of French being a "head first" language. Not
surprisingly, finally examples of the type of (47) and
(48) are also illformed:
(47)a. *J'ai fait [vp (vp parti~ t a Marie )
b. *J'ai fait [vp (vp partir t par Marie
(48) a. *J'ai laiss' (vp (vp partir t a Marie J
b. *J'ai laiss' [vp [vp partir t par Marie
Minimally, both (47) and (48) are illformed because partir
aoes not satisfy condition 2.2.(14) For, in (47) - (48),
partir, though a Case assigner under reanalysis, and a Case
assigner which is also a a-role assigner, does not enter
Case assignment, not with the traca by definition, and not
with Marie because Marie is already Case assigned by a or
par. But if so, condition 2.2(14) is violated. In addition,
at least (47)b and (48)b are excluded because Marie must
bind the trace ~, but, being embedded under par, it cannot,
since it clearly does not a-command it. Whether the same is
true of (47)a and (48)a depends ultimately upon the exact
-lo ~.
nature of the a of ! insertion, but is not crucial here.
At this point, we can notice that all of the examples
we gave irlvolve simple patterns 3ubject. verb - object
embedded under faire or laisser. It is obvious however that
more complex patterns involving in particular PP cornplement~
reduce essentially to simple ones; hence, in general, more
complex patterns than the already familiar ones do not re-
quire any special attention. There is however one exception
to this general state of affairs. Consider again the pat-
tern where the verb reanalyzed with by faire or laisser Case~
assigns its subject. This pattern is most clearly
exemplified by sentences like (28)a and (29)a and structures
like (30), where ai fait or ai laisse reanalyze with the
"object deletion" verb ~crire; or by sentences like (35)a and
(36)a and structures like (37), where ai fait or ai laisse
reanalyze with the purely intransitive verb rire. If a PP
complement to 'crire and rire is inserted in (30) and (37)
respectively, we expect that structures of the type of (49)
and (50) are obtained, where in (49) 'crire takes an ! (to)
phrase oomplement and in (50) rire takes a de (of) phrase
complement:
(49)a. [s Je [ vp ai fait [ vp [ Vp ecrire a Pierre] Marie)]]
I made write to Pierre Marie
b. (s Je [ vp ai laisse Ivp lvP ~crire a Pierre] Marie)] 1
I let write to Pierre Marie
(50)a. [s Je ( vp ai fait [ vp [ vp rire de ra ] Marie]]]
I made laugh of it Marie
.. lo~_
[s Je [Vp ai laisse [vp[vp rire de ~a ) Marie))]
Rather uninterestingly, in (49) and (50), Case and e re-
lations are exactly as indicated in (30) and (37) respec-
tively, with the simple addition that in (49) !, sel~cted
in some way by ~crire, in turn assigns e-role and Case to
Pierre; and/similarly/~ in (50), selected by rire,
assigns a-role and Case to~. Structures like (49) and
(50) then are not very interesting in themselves. What is
interesting about them, however, is that, while they include
the constituents ecrire a Pierre and rire de fa, respectively,
with A Pierre and de s:a preceding Marie,
the sentences they correspond to are (51) ~nd (52), where
Marie precedes a Pierre and de ca, and not (53) and (54),
where the ordering in (49) and (50) is maintained:
(51)a. J'ai fait ecrire ~1arie a Pierre
b. J'ai fait rire f-larie de ra
(52)a. J'ai laiss' ~crire f~1arie a Pierre
b. J'ai laiss~ rire Marie de' )'a
(53)a. *J'ai fait ~crire a Pierre Marie
b. *J'ai fait rire de sa Marie
(54)a. *J'ai laisse 'crire a Pierre Marie
b. *j'ai laisse rire de ia Marie
This, however, is exactly what is· predicted by the adjacency
oondi tion 2 •2 (17). Acoording to 2. ~ (17), two elements
related by Case assignment or reanalysis in the syntax must
be adjacent one to the other, not in the syntax itself but
rather in PF. If so, in (49) and (50), ecrire and rire
respectively can Case assign Marie, across a Pierre and de
£!, while in the corresponding PF, the prediction is, cor-
rectly, that ~crire and rire must be adjacent to Marie, as
in (51\-(52), and cannot be separated from it by other ma-
terial,as in (53)-(54).
Finally, before concluding, we can notice that,in
introducing the relation reanalysis, we restricted its range
to Case ~lements, hence Case assigners or reanalyzers~ while
in all of the examples we gave up to now, faire or laisser
reanalyze with Case assigners, never with other reanalyzers.
Exemples of faire or laisser reanalyzing with other rea-
nalyzers, however, are easily found. In fact, faire or
laisser can reanalyze one with the other, as in (55):
(55)a. J'ai laisse faire ~crire una lettre
I let make write a letter
b. J'ai iaisse faire ecrire Marie
I let milke write Marie
c. J'ai laisse faire rire Marie
I let make laugh Marie
d. J'ai laisse faire seen aller Marie
I let make go Marie
In (55), obviously at laisse sUbcategorizes the small clause
VPs faire -ecrire una lettt'e,... and assigns a a-role to it,
while reanalyzing with the reanalyzer, hence Case element
faire, exactly as if the verb embedded under ai laisse were
a normal Case assigner, like ~crire, etc, .... In turn,
faire subcategorizes for and a-role assigns the VP small
clauses ~crire una lAttre, •.. and reanalyzes with the verb
~crire, .•. exactly as in all of the other examples of rea-
nalysis involving it we gave. Similarly, it is not
difficult to find examples with three reanalysers in a row,
one reanalyzing with the following till the last one ends
the sequence by reanalyzing with a Case Qssigner. In
theory, indeed a sentence can contain an indefinitely large
number of reanalyzers.
In conclusion, our second question in this section,
what kind of structures are associated with causative or
causative-like constructions proper, is answered in (23)-(25),
(30)-(33), (37)-(38), (44) as well as in (49)-(50), etc. As
for faire, laisser, etc., in causative and causative-like
constructions proper, they are, phonological and semantic
properties aside, just verbs and a-role assigners,in addition
to being reanalysers. Thus, a verb like laisser has, everything
considered, a lexical entry like (56) where Ilaisserl stands
for its phonological properties, "laisser" for its semantic
properties, and its syntactic properties are that it is a verb,
a e~role assigner, and alternatively either a Case assigner, as
in examples of the type of (3) and structures of the type of
(9), or a teanalyser, as in examples like (22), (29), (36)
and (43) and corresponding structures:
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(56) laisser: /laisser/,
"laisser",
V,
a-role assigner
Case assigner v reanalyser
On the other hand, a verb like faire has a lexical entry like
(57), where once its phonologi.cal properties, Ifaire/, and its
semantic properties, "faire", are discour4ted, its syntactic
properties are that it is a verb and a a-role assigner and
a reanalyser obligatorily, not optionally as laisser:
(57) faire: /faire/,
"faire",
V,
i-role assigner
reanalyser
Obviously the lexical entry in (57) does not take into account
I the fact that faire both a-role assignes and Case assigns
nominal objects in examples like J'ai fait unetable (I made
a table). If this is taken into account faire must be a
Case assigner or a reanalyser and not only a reanalyser in the
lexicon; the fact that,when subcategorizing for a (small)
clause,faire obligatorily reanalyses must obviously be captured
by introducing in its lexical e~try an implication from 9-role
assigning a (small) clause to being a reanalyser. This,
however, need not concern us here.
4.2 More causative constructions
In the preceding section we limited our investig-
ation of causative constructions essentially to French, though
we extended it to English in the case of causative
constructions not involving reanalysis; and in French we
limited our in')estlgat:.ion to causative constructions
of the simplest kind. In this section
we will be concerned with extending Ollr investigation both
to more complicated constructions and to a larger number of
languages. In particula~we will discuss the impossibility of
causative constructions proper in English; the impossibility of
passivizing the causative verb in a causative construction in
French and the possibility of doing so in Italian~ the impossibilit~
of passi vizing the embedded verb in a causative construction proper in
general; and nore. On the one hand, we will argue that all d.ifferences
betwe~n English, French and Italian causative constructions
follow from the assumptimn that English causative verbs are
simply Case assigners, French and Italian causative verbs are
reanalyzers, and Italian causative verbs and the verbs they
reanalyse with are like one verb
with respect to Case. On the other hand, we will argue
that all complex patterns met in causative constructions
follow from our assumptions about reanalysis and in general
about Case. Among additional topics, we will address the
question of cliticization in causative constructions proper~
and we will conclude that .tts properties are less crucial
it is otherwise assumed.
To begin with, we recall that if section 4.1 is
correct, the fact that French faire, laisser, etc. are
associated with causative constructions proper, i.e. causative
constructions wi.th peculiar word order and/or Case marking,
follows straightforwardly from the theory of grammar under
the assumption that faire'and laisser are reanalysers. On
the other hand, we recall that if section 4.1 again is correct
the fact that French laisser, but not French faire, is
associated with causative constructions with ordinary word
order and Case marking follows from the theory of
grammar under the assumption that laisser, but not faire, can
also SiIL!ply be a Case assigner. Now, English to make, etc.
are associated with causative constructions of the ordinary
word order and Case marking kind exactly as French laisser, etc.
are. 01 the other hand to make, etc., contrary to French faire,
laisser etc., are not associated with causative constructions
------
proper, as in (1)- (4):
(1) a. *1 made write a letter "to" Mary
b. *I made write a letter by Mary
c. *I made write a letter
(2) a. *1 made write Mary
b. *I made write "to" Mary
c. *I made write by Mary
d. *I made write
(3) a. *I made laugh Mary
b. *I made laugh
(4) itI made go Mary
Obviously the fact that to make, etc. are associated with
causative constructions of the ordinary word order/Case
marking kind can be made to follow, as in section 4.1
under the assumption that to make, etc.,
like French laisser, etc., are simply Case assigners. On
the other hand, the fact that to make, etc. are not associated
with causative constructions proper implie~
everything else equal, that to make, etc., contrary to French
faire, laisser, etc., are not reanalysers. The question
then is whether I conversely, from the asswnption ttlat
to make, etc. are not reanalysers the fact that to make, etc.
are not associated with causative constructions proper can be made to follow ..
Consider first (1). In (1) the theta criterion and the Case
filter as well as various other conditi~ns, can ~e s&tieficd
exactly as in the French counterparts in 4.1(21); made however,
contrary to ai fait , clearly violates condition
2.2(14) • Tn 4.1(21) indeed faire, being a reanalyzer,
satisfies condition 2.2(14) by entering reanalysis with
ecrire. In (1) on the other hand to make, being a
Case assigner, under condition 2.2(14) must enter
Case assignement with some nominal phrase; but
- 1..1 1. ~
obviously there is no nominal phrase to make can enter
Case assignment with. In (1) indeed
the small clause made governs and subcategorizes for,
being neither a projection of N nor of INFL, does not fall
under our definition of nominal (phrase). On the other hand
the matrix subject I, the embedded object a letter and in
(21a)-(21b) the embedded subject or agent Mary are nominal
phrases, but they are not governed by made, hence made cannot
-
Case assign them or the government condition is violated.
Thus under the assumption that to make, contrary to faire,
is a Case assigner and not a reanalyzer, the ungrammaticality
of (1) follows straightforwardly.
Consider then the other examples. Obviously enough, (2b)-
(2d) and (3b) reduce to (1); indeed it is easy to see that
in (2b)-(2d) and (3b) as in (1) there is no nominal phrase
made can enter Case assignment with, hence,as (1), (2b)-
(2d) and (3b) violate condition 2.2(14). In particular,
it is easy to see that (2b) is in all relevant respects
analogous to (la), (20) analogous to (lb) and both (2d)
and (3b) analogous to (10). If so, only (2a),
(3a) and (4) are left. (2a), (3a) and (4) differ from the
other examples in that they can satisfy not only the a-criterion
and the Case filter but also condition 2.2 (14); indeed in (2a),
(3a) and (4) m!S! can govern Mary and Case assign it. On the
other hand, we know that under the adjacency condition two
elements entering Case assignment must be adjacent to each
other in PFi hence if in (2a), (3a) and (4) made Case assigns
Mary, made and Mary must be adjacent to each other in PF. But
in (2a), (3a) and (4) ~ and Mary are separated by write,
laugh and ~ respectively, hence the adjacency condition is
violated. Thus under the assumption that to make, COlltrary
to faire, is a Case
assigner and not a reanalyser, the ungrammaticality of (1)-
(4) also straightforwardly follows. Ultimately then we
conclude that in the lexicon to make, leaving aside its
phonological properties, /make/, and its semantic properties,
"make", syntactically
simply is a verb, a 9-role assigner and a Case assigner, as in (5);
and that the difference }:)eoveen the lexical entries of make, as in (5) and faire
or laisser, as in 4.1 (56) and 4.1 (57) respectively, indeed accounts for
the difference }:)e~ causative constructions ill E flglish and in
French:
(5) make = /make/,
"make" ,
V,
theta-role assigner,
Case assigner
Next, we consider what is both a more complicated
example of causative construction and a more subtle
example of variation across languages. We know from
section 5.1 that causative constructions of the ordinary
word order/Case marking type are predicted to be compatible
with passivization of the causative verb, correctly in French,
though incorrectly in English for reasons that we tentatively
dismissed as irrelevant to our investigation here. We can
wonder, then, whether causative constructions proper are
compatible with passivization of the causative verb and what
our predictions are in this respect.
For one thing, French causative constructions proper
are incompatible with passivization of the causative verb, no matter
whether it Uwolves an embedded subject as in (6) and (7), or
an embedded subject in object position as in (8), or an
embedded object, as in (9):
(6) *Marie I I faite I (par Pierre)a ete ecrire
Marie was made write (by Pierre)
(7) *Marie ' I faite tire (par Pierre)a ete
Marie was made laugh (by Pierre)
I I(8) *Marie a ete faite partir
Marie was made go
(9) a. *La lettre a ete faite ecrire a Marie (par Pierre)
Tlu9 letter was made write "to" Marie (by Pierre)
· L. f-
I Ib. *La lettre a ete faite ecrire par Marie
The letter was made write by Marie
(par Pie+re)
(by Pierre)
~ ~ ~
c. *La lettre a ete faite ecrire (par Pierre)
The letter was made write (by Pierre)
On the other hand, in Italian,
which exactly duplicates French in simple examples, causative
constructions proper are compatible wi th passivization of the causative
verb in all cases, whether an embedded subject is involved
as in (10) and (11) or an embedded subject in object position
is involved as in (12), or an embedded object is involved, as
in (13) :
(10) Maria fu fatta scrivere (da Piero)
Maria was made \6/ri te (by Piero)
(11) t1aria fu fatta ridere (da Piero)
Maria was made laugh (by Piero)
(12) Maria fu fatta andare (da Piero)
Maria was made go (by Piero)
(13) a. La lettera fu fatta scrivere a Maria (da Piero)
The letter was made write "to" Maria (by Piero)
b. La lettera fu fatta scrivere da Maria (da Piero)
The letter was made write by Maria (by Pier-c)
c. La lettera fu fatta scrivere (da Piero)
The letter was made write (by Piero)
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Thus in the case of French we must be able to predict that
causative constructions proper and passivization of the
causative verb are incompatible; in the case of Italian we
must be able to predict that causative constructions proper
and passivization of the causative verb are compatible.
Consider first French, and the incompatibility in French
of causative constructi,>ns proper and passivization of the
causative verb. To begin with, we notice that passive morphology
has been nharacterized, here and quite generally, as eliminating
the Case assigner properties of the verbs it is associated with,
and the theta-role assigner properties of the predicates the verbs
fOLm. It would be a natural extension of this characterization
if passive morphology were to eliminate in general the Case
properties of the verbs it is associated with, including not only
their Case assigner properties but also their reanalyzer
properties. This extension however is by no means necessary;
obviously it is at least as natural to maintain that passive
morphology is actually associated with Case assigners only, excluding
in this way reanalyzers. If this is the case, it is easy
to see that the incompatibility of causative constructions proper
and passivization of the causative verb straightforwardly
follows. For in causative constructions proper the causative
verb is a reanalyzer; and if passive morphology cannot eliminate
its reanalyzer property, it must enter reanalysis. Hence, for
example, in (6)-(9) faire must reanalyze with ecrire, rire, partir
I ~
and ecrire again. But if so, in (6) and (7) ecrire and rire
respectively must Case assign the embedded subject, making
movement of Marie into the matrix subject position impossible;
similarly in (8) partir must Case assign the embedded "inverted"
subject, making movement of Marie into the matrix subject position
similarly impossible. Fi ally in (9), even indepenrlently of whether faire
reanalyzes ,.,lt~ it or not, ec::rire must Case assign the embedded object
position; hence movement of la lettre into the matrix subject
position is once aqain made impossible. Ultimately then the impossibility
in French of causative constructions proper ann passivization
of the causative verb follows under unchanged assumptions about
both passive morphology and French causative verbs.
Consider then Italian and the compatibility in Italian
of causative constructions proper and passivization of the
causative verb. To begin with, we must recall that Italian and
French,while differing with respect to examples of the type of
(6)-(9) and (10)-(13), are identical with respect to all other
examples of causative constructions taken into consideration.
Indeed if we were considering only examples of the simpler kind,
we could conclude that Italian causative verbs have the same
lexical properties as their French counterparts, hence, under
the same principles of grammar enter the same syntactic construc-
tions. When on the other hand we consider examples of the type
of (6)-(9) and (10)-(13) we must conclude, barring the hypothesis
that Italian and French differ with respect to &ome principle(s)
of grammar, that Italian causative verbs and French causative
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verbs have different lexical properties, hence under the same
principles of grammar enter different syntactic constructions.
Suppose then we assume that an Italian causative verb like fare
has all of the (syntactic) properties of its French counterpart
faire; but, in addition, if fare enters reanalysis with a Case
element eJ., it is a property of fare that ~ in turn ent.ers Case
with another element ~ if and only if fare and ~ together enter
Case with ~, much as if they were one (Case) element. It is not
difficult to see that under these assumptions it indeed follows
both that fare enters all and only the simple constructions its
French counterpart faire enters, and that fare, contrary to its
French counterpart faire, as in (6)-(9), enters constructions
of the type of (10)-(13). Consider first (10)-(13). As in
(6)-(9) the passive morphology does not eliminate the reanalyzer
property of faire, in (10)-(13) we can assume that the passive
morphology does not eliminate the reanalyzer property of fare.
Consequently, as in (6)-(9) faire reanalyzes with ecrire, rire,
parti,r and ecrire again, in (10) - (13) fare reanalyzes with
~crivere, ridere, andare and scrivere respectively. As the next
. 'step, however, In (6)-(9) the embedded verbs ecrire etc. must
Case assign Marie in (6)-(8) and la lettre in (9); in (10)-(13)
on the other hand it is our assumption that, as a property of
fare, the embedded verbs scrivere etc. enter Case if and only
if !!£! and the embedded verbs together, hence fare scrivere
etc. do. Obviously, because fare is associated with passive
morphology, fare scrivere etc. also are; arid because they are
associated with passive morphologj, fare scrivere etc. have
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their Case assigner properties eliminated and do
not enter Case assignement. But in turn, because fare scrivere
etc. 00 not, scrivere etc. do not have Case assigner properties
and do not ent~r Case assignement either. Hence in (10) and (11)
(fare)scrivere and (fare)ridere respectively do not Case assign
the embedded subject positio~ and Maria can and must move into
the matrix subject position; similarly in (12) (fare)andare does
not Case assign the embedded "inverted" subject,and Mari~
similarly can and must move into the matrix subject position;
and finally in (13) (fare)scrivere does not Case assign
the embedded object. position and la lettera can and must
move into the matrix subject position. Thus the compatibility
in Italian of causative constructions proper and passivization
of the causative verb indeed follows from the assumption that
the causative verb and the verb it reanalyzes with are, with
respect to Case, essentially one element. Consider then the
exact similarity of simple causative constructions in Italian
to simple causative constructions in French. Leaving aside
causative constructions with standard word order, and taking into
consideration, among causative constructions proper, all and only
the wellformed ones, the relevant Italian examples are in (14)-
(17), where the embedded verb is a transitive verb in (14), a
transitive verb used j.~transitively in (15), an intransitive
verb in (16), and an "ergative" verb in (17):
(14) a. Feci scrivere una lettera a Maria
I-made write a letter Maria
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b. Feci scrivere una lettera da Maria
I-made write a letter by Maria
c. Feci scrivere una lettera
I-made write a letter
(15) a. Feci scrivere Maria
I-made write Maria
b. Feci scrivere a Maria
I-made write Maria
c. Feci scrivere da Maria
I-made write by Maria
d. Feci scrivere
I-made write
(16) a. Feci ridere Maria
I-made laugh Maria
b. Feci ridere
I-made laugh
(17) Feci andare Maria
I-made go Maria
In the French counterparts to (14)-(17), faire reanalyzes
with the embedded verbs ecrire Ietc.; in turn ecrire etc. ,
depending upon their different properties, Case assign the
embedded object or the embedded subject or do not
assign Case at all. Similarly in (14)-(17) fare reanalyzes with
the embedded verbs scrivere etc.; and similarly in turn scrivere
etc. Case assign the embedded object, as in (14), or the embedded
subject, as in (15a) and (16a), or the embedded "inverted" subject,
as in (17), or do not assign Case at all, as in (15b)-(15d) and
(l6b). Under our as'sumptions the one difference
between French and Italian is that in Italian, as a lexical
property of fare, the embedded verbs scrivere, etc. enter Case
if and only if fare and scrivere, etc. together do. But this
simply means that in (14) fare scrivere Case assigns una lettera
as scrivere does; in (15a), (16a) and (17) fare scrivere, fare
ridere and fare andare Case assign Maria as scrivere, ridere and
andare respectively do; and in (lSb)-(15d) and (16b) fare scrivere
and fare ridere do not enter Case at all, as scrivere and ridere
also do not. Hence in general fare scrivere, etc. simply double
scrivere, etc. Thus under the assumption that in Italian a
causative verb and the verb it reanalyzes with are essentially
one element with respect to Case, the exact similarity of simple
causative constructions in Italian to simple causative constructions
French also follows. Ultimately then we can conclude that an
Italian causative item like fare, leaving aside its phonological
properties, Ifare/, and its semantic properties, "fare", is a
verb and a theta-role assigner and a reanalyzer; and in addition
it is its property that if it reanalyzes with some other element
~ , « enters Case if and only if fare and ~ together do; as in
(18) :
(18) fare = Ifare/,
"fare",
v,
theta-role assigner,
reanalyzer,
if Case (fal"'e, 0( ), then Case ( «, ~ )
if and only if Case (( fare, « ) , p )
... llZ-
Ne~t, we consider again a complicated example of
causative constructions proper, though this time one net
involving variation across languages.We just saw in this
sectiun that causative constructions proper and passivization
of the causative verb a~e incompatible in French ann compatible
in Italian. We now notice that causative constructions proper are
incompatible with passivization of the embedded verb
in ~oth Frsnch and Italian, as in (19) and
(20) respectively:
(19) *J'ai fait ~tre invite Pierre par Marie
I made be i.nvited Pierre by Marie
*Feci essere invitatc Piero(20)
I-made be invited Piero
da Maria
by Maria
::t i'3 easy to see that the. incanpatibili ty of causative constructions
proper and passivization of the embedded verb indeed
follows from our assumptions. In (19) ai fait reanalyzes
with etre invite, in (20) feci reanalyzes with essere invitato;
etre invite and essere invitato then must Case assign Pierre
and Piero respectively. But both etre invite and essere invitato
bear passive morphology; hence etre invite and essere
invitato cannot assign Case at all. The one difference between
French ana Italian is that in Italian, in addition, as a lexical
property of f,~ essere invitato enters Case assignment if and
only if feci essere invitato also does. But this only means that
as essere invitato cannot enter Case, so feci easere invitato
cannot. Hence the incompatibility of causative construct,ions proper
and passivization of the embedded verb follows straightfor'/ardly,
lack of ~ifferences between Italian and Frencb included.
~lotice tha t
while there is incomnatihility between causative constructions
proper and passive embedded verbs ther~ is no qenera! in-
co"'\pa tibi).. i ty bet1,'een causative construct.lons proper and
NP-movement embedded verbs Indeed, we ~~ve seen
alreadY,in the preceding section and in this one,thQt one
significant class of NP-movement verbs, "ergative" verbs, is
perfectly compatible with causative constructions proper both
in French and in Italian. One cl~ss of ~P'·mOVA"'.e:l.t verbs is left
after thiq, the class of raising verbs, including verbs of
the type of to seem, and verbs of the class of to be
if the small clause and raising analysis is adopted for them;
the compatibi11ty of these verbs and causative constructions
proper is dubious both in French and in Italian, as in (21)
and (22) respectively:
(21) a. ? J'ai fait resulter Marie avoir vaincu
I made appear Marie to have won
b. ? J'ai fait etre Marie arrogante
I made be Marie arrogan't
(22) a. ? Feci risultare Maria aver vinto
I-made appear Maria to have won
b. ? Feci essere Maria arrogante
I-made be Maria arrogant
:1C'th in (21) and in (22) the causative verb, ai fait and
feci respectively, can reanalyze with the embedded
verb resulter/risultare or atre/~~!; and the embedded verb
in turn, in virtue of reanalysis, can be a Case assigner and
Case assign ~arie/Maria. Hence, exactly as in the case
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examples irlvo!ving an "ergative"verb embedded under a causative
verb, (21) and (2/) are predicted to be wellformed,
provided of course, under our assumptions about fare, that in (22)
as risultare and essere so fare risultare and fare easere
assign Case to Maria. On the other hand
not only the compatibili ty of .embedded raising verbs with causative
constructions proper, but also the compatibility of embedded
raising verbs with causative constructions of the standard
word order/Case marking type is dubious, as in English (23);
and (23) is obviously predicted to be wellformed , made
in particular as~igning Case to Mary:
(23) a.? I made Mary appear to have won
B. ? I made Mary be arrogant
".."eT\ce it is only natural to assume that ~21},- ~22) alto~~ether are
not quite wellformed fo~ rea.sons other tr..an syntactic, say se.TTlatic reasons;
roughly, it is sematically sound to make something "happen"
but not to make something "seem" or "be",
Notice that there is a degree of dubiousness associated also
with the interaction of causative constructions of the standard
word type and passive embedded verbs, as in English (24),
(~4) bein~ obviously predicted to be wellformed
under the general principles of grammar I '",i tb mad~ :r~ £~d.rticular
assi~ning Case to Peter:
(24) ? I made Peter be invited by Mary
"'aturally t'le ass~ that (24) is not quite wellformed for
reasons other than syntactic, say sematic again. Correspondingly,
we actually expect the differende which seemingly exists
~etween the unacceptability
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of examples like (19) and (20) and the oddity of examples like
(24); and the similar difference which seems to exist
between examples like (19) and examples like (21) within French
and examples like(20) and examples like (22) within Italian.
Finally, we consider again a class of complicated I
examples of causative constructions proper and one without
variation across lanquages, the class of examples involving
interaction of causative constructions proper and cliticization. To begin with,
1" a causative construction proper a clitic fran the embedded subject or
"inverted" sUbject or object posi tion associated wi th the causative verb
(or its auxiliaries), as in French (25)-(26) and Italian (27)-(28);
where the clitia is the anbedded object in (26) and (28) and the embedded subject
or "inverted" subject in (25) and (27), i~ particular a da t i ve sub j eo t
in (25a), (25c) and (27a), (270) and an accusative subject
otherwise:
(25) a. Je lui ai fait ~crire une lettre
I her made write a letter
b. Je l'ai faite ecrire
I her made write
c. Je lui ai fait ecrire
I her made write
d. Je lea! faite rire
I her made laugh
e. Je lea! faite partir
I her made go
(26) a. Je l'ai faite ecrire a Marie
I it made write Marie
b. Je I'ai faite ecrire par Marie
I It made write by Marie
c. Je l'ai faite ecrire
I it made write
(27) a. Le feci scrivere una lettera
Her I-made write a letter
b. La feci scrivere
Her I-made write
c. Le feci scrivere
Her I-made write
d. La feci ridere
Her I-made laugh
e. La feci andare
Her I-made go
(28) a. La feci scrivere a Maria
It I-made write Maria
b. La feci scrivere da Maria
It I-made write by Maria
c. La feci scrivere
It I-made write
Suppose we assume that in general a clitia and a pro the clitia
identifies must a-command each other, equivalently that the verb
the clitic is associated with must gove~n the p~o the clitia
identifies; and more in particular that in a set of verbs
c-commanding each other, hence all g9verning the
same elements, the verb a clitia is associated with must
be the first or highest of the set. It is easy to see that,cn
the one hand, these assumptions are indep~ndently needed to
account for the simple fact that a clitia is generally associated
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with the verb whose Case the clitia ends up with, or with
the highest/first one of the auxiliaries associated with the
verb, if any; on the other hand under these assumptions the
interaction of subject and object clitics and causative construc-
tions proper also straightforwardly follows. Consider
first (26) or (28). In (26), where ai fait reanaly~es with
ecrire, and in (28) where feci reanalyzes with scrivere,
ecrire/scrivere and faira/fare a-command each other and govern
each the embedded object; and,of the two, fai~~/fare obviously
is the first or highest one. Hence in (26) and (28) the clitic la
which identifies a pro in the embedded object position,
rnus't be associated wi th ai fait/feci. Consider then (25) or (27);
needless to say, the same can be repeated if only subject, or
"inverted" subject, is substi tuted for object and lui eventually
for la. Thus the interaction of cliticization from the embedded
subject or object and causative constructions proper
follows indeed straightforwardly under our assumptions. Now,
as the embedded subject or objec~ in a causative construction
proper an embedded complement generally cliticizes on the
causative verb (or its auxiliaries); which as in the case of
an embedded subject or object follows strai~htforwardly under
our assumptions. In the case of an embedded complement, however,
there seem to be a number of exceptions. For example,
cliticization of an embedded dative complement on a causative
verb is unacceptable in presence of an embedded
dative subject, as in French (29) and Italian (30),
though obviously French (29), Italian (30) and
similar examples are perfectly wellformed if the clitic is
taken to be the dative embedded subject and the dative
phrase the embedded complement:
(29) a. * Je lui ai fait ecrire une lettre a Marie
I to-him made write a letter Marie
c. * Je lui ai fait ecrire a Marie
I to-him made write Marie
(30) a. * Gli feci scrivere una lettera a Maria
To-him I-made write a letter Maria
c. * Gli feci scrivere a Maria
To-him I-made write Maria
r~a turally , our contention is ~tthe ungramrnaticality or
oddity of (29) (30) and the like does not count against our
assumptions; rather examples like (29) and (30) are less
than good on grounds other than syntactic. Notice indeed ~t all sUPIX>-
sed principled accounts of (29) - (30) and the like, essentially
Kayne's (1975) and Rouveret & Vergnaud's (1980), rely on some
version of the Specified Subject Condition,orof Opacity
or of binding condi tion A, as applied to the em)"; ty ca tegory left behind b
cliticization. But the unacceptability of (29) and (30) is exactly
reprcx:luced if in (29) and (30) wh-movement is substituted for
cliticization, 88 in French (31) and Italian (32); and obviously
the empty ca tegoxy left behind by wh-roovement is not subject to binding
condition A:
--ll~ ..
(31) a. * L'homrne a qui j'ai fait ecrire une lettre
The man to whom I made write a letter
a Marie
Marie
b. * L'homme a qui j'ai fait ecrire a Marie
The man to whom I made write Marie
(32) a. * L'uorno a cui feci scrivere una lettera
The man to whom I-made write a letter
a Maria
Maria
b. * L'uomo a cui feci scrivere a Maria
The man to whom I-made write Maria
Hence a Specified Subject Condition or Opacity or binding account
of (29)- (30) and the like actually loses credibility and
correspondingly an use-oriented account gains
some, especial~y in view of the fact that, again,
(29) and (30) as well as (31) ar4d (32) are perfectl:r well-
formed if the clitic is taken to be the dative embedded subject
and the dative phrase the embedded complement. Ultirneltely then
if tills, and some more, is the case, we can conclude that
all the various types of interactions between causative
constructions proper and cliticizarion, in French and in Italian
alike, indeed follow from our assumptions or else behave
anomaluously on grounds other than syntactic.
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